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Preface
This study was initially commissioned in October 1993 by the UK Department of
Social Security, to inform its understanding of social assistance schemes in the
member states of the European Union and a number of other relevant countries.
The original proposal was to include in the study the then 12 countries of the
European Union, plus Norway and Sweden as likely future members. together with
the English-speaking group of developed countries consisting of the USA. Canada.
Australia and New Zealand. In the course of initial information gathering, contact
was made with the Social Policy Division of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). They expressed interest in the research being
extended to the six member countries not already covered by the study and after
consultations between the two sponsoring bodies, and with the six member
governments, a further contract was agreed. Shortly after the research was
commissioned it was discovered that Professor Ian Gough of the University of
Manchester had received a social science fellowship from the Nuffield Foundation
to pursue a similar study, on a smaller scale but including some of the non-EU
countries. Once the OECD participation was confirmed it was agreed that it would
be mutually beneficial for the two projects to co-operate.
The results of the research are presented in two volumes. The second volume
presents separate country-by-country descriptions of assistance schemes and their
place within social security more widely, with trend data on claimant numbers and
expenditure and brief discussions of policy issues current in each country. This
volume provides a synthesis of comparative and analytical material organised by
themes.
Any views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of
participating governments, nor those of either the UK Department of Social
Security or the OECD.
University of York
August 1995
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Executive Summary
Chapter L Introduction
Objectives
The study is concerned with the ways in which countries provide a guarantee of
minimum resources to residents who lack sufficient income from other sources. The
research was commissioned originally by the UK Department of Social Security to
cover the then 12 member countries of the European Union, plus Australia,
Canada, Norway, New Zealand. Sweden and the USA (taking four states as
examples). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) provided additional funding for the study to be extended to the remaining
six OECD member countries (Austria. Finland. Iceland. Japan, Switzerland and
Turkey).
`Social assistance' does not have a precise definition internationally. For the
purposes of the study, it is defined as the range of benefits and services available to
guarantee a minimum (however defined) level of subsistence to people in need,
based on a test of resources. In some countries a key element of the social safety
net comes through non-contributory citizens' benefits or pensions. These are not
discussed in detail unless they are also resource-tested.
The study also distinguishes between benefits described as `poverty-tested' (that is,
aimed at providing a minimum income. which is often regarded as a de facto
poverty line) and other income-related or means-tested benefits which may have a
different purpose, or are withdrawn at a higher income level.
The aims of the study were:
• to provide detailed country-by-country descriptions of the structure of
social assistance schemes, with data on expenditure and claimant numbers,
recent policy developments and proposals. and an assessment of overall
performance. This information is provided mainly in Volume Two
• to provide a comparative analysis of trend data: the legal and
administrative structures of assistance schemes; and policy debates and
issues affecting the development of social assistance
• to analyse the comparative value of assistance payments, their components
and their implicit incentive structures.
Specific issues to be addressed included:
• conditions of entitlement
• coverage
• benefit levels
• operation of means tests
• administration, regulation and finance
• fraud control
• emergency and lump-sum payments
• benefits in kind. 'passported' benefits and exemptions
▪ help with housing costs
• the relationship between means-tested and other benefits
• the role of non-governmental or ganisations and 'poverty lobbies'.
Research methods'
Research was carried out using two networks of national informants. one
consisting of senior officials in national ministries and agencies, and the other of
experts recruited from universities or independent research institutes. The latter
completed a 'model family income matrix'. to allow comparison of the value of
assistance benefts, both between countries and within them in relation to insurance
benefits and earnings.
Information obtained from the two networks was put in context by reviewing
national and comparative literature on social assistance, poverty and income
distribution.
Purchasing power parities (PPPs) were used in the comparison of expenditure and
to assess the relative value of benefits across countries. PPPs have some limitations,
but are generally seen to be a more satisfactory measure than exchange rates.
Within different classifications of approaches to comparative research, the study
can be seen as primarily a 'system-by-system° analysis (Hauser. 1993). or a 'micro
study of policy inputs' (Bradshaw, 1994).
Why study social assistance?
There is growing international interest in selective and targeted approaches to
social protection. Research has identified substantial levels of 'new poverty' in EL
member countries, partly related to limitations in insurance-based protection in the
context of long-term unemployment and social change. The view that high levels of
social security expenditure damage economic effort has also become more
influential internationally, and financial institutions working in the transitional
economies of Eastern Europe have been calling for the establishment of means-
tested safety nets as a key element in anti-poverty strategies.
There is a need to understand to what extent reliance on assistance has been
increasing. what patterns have emerged in how schemes are organised, and how
successful policy approaches to common problems have been. Some previous
research has been carried out comparing social assistance schemes in selected
countries, but no studies have been mounted on the scale reported here.
Chapter 2. Social assistance across the OECD: patterns and trends
A taxonomy c social assistance
There are three basic mechanisms by which the state can directly allocate income
or services to individuals or households:
`universal' or contingency benefits, not related to income or employment
status, allocated to all citizens within a certain social category
® social insurance, where the benefit is related to employment status and
contributions paid
• means-tested or income-related benefits, where eligibility is dependent
upon the current or recent resources of the beneficiary.
Within resource-tested programmes, the study makes three distinctions:
• between 'poverty-tested' benefits, and `general means- or income-tested
benefits'. The latter may go to people well above any poverty line
• between `cash - and `tied' benefits. The latter cover reductions in costs for
specific services. the most important of which is housing
® between schemes open to all people within a certain income group and
those for specific categories. such as older or disabled people.
The study concentrates on benefits aimed at guaranteeing minimum incomes, but
the structures of benefit in countries like Australia and New Zealand_ which extend
beyond the poverty line_ require also the inclusion of benefits performing similar
functions in the U.K, the USA and some other European countries. `Social
assistance' in the report therefore includes:
• general assistance providing cash benefits for all or most people below a
specified minimum income level
• categorical assistance - providing cash benefits for specific groups
(sometimes at a level above the minimum)
® tied assistance - providing free or subsidised access to specific goods or
services. either in kind or in cash. This is further divided into housing
assistance and other tied assistance.
Expenditure on social assistance
Data on social assistance expenditure are problematic: definitions of what
constitutes social assistance expenditure vary and accurate national estimates are
not always available. Estimates are presented of expenditure on social assistance as
proportions of GDP. `social protection' and `social security' (as estimated by the
OECD).
As a proportion of GDP, total spending on social assistance in 1992 ranged from
0.1 per cent in Greece. which has no general assistance scheme, to 13 per cent in
New Zealand, where virtually all benefits are resource-tested. Categorical assistance
for specific groups is more important than general programmes in most continental
EU member countries. while housin g assistance is particularly important in the
UK, France and Sweden.
All types of welfare regime exhibited a rising share of expenditure on means-tested
schemes in the 1980s -- a notable convergence of otherwise disparate national
patterns. Proportionately, the fastest growth in spending took place in the Nordic
countries. though from a low base. Only Japan and Switzerland appear not to have
spent a higher proportion of overall social security spending on social assistance
between 1980 and 1992.
Recipients of social assistance
Comparative estimates of the number of people receiving social assistance are also
problematic_ for reasons similar to those for expenditure. Estimates are given of the
total numbers of beneficiaries (including dependants) as a proportion of total
populations.
Overall. the English-speaking countries operate the most extensive social assistance
programmes. Those with the Iowest numbers receiving assistance include Greece.
Japan. Portugal, Spain and Switzerland. In terms of general unified assistance
schemes, the UK stands out. delivering Income Support to more than 15 per cent
of the population in 1992. When categorical schemes are included. Australia and
New Zealand predominate, and Ireland also joins the high-coverage group.
The majority of countries recorded a substantial expansion in beneficiary
populations between 1980 and 1992, particularly the UK. Canada. Ireland,
Germany and the Nordic countries. The proportionate increase was greatest in the
Scandinavian countries (except Sweden, though numbers there have grown rapidly
since 1992).
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Data breaking down recipients into comparable categories are particularly difficult
to obtain. However, generally speaking, old age is a diminishing reason for people
to claim means-tested benefits. both in absolute and relative terms. All countries
except Japan appear to have a growing demand for assistance payments on the
basis of disability. partly because of more generous provision and partly, in some
countries, as a substitute for inadequate unemployment protection.
Lone parents make up a disproportionate and growing proportion of the claimant
population in many countries, though lone parents' likelihood of being on social
assistance is linked to other policies on labour market participation and to the
existence of other forms of special provision.
Despite sparse data. unemployment (especially long-term unemployment) appears
overall to be the principal cause of the rising social assistance clientele since 1980,
especially in the English-speaking countries, except the USA.
In most countries, between half and two-third of claimants are single people, and
only around one-third on average have children. Benefit units headed by women,
including lone mothers and single women, make up between one-third and 60 per
cent of recipients overall.
Chapter 3. The structure and principles of social assistance schemes
Chapter Three compares the structure of the benefits and the rules governing
eligibility and entitlement. It considers how far common principles and practices
can be discerned across the schemes.
Issues examined include:
• underlying principles
• conditions of eligibility
t conditions of entitlement and resource testing
• help with housing costs
• meeting exceptional needs.
Although the basic principles informing different schemes are not dissimilar, the
realisation of these principles in practical policy varies considerably. The first
major distinction is whether minimum income guarantees are provided across the
board, through a generalised scheme, or whether people's needs are addressed
within different categorical population groups. At present, the preference of the
majority of countries is still to offer protection by category.
The minimum age threshold for most general schemes is 18 years, unless young
people have or are about to have children_ or face particular hardship.
More than half the countries studied have some prior residence conditions, as well
as limiting the availability of help for refugees and asylum seekers.
Most countries take into account only the resources of the claimant, and the
partner in the case of couples. In a few countries, however, expectations of family
support extend further, at least in principle. These include Austria, Germany.
Japan and Switzerland. By contrast. a small number of countries. mainly in the
Nordic group, do not always take into account the resources of a cohabiting
partner unless the couple are married.
There is also wide variation in the level and type of earnings, other income and
assets discounted in the means test, though most take into account child
maintenance payments. Overall. the strictest means tests are found in the
Scandinavian countries, plus Austria and Switzerland.
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The various combinations of approaches to means-testing can sometimes appear
paradoxical. For example, the Nordic countries tend to combine strict means tests
with liberal approaches to cohabitation rules, while countries like Austria and
Switzerland may expect claimants to seek support from their wider family, but still
offer relatively generous benefits. These paradoxes can partly be explained by
looking at different countries' traditions, in terms of expectations of family
support, the emphasis placed on work incentives, their attitudes to cohabitation
and lone parenthood and the relative importance of assistance schemes in the wider
income maintenance systems.
As regards approaches to the benefit and resources unit, it is interesting to note the
relative uniformity. With a number of exceptions where wider family obligations
have retained a strong legal foundation. the nuclear family is the norm, in spite of
some tentative moves towards forms of individualisation. Efforts to shift obligation
back on to the wider family seem to be unsuccessful where it has been attempted.
Most countries meet some or all of the housing costs of people with incomes low
enough to receive social assistance, usually including owner-occupiers as well as
tenants. The main distinction is between those countries which provide help as part
of a general social assistance payment (and only for assistance recipients) and those
with a general housing benefit scheme open to people on low incomes generally.
Virtually all countries have some arrangements for meeting exceptional needs,
through combinations of loans and grants. These are frequently discretionary, but
the level of debate generated by such provision in the UK appears to be
exceptional.
Chapter 4. Administration and delivery of social assistance benefits
Centre-local responsibilities
All social assistance schemes have complex administrative structures, but there are
important differences between countries in how benefits are organised and
delivered. The main contrast is between countries like Australia and the UK, which
have integrated and national schemes with common rules of eligibility and payment
levels, and those such as Italy, Norway and Switzerland, where both administrative
responsibility and decisions about levels of benefit payable are devolved almost
entirely to the local level.
Some of the latter countries face a dilemma: it is usually those regions or local
authorities with the lowest potential funding capacity which have the highest
demand on social assistance. In these countries, funding is generally split
proportionately between central and local governments. Outside the centrally-
organised systems, the trend is towards greater devolvement of powers towards
regional or local authorities and reductions or restraint in central funding. The new
funding structure set to replace the Canada Assistance Plan from .1996 provides a
key example. On the other hand, there is also pressure in several of the
Scandinavian countries in particular, and in Switzerland to a lesser extent, for
greater national standardisation of benefit levels.
The chapter compares arrangements for the administration and delivery of benefit
as follows:
• making a claim and receiving a payment
• procedures for verification of identity
• computerisation of benefit delivery
• fraud prevention and control
• recovery of overpayments
• provision for payment of benefit to third parties
5
s the role of social workers
s the role of non-governmental organisations
s quality and scrutiny of administration.
Of necessity, all social assistance schemes are complex. as they seek to adjust to the
diverse and changing needs of claimants on the one hand and the interests of tax
payers and employers on the other. Aspects of the administrative process. such as
methods of application and payment, reporting requirements on claimants and
recovery of overpayments, seem, at least in principle. broadly similar in most
countries. There is considerable disparity in the extent to which fraud and abuse
are regarded as serious problems in social assistance. and in the measures adopted
to administer it. This variation correlates broadly to the size of assistance schemes.
In the larger, centralised systems such as in Australia and new Zealand, increasing
use is made of sophisticated computer data-matching technology. but even in the
smaller schemes in Scandinavia and elsewhere_ assistance authorities have
considerable access to other databases.
More research needs to be undertaken looking in detail at the practicalities of
administration 'on the ground' in the different countries, in order to understand
the role of administration and benefit delivery in the translation of policy
objectives into outcomes.
Chapter 5. Benefit rates, adequacy and take-up: national debates
The construction of social assistance scales
In more than half the countries studied benefit rates are set nationally, whether
social assistance is locally administered or not. Austria, Canada, Norway, Spain
and :Italy (for the local Minima Vitale} are the only countries where both
administration and the setting of rates are entirely the responsibility of the
provinces or municipalities.
In most countries, uprating of benefits takes place annually, though in a few it
takes place more often. Benefits are most commonly uprated in line with
movements in the consumer prices index. Exceptions include Austria, Denmark
and Finland. where benefits are linked to an earnings index or another benefit: and
Germany-, which uses an index of the expenditure of the lower third of the income
distribution. The formula used for uprating is not necessarily related to the way
benefits were set in the first place.
Debates about poverty and the level of benefits
How much poverty is debated as an issue varies between countries. Factors which
influence the level of debate include the extent to which recent economic problems
have resulted in noticeable increases in deprivation, and the effectiveness of
political parties or lobby groups at drawing public attention to the issues. There is
not necessarily a correlation, however, between intensity of debates on poverty and
actual levels of either absolute poverty or inequality.
Debates within the EU member countries have often focused on 'new poverty`
identified with certain population groups amongst whom poverty has become more
prevalent as a result of recession, social and demographic change and labour
market restructuring. Emphasis on economic poverty is often seen as too narrow
an approach, however. ' Social exclusion' is regarded as better capturing the
broader deprivation which can result from inability to participate in the
mainstream life of the citizen. It implies that effective action should encompass
more than simply cash income maintenance.
In southern Europe debate has mainly focused on developing guaranteed minimum
incomes in line with other EU countries, though discussion has tended to founder
on the economic practicalities of such provision.
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The terms of debate have been somewhat different in the Scandinavian countries,
where concern has been largely about inequality rather than poverty as such. In
both Norway and Sweden, arguments have centred on the advantages of uniform
national rates and regulation versus local and individualised discretion.
A theme which has been particularly salient in the USA, and to a lesser extent in
the UK. has been that of benefit dependency and work incentives. In both
countries assistance benefits are central to their systems of social protection. The
`underclass' debate has also had some resonance in the other English-speaking
countries.
The Labor Government in Australia has been engaged in a high profile `Social
Justice Strategy', of which income support benefits are a key element. This includes
concentrating resources on lower income families, in order to combat child
poverty, through a combination of increased payments and tighter eligibility
criteria. This was also one of the aims of the UK's benefit reforms in 1988, but one
key difference has been the establishment in Australia of an official working party
to research benchmarks of adequacy for benefit payments. By contrast, debate on
poverty in New Zealand has been revived as a result of policies of economic
liberalisation_ involving direct and substantial reductions in some benefits and
increases in charges for services.
The existence of organised campaigns and lobby groups appears to be one
important element in whether poverty and social assistance are matters of public
debate, even though these groups are often judged to have only limited influence.
There are some distinctions between countries in terms of whether ' poverty lobbies'
consist primarily of secular welfare rights organisations, often dependent on central
or local government for funding, or whether the leading role is played by church-
based groups and charities.
Whether benefits are adequate is largely a subjective question. and the extent of
research both on measures of adequacy and on views and attitudes varies
considerably across countries. The chapter summarises in tabular form the limited
information available for different countries. In most countries. the degree of
debate about adequacy reflects to some extent the salience of social assistance in
the social security system. Where social assistance is more important, it appears
that there is more concern about adequacy and more information on the subject.
These countries include. as well as Australia and the UK, Ireland. New Zealand
and the USA. In those countries where social assistance levels are highly variable
or locally determined. there is naturally more difficulty in examining the issue of
adequacy.
Take-up of means-tested benefits
Whether or not benefit rates are considered to be sufficient to live on, means-tested
benefits are only likely to be effective against poverty if people who are entitled to
claim them do so. It has long been a criticism of means-tested benefits that take-up
is often low compared to that for other types of benefit. Other research has
suggested that, with the exception of in the UK, the non-take-up of social security
benefits has been a particularly neglected topic. This observation was supported by
the information provided by national informants for this study. Less than a quarter
of the countries were able to provide any recent estimates of take-up and the basis
of these was not always clear.
Chapter 6. The level and structure of social assistance payments
This chapter compares the level and structure of social assistance payments using
the 'model family income matrix' data.
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Methods
This method draws on the technique developed in a previous study at the
University of York on child support in 15 countries (Bradshaw et al„ 1993). Ten
examples were chosen to illustrate the range of types of families that might be
dependent on social assistance benefits. Information was collected on three benefit
`packages:
• social assistance - representing the `worst case scenario' for all families
• social insurance --- representing the benefits payable if the model individuals
and families were entitled to insurance-based unemployment benefits or
pensions. under specified conditions
• the working case -- assuming that specified family members were working
for average male production worker earnings.
Calculation of the packages required a common framework of analysis, with
specification of:
• housing costs
• local taxes
• health costs
• education and child-care costs.
Housing costs are particularly problematic in comparative research, especially in
relation to social assistance, which may or may not include elements for housing.
The necessary assumptions made have to be borne in mind in interpreting the
results of this analysis. In most analyses, results are presented both before and after
housing costs.
Limitations of the model family' approach
There are several inevitable limitations to this method. It simulates how systems
should work rather than how they actually do, and cannot include the behavioural
effect of the policies simulated. The more assumptions are made about families in
order to create comparability, the less representative they become of real
populations. Also, for countries with locally- or individually- determined benefit
rates, the figures used are the best estimates available of amounts payable in
specified locations. They cannot necessarily be seen as representative of the
countries as a whole.
The results of the income matrix analysis
Analysis of the structure of social assistance packages in May 1992 shows that for
most countries recipients did not have to pay tax or social security contributions,
but in about half they had to make small payments for health costs. In a number
of countries additional 'tied' assistance payments were available, such as Food
Stamps in the USA and an allowance for electricity in Ireland. Housing costs had a
substantial impact, consuming a large element of social assistance payments in
several countries, whereas in others, including the UK. recipients had little or no
housing costs to pay.
Comparing the level of net disposable income at the social assistance level shows
that for a couple with two children, the UK came 15th in the ranking of countries
before housing costs and eighth after housing costs. Payments, after housing costs,
ranged from £21 (533) per month, in purchasing power parities, in Portugal to £544
(51,024) per month in Iceland.
Examination of the implied equivalence scales in social assistance shows that
countries' relative position in a ranking changes for different family types. Most
countries provided relatively larger assistance benefits to people over retirement
age: Canada, France, Greece and the USA were notably more generous to people
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above retirement age. Some did not vary their social assistance payments between
those below and above pension age, while a few countries appeared to pay higher
benefits to working-age single people and couples than to pensioners. These
differences did not appear to follow any obvious pattern, though they may be
related to the level of benefits available from old-age insurance pensions.
There were also considerable variations in the ratios of payments to single people
compared to couples. for children of different ages. and for lone parents compared
to couples with children.
A composite ranking, based on percentages from the mean for nine family types,
puts Iceland at the top, after housing costs, heading a group including the Nordic
countries, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Australia, all with levels more than
20 per cent above the mean. Next comes a group of countries led by the UK and
including the USA (New York), Japan, France, Canada and Germany. Finally,
there is a third group, all with social assistance levels more than ten per cent below
the mean, including Belgium. New Zealand, the three other US states and the
southern European countries.
Comparing the level of social assistance with average gross earnings, before
housing costs, has the effect of improving the relative position of France, Finland
and Sweden - all countries where average gross earnings are relatively low because
high employer contributions constitute a deferred social wage.
Comparison with social insurance payments gives a picture of the `contributions
trap' for pensioners and illustrates the potential impact on family incomes when
unemployment insurance runs out. Before housing costs, ratios varied
considerably, both between countries and within countries by the type of family.
Excluding Australia and New Zealand, which have no insurance benefits, the
Nordic countries had particularly high ratios, followed by the UK and Ireland.
After housing costs, ratios were generally higher because housing benefits are more
generous to families on social assistance than on social insurance.
Overall, the highest levels of benefit appeared to be awarded in Switzerland (more
specifically in Fribourg, since payments vary throughout the country),
Luxembour g . the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and Australia. Among this
group, the Nordic countries and Switzerland have common characteristics - they
have relatively high levels of GDP, traditionally low levels of unemployment, and
social assistance schemes which are residual and locally administered. They also all
have strict means tests, while in the Nordic countries there are limited capital or
earnings disregards and an emphasis on encouraging claimants to return to the
labour market. These common features suggest that countries can sustain higher
levels of social assistance provision when they support only a small number of
claimants.
Chapter 7. Social assistance, work and incentives
This chapter provides an overview of features of social assistance arrangements
which might influence labour supply behaviour, including how long people might
be entitled to unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance and social
assistance generally; job search activity tests and sanctions; insertion and
integration programmes; and other incentives. Calculations are presented of
replacement ratios and effective marginal tax rates.
Selected background labour force data are also given for the OECD countries in
1992. Unemployment rates ranged between 1.5 per cent in Luxembourg and just
over 18 per cent in Spain. Since 1992 unemployment has fallen in most of the
English-speaking countries and risen particularly in Finland, Sweden and Spain.
Rates of long-term unemployment vary considerably and are not always correlated
with the unemployment rate as a whole.
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Variations in conditions and coverage of unemployment insurance means that the
percentages of assistance recipients who are unemployed and in the labour market
also differ substantially between countries. Data are limited, but it is estimated that
in 1992 the proportions varied from relatively few in Luxembourg and Portugal to
about a third in the UK, half in Canada and Ireland, two thirds in the Netherlands
and nearly all in Sweden. About two-thirds of social assistance recipients in the
Nordic countries are young single persons who have not established an entitlement
to insurance benefits. By contrast, in the UK, couples with children are the largest
group of unemployed recipients of social assistance.
Duration of assistance
Entitlement to unemployment insurance can vary from none or a few months only.
to indefinite periods for older workers in some countries. Belgium and the
Netherlands appear to have the longest entitlement, if claimants have had sufficient
recent employment. Duration of social assistance is generally unlimited where
needs continue, except for specific benefits for young people in some countries. In
Austria. Denmark, Italy, Spain (outside Madrid). Switzerland and Turkey.
duration of payments is discretionary, and an assumption exists that assistance is
intended only for limited periods.
Evidence on duration of receipt is patchy and not always comparable, but that
available is presented in a table.
Job search requirements
In the majority of countries, recipients are required to register as unemployed and
to establish that they are actively looking for work, unless exempted. In a few
countries, the requirement to seek work is not a formal rule. but there are strong
expectations that individuals will make full use of their capacities. Work tests can
also be applied implicitly through the basic conditions of eligibility. In several
states of the USA, for example, General Assistance is not available to able-bodied
single people or couples without children.
In virtually all countries, work tests are less strict for people who are ill or
disabled, or who are over or approaching retirement age. The major variations
relate to lone parents. in particular to the age of children who exempt lone parents
from the requirement to seek work. The most liberal provisions apply in Ireland.
the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. where lone parents are not
required to seek work until their youn gest child is 16 years (or older).
Requirements vary across provinces of Canada from the most restrictive (six
months) to the more generous (12 years). Germany is also relatively liberal in this
respect, as lone parents must normally seek part-time work when their youngest
child is at school or in nursery education, and full-time work when the child is 14
or over. In Norway, lone parents receiving the Transitional Allowance are not
required to seek work until the youngest child turns ten years of age. In
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the qualifying age is six years and five years
respectively. In Austria and Finland, the qualifying age is three years. while in
Sweden the age threshold is being liberalised from about 15 months to three years.
In both Sweden and Denmark, however, which have the highest expectations that
lone parents will seek work, municipalities are required to provide child care for
lone parents seeking work. In France, expectations that lone parents receiving the
RMI will engage in insertion activities vary between departements.
Most schemes have sanctions against claimants who fail to satisfy work tests.
though it is not clear how often these are applied.
A range of work incentive schemes also operate in some countries, including
disregards of income in the means-tests, lump-sum back-to-work allowances, and
loans and grants for work expenses or self-employed business start-up.
Municipalities are obliged to provide special employment schemes in Belgium.
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden.
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Benefit replacement rates
Taking account of earnings disregards. replacement ratios were calculated for the
model families, comparing disposable income on social assistance in 1992 with that
on average male production wages. There are difficulties with this analysis. which
are spelled out in the chapter.
For single people and couples (aged 35 years), replacement rates before housing
costs were very low in Greece and in Texas and in Florida in the USA. They were
also quite low in Pennsylvania, Germany, Canada (for single people), and the
United Kingdom. Replacement rates were highest in Switzerland (Fribourg).
Sweden, the Netherlands. Norway (Oslo) and Denmark. For couples with children
the highest replacement rates were in the same countries (plus Australia). For most
other countries the presence of children raises the replacement rate sharply. In
general, replacement rates in the UK were around two-thirds of the way down the
overall 'league table'.
Replacement rates for tone parents were generally lower than for couples with
children if the lone parent did not have to pay for child care when working. The
exceptions were Belgium. Portugal and Switzerland. If the working lone parent had
to pay for child-care because of the presence of a child under the age of three. her
replacement rate increased compared with a one-earner couple not requiring child
care.
In general_ replacement rates rise where there is additional help with housing costs
for families on social assistance - substantially in some countries.
Average effective tax rates and the poverty- trap
The other component of an economic analysis of work incentives is the substitution
effect associated with the withdrawal of benefits. This is usually analysed as the
`effective marginal tax rate' (EMTR), estimated as the sum of the withdrawal rate
on benefits, its interaction with any other form of benefit withdrawal. plus tax
liabilities. EMTRs are usually estimated for a small change in labour supply at the
margin.
In this chapter, average effective tax rates (AEMTRs) are calculated. estimated
over the range of income between zero and average male earnings. This is a more
realistic illustration of the choices available to individuals, who generally cannot
vary their work effort by small increments. The measure provides an indication of
any disincentive effects of moving from unemployment to full-time paid work.
Effective tax rates are lowest where benefit levels are lowest, since there is less
assistance to be withdrawn. Correspondingly. effective tax rates are highest where
benefits are relatively high, and exceed 100 per cent in those countries where
replacement rates also exceeded 100 per cent. Effective tax rates are higher for
those without children than for those with children, although in many cases they
are lower for lone parents than for unemployed couples with children. In a number
of countries. child care costs add to effective tax rates. Housing costs also increase
effective tax rates in all countries apart from Portugal, Spain, and the USA. The
UK. in this respect, performs relatively well. with rates below the average for most
family types.
Social assistance schemes commonly impose a range of work-seeking requirements
on recipients, and many offer incentives to return to work. Nevertheless many of
the schemes involve high effective marginal tax rates which could, theoretically at
least, act as a disincentive to labour force participation.
There is no clear association between the level of replacement rates or the
stringency of work tests and the level of unemployment. If anything, there is a
tendency for the countries paying higher social assistance benefits to have tougher
work tests and lower levels of unemployment.
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Chapter S. Diverse systems, common destination?
Patterns of social assistance
The extent and generosity of schemes are not correlated. Extensive social assistance
schemes in the English-speaking countries deliver relatively generous benefits in
Australia and low benefits in the USA. There are similar variations among those
countries with low or modest reliance on social assistance.
Looking at key features of social assistance schemes, including coverage and
expenditure. level of benefits, administrative structure, operation of the means-test,
work tests and degrees of officer discretion, it is possible to identify at least seven
`social assistance regimes':
• Seiectivc~ welfare systems: Australia and New Zealand
• The public assistance state: the USA
• Welfare states with integrated safety nets: the UK. Canada, Ireland and
Germany
• Dual social assistance: France and the Benelux countries
• Rudimentary assistance: Southern Europe and Turkey
• Residual social assistance: the Nordic countries
• Highly decentralised assistance with local discretion Austria and
Switzerland.
Japan is difficult to place in this typology, as it shares features of several of the
categories.
Debates and policy initiatives
The English-speaking countries with extensive social assistance schemes report a
range of issues in common, including the costs of assistance, work disincentives
and fraud. In all these countries, except the USA, the high level of unemployment
is also a continuing cause for concern.
Welfare dependency and the `underclass' debate appears to be a defining feature
mainly of the stigmatising public assistance system of the USA.
A variety of other concerns feature in debates in different countries, including the
rights of immigrants and asylum seekers to social assistance benefits, payment for
long-term care of the frail elderly (particularly in Germany and Austria), and the
role of social workers in increasingly income maintenance-oriented assistance
schemes (especially in the Scandinavian countries).
There is some debate also in the countries with localised schemes about whether to
move towards more nationally-standardised regulations and benefit levels.
Common pressures and national responses
Pressures driving policy change in the area of social assistance can be seen as
falling into two groups: first those deriving from forces external to the structure of
benefit systems themselves, and secondly those resulting from internal features of
policy systems.
New demands from external forces:
• demography
• changing family structures
• labour market change
• rising housing and fuel cost problems.
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Pressures from within policy systems:
A number of related pressures which impact on social assistance policy stem from
within the structure of social security systems themselves. These include:
• the breakdown of traditional social insurance coverage
• pressures on public expenditure
• tensions between central and local governments over costs
• public sector staffing.
A key concern has been how to make welfare systems more compatible with
changing labour markets. Policies can be grouped into 'carrots' and `sticks'.
`Carrots' include reducing the withdrawal rate of benefits as earnings rise,
providing education, training and work experience programmes for jobless
claimants, and extending child care and other benefits to enable claimants with
caring responsibilities to combine these with paid work. 'Sticks' include enhanced
monitoring of able-bodied claimants, stricter tests of job-search activity, time-
limited benefits and reductions in relative benefit levels.
Policy approaches vary across the major forms of assistance regime identified
above. They can be grouped into four sets for this purpose:
• Countries with a past record of Cull or near-full employment (the Nordic
countries, Switzerland, Austria and Japan): work incentives have been a
relatively minor feature of debate (though this is changing in Denmark and
Sweden).
• The limited social assistance regimes of southern Europe, includin g
Turkey: here the debate on labour market disincentives within assistance
itself is less relevant. Social assistance for the able-bodied of working age is
vestigial and its impact on local labour markets likewise slight.
• The remaining Eli member states (excluding the UK and Ireland): here a
growing concern with 'new poverty' and social exclusion in the 1980s has
fuelled experiments with 'integration' programmes. These have all targeted
young unemployed people and tied improved benefit levels to insertion in
training and work experience schemes. In the Netherlands, there has been
some tightening of work requirements for lone parents. Germany has not
developed special insertion schemes, preferring to rely on its established
training mechanisms.
• The extensive social assistance states of the English-speaking world
(including bi-lingual Canada): it is in these countries that the relation
between assistance and the labour market has assumed greater importance
in policy debates. Ireland is an exception, with few major proposals or
policy changes. New Zealand has opted for a variety of measures to make
claiming less attractive, notably absolute reductions in benefit levels.
Other countries in this group have adopted a mixture of carrot and stick,
including partial individualisation of income support for couples
(Australia); a substantial extension of Earned Income Tax Credit in the
USA; extra disregards within Family Credit and a package of back-to-
work provisions, plus reduction in the insurance element of unemployment
payments_ under the new Jobseeker's Allowance (the UK). The sticks have
also included more intensive requirements for job-search activity in all
these countries. Following the mid-term elections in the USA. debate and
policy proposals on welfare have become more punitive.
Overall, the pattern of response to common economic pressures is complex. The
prominence of work incentives in policy debates is certainly greater in countries
with greater reliance on social assistance. Yet even within this group, differences
are noticeable between the Australian selective welfare state and the American
public assistance state.
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Eyahwtiang assistance regimes
The many differences observed in social assistance arrangements across the OECD
raise questions about how schemes could be evaluated on a comparative basis. The
report does not include a full-scale evaluation. as this was not within the study's
remit or resources. Some possible criteria are, however. outlined and discussed.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Objectives
This study is concerned with the ways in which developed societies provide a
guarantee of minimum resources to citizens or residents who lack sufficient income
from other sources. Such forms of protection are often described as constituting a
'safety net', through which people should not have to fall. By implication, if people
without access to other sources of help fail to be caught by the safety net, they are
likely to face poverty or some other manifestation of unmet need although, as the
study shows. safety nets may themselves be set below some definitions of a poverty
line. Not all OECD countries have such a general safety net but, where they do. a
substantial part of the safety net is normally provided through cash benefits or
services available to applicants only where they cannot provide for themselves
that is. through some form of assessment of the resources already available to
them.
Provision of this kind is commonly termed 'social assistance' and is the main focus
of this study. though the term does not have a precise definition internationally.
especially in translation. For example. in some countries, particularly those of the
Nordic group, social assistance is a concept associated not only with income
maintenance but also with social work service and individual treatment or
rehabilitation; whereas in some others it is understood as referring mainly to
discretionary supplementary schemes which are subsidiary to the main means-
tested minimum income benefit. Taking branches of social security or benefits
simply by their names may be misleading, which is one reason why Brown et al.
(19911 have suggested abandoning the term social assistance altogether in
comparative studies. We would argue, however. that the term `social assistance' is
sufficiently meaningful and commonly understood to justify its continued use,
albeit with caveats. Nevertheless. problems of terminology indicate the need to
look at the functions fulfilled by different elements of welfare structures rather than
simply at the nominal systems. Therefore, although we frequently refer to social
assistance, the main subject of enquiry is more accurately the range of benefits and
services available to give a minimum (however defined) level of subsistence to
people in need. based on a test of resources.
Even this definition is not without problems. First, we have stated that safety nets
are mainly provided through social assistance. but there are countries where
minimum income protection for some groups of people, particularly those over
retirement age or disabled, comes through non-contributory 'citizens' benefits or
pensions. awarded without a test of other resources. However. important as these
benefits sometimes are, they are generally not discussed in detail in this study
because the main focus of interest is on the resource-tested elements of the social
safety net.
The second difficulty derives from the role of benefits which are tested against
applicants' resources, but are designed to exclude higher earners rather than to
offer a guaranteed minimum to the lowest income groups. There are examples of
these in several countries, and they often derive from the selective refocusing of
benefits such as family allowances which were previously universal. We deal with
this problem by drawing a distinction between benefits we call 'poverty-tested'
(that is, aimed at providing a minimum which is often regarded as a de facto
poverty line) and those other income- or means-tested benefits which may have a
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different purpose, or may be withdrawn at a much higher income level. This
distinction is elaborated in more detail in the next chapter. However, even with this
approach absolute consistency cannot be achieved, because in some countries there
are important benefits which are resource-tested and available in full when other
income is very low, but which are withdrawn at a rate of less than 100 per cent as
other income increases - often tapering out at a considerably higher level of income
than would allow entitlement to the main social assistance benefit. The UK Family
Credit is a good example. Such benefits are important because. to extend the circus
analogy, they are intended to act less as safety nets than as trampolines or
springboards to help lift beneficiaries back into independence through labour
market participation.
The final problem of definition or terminology concerns the use of 'means-tested',
- income-tested" or `income-related'. and 'asset-tested' to refer to different forms of
resource testing. These terms are sometimes used in the literature loosely or
interchangeably, but they do have different meanings, even if the processes which
they are describing are not always clear cut. In this study income-tested or income-
related benefits are generally taken to be those where the level of benefit to which
an applicant is entitled is based only on an assessment of his or her earnings or
other income (however defined) and where capital or other property and assets are
not taken into account. Some benefits have specific rules relating to the value of
property or other assets which applicants may have and still be entitled to benefit.
and we describe these as assets tests. Where both income and assets are taken into
account, benefits are described as means-tested. This definition of means testing
also encompasses those benefits where there are no specific limits to the amount of
capital or savings an applicant can have, but the savings are deemed to produce a
notional amount of weekly or monthly income which is then counted in the income
test.
The schemes which exist in each country have evolved out. of different traditions
and often in symbiosis with other elements of the particular social security system:
to that extent they are necessarily very different. However, there is evidence that all
systems are facing common structural, social and economic pressures. Moreover
the policy objectives, where these are articulated, may be said to be similar if not
identical.
On the basis of the definitions outlined above, the aims of the study were to
provide:
• a detailed country-by-country description of the structure of social
assistance schemes in the member states of the OECD, together with data
on trends in expenditure and claimant numbers; recent policy
developments and proposals for change under consideration in the
respective countries; and an assessment of the performance of different
schemes, highlighting their strengths and limitations. This information is
provided mainly in Volume Two.
• a comparative analysis of trend data; the legal and administrative
structures of assistance schemes; policy debates and issues affecting the
development of social assistance.
• detailed information on the comparative value of assistance available, with
analysis of its components and implicit incentive structures.
The latter two aims are addressed primarily in this volume.
Within these core aims, the analysis of the different schemes has been structured by
consideration of a number of specific issues. These include:
• conditions of entitlement: such as nationality/residence, age, availability for
work, duration of entitlement
• coverage: inclusion and exclusion, treatment of different population groups
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benefit levels: how these are determined and methods of uprating
s means tests: which and whose resources are counted, earnings disregards
e administration and finance: local/national variations, adjudication,
discretion, appeals, recovery of benefit, changes in circumstances
• fraud: methods of detection and control
• emergency and lump-sum payments
• benefits in kind and ' passported' benefits: exemption from health or other
insurance contributions
• help with housing costs
• the relationship between means-tested and other benefits, and with health
and social care
• the role of `poverty lobbies' in debate and reform of social assistance.
1.2 Research methods
The research for this study was carried out using networks of national expert
informants. The rationale was that informants based in the individual countries
would have access to up-to-date information and recent research studies. and
would be able to comment with authority on policy trends and debates in their
countries. Because the study required both detailed descriptive material on the
formal structure of social assistance schemes and commentary on their practical
effectiveness, it was agreed to use two networks of informants - one consisting of
senior officials in the relevant ministries and agencies, and the other of independent
experts recruited from universities or research institutes.
The first group was asked to complete a pro forma questionnaire covering
structural and legal details of their minimum income schemes, together with
statements of official policy, statistical data on expenditure and claimant numbers,
and summaries of recent or forthcoming changes. The independent experts were
asked to provide a commentary, informed by research and debate in their
countries, on key policy topics in social assistance. They also completed a 'model
family income matrix' to allow comparison of the value of assistance benefits. both
between countries and within countries in comparison with social insurance
benefits and average earnings. The matrix was based on the package of benefits
and charges likely to accrue to a set of 'typical' families in specified, identical
circumstances in each country in May 1992. This approach built on a similar
method developed for an earlier study of child support packages also carried out at
the University of York (Bradshaw et al., 1993a). The model family methodology is
discussed in detail in Chapter Six.
The independent experts also provided edited bibliographies and copies or
summaries of key research studies. In some cases they helped to fill gaps in the
information provided by officials. In July 1994 they attended a two-day colloquium
held in York, to which policy makers were also invited, where the research team's
initial analyses were modified or supplemented, items of the matrix methodology
were clarified and policy issues were discussed in a comparative exchange of views
and expertise. Finally, the information obtained from the two networks was put in
context by reviewing national and comparative literature on social assistance,
poverty and income distribution.
Purchasing power parities
One feature of the comparison of expenditure and the value of benefits across
countries requires some comment. This is the use of `purchasing power parities'
(PPPs). Purchasing power parities are a method of comparing the actual value of a
currency in terms of its purchasing power. PPPs convert national currency amounts
into a common monetary denominator. which in this study has been expressed
both in USS and £s sterling. PPPs are generally more satisfactory than exchange
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rates in that they take account of differences in the price of a common basket of
goods and services in each country. and are less subject to the sharp fluctuations
which can take place in exchange rates. The relationship between exchange rates
and PPPs tends to vary between countries: for the majority of OECD countries
PPPs are fairly close to the exchange rates, with the exception of the Nordic
countries, Japan and Switzerland. where they are notably higher, and the southern
European countries where they are notably lower. The PPPs used here have been
developed by the OECD (Economic Outlook, 1993).
PPPs do have their limitations, however. It is arguable, for instance, that their
primary utility is in application to ag gregate national data. rather than at a micro
level, as applied to benefit rates or individual household income and expenditure.
PPPs are calculated for each country on the basis of the consumption patterns of
an average household. This study is about social assistance recipients_ who may
well have consumption patterns considerably different from the average. and if the
degree of difference varies between countries then PPPs based on an average basket
of goods may be misleading. In using PPPs for the comparison of disposable
income after benefits and charges (in Chapter Six), it should also be acknowledged
that there is an element of double counting involved in relation to housing, health
and education. Variations in these costs are already taken into account in PPPs,
and we are effectively counting them twice by adjusting net, post-housing cost.
disposable incomes by PPPs. There are also difficulties in the construction of PPPs
themselves and they are not always regarded as fully reliable. In spite of their
limitations, it is nevertheless believed that they are the most useful way of
comparing monetary values across the countries in this study, but they should be
taken as indicators of relative benefit levels rather than exact measures. Table A6.2
appended to Chapter Six provides a comparison of PPPs and exchange rates in
1992 the year for which we have data from the model family matrix.
Approaches to comparative research
In recent years there has been a proliferation of comparative research in the field of
social policy, yet effective methodology for ensuring valid comparison is still
relatively under-developed. Bradshaw (1994) has suggested that most comparative
studies of social policy can be located within a matrix of two dichotomies --
between `macro' and `micro' studies and between policy inputs' and ' outcomes'.
Briefly, macro studies aim to explain the origins and evaluate the impact of
particular formations of social policies at the aggregate level. Macro input studies
are concerned with explaining welfare state effort_ often focusing on levels of
expenditure or tax structures over time and analysing the correlation with variables
such as demography. economic development, party political control, the role of
organised labour, religion, or the position of women (see, for example, VVilensky,
1975; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Heidenheimer et al., 1990). Macro outcome studies
concentrate on the social and economic consequences of' welfare state activity on,
for example, economic growth, unemployment, inflation, or social solidarity (for
example, Cameron, 1985). The difference between inputs and outcomes here refers
to the distinction between the policy instruments and what they achieve. Macro
studies tend to serve an academic agenda rather than the more pragmatic concerns
of' policy makers, although their significance in the latter field should not be
overlooked.
Micro studies are generally concerned with drawing practical lessons for policy
making by examining different systems (inputs) or their impact at the individual or
household level (outcomes), though they may also contribute to theory in the
course of doing so. Much government-commissioned research is likely to fall into
this category. since policy makers and politicians are primarily interested in the
immediate policy relevance of the findings. In the UK there has been a growing
interest, on the part of government, in comparative research on social security
inputs. partly stimulated by policy debates within the European Union. The
questions typically asked about benefits are: what is available. to whom. for how
long, how is it delivered, at what level and at what cost, and how successful are
other countries at dealing with common problems? Micro studies of outcomes tend
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to rely on population surveys and generally involve secondary analysis of national
datasets. Questions include the effectiveness of social policy in relieving poverty,
fostering equality, or maintaining living standards for particular groups. Cross-
national surveys are still fairly rare (with the Eurobarometer attitude studies being
amon g the few exceptions). though the EU is launching a Union-wide household
and income survey in 1995. Following pioneering work by Beckerman (1979) and
Rainwater et al. (1986). the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)' has become one of
the main vehicles for comparative research in this field. Many of the initial
problems of comparison have been overcome and a stream of high quality research
has resulted (see. for example, O'Higgins and Jenkins, 1989; Mitchell, 1991;
Smeeding et al._ 1992; Whiteford and Kennedy. 1995).
Hauser (1993) has proposed another way of classifying basic approaches to
comparative analysis. In this typology the first approach is `system-by-system'.
where analysis concentrates on institutional features of the social security system or
a sub-system of it. The second approach is 'group-by-group' and starts from the
positions in different societies of specific population groups, such as lone parents
or older people. The third approach is more abstract and deals with comparisons
on a ' problem-by>
-problem' basis. looking, for example. at poverty, incentives, or
redistribution. The raft of comparative poverty studies emanating from the
Luxembourg Income Study represents perhaps the most common application of
this approach. The final `state-by-state' type is more comprehensive, comparing
whole welfare states in their contemporary or historical forms, and is perhaps
exemplified by Esping-Andersen's (1990) work on welfare state typologies.
In practice much research is a mixture of these types. and there are aspects of all of
them in this study. Mainly we take the system-by-system approach. In Bradshaw's
typology the study can be seen primarily as a micro study of inputs.
In spite of the advances made in comparative research. there remain considerable
methodological problems in the collection and interpretation of data in ways that
provide genuine comparison of like with like. Comparative analysis relies on there
being a sufficient level of basic similarity between countries for some generalisation
from empirical evidence. But the more heterogeneous a group of countries, the
greater becomes the possible number of unique, specific features. It can be argued
that the European Union, and to a lesser extent the OECD, are by definition
groupings of states which share. at least in a broad sense, core similarities.
Nevertheless, the cultural and economic differences and historical specificities are
still great enough to present considerable limitations to comparative analysis.
Even if the general level of comparability is regarded as acceptable, there remains a
choice as to the numbers of countries to be studied. Here the researcher is
presented with the risk of either 'going naive' - that is, of losing richness and
extensiveness of analysis in favour of larger numbers of comparator countries -- or
of 'going native' and pursing more sensitive qualitative analysis, but not achieving
more general explanation. For this study the choice was made to cover a large
number of countries, because basic comparable information on social assistance in
many of the OECD countries was lacking. It should be recognised, however, that
there are some questions which it has not been possible to pursue in great detail,
and that there are differences between countries in the level and quality of
information available.
A further problem derives from the complexity of welfare states. Packages of
provision are made up in quite different ways in different countries, involving
interactions between earnings, social insurance, taxation, public services and
private provision which are difficult to grasp even in one country. They are also
The LIS protect has assembled a database of more than 45 microdata sets on income and expenditure
from participating countries (17 in the 1985 wave of surveys). The database is held at the Centre for
Populations, Poverty and Policy Studies (CEPS/INSTEAD) at Walferdange, Luxembourg. Datasets are
transformed from the original microdata using a standard format to allow comparative analysis.
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constantly evolving and changing, making information quickly out of date.
Comparative analysis has to be based on the selection of characteristics which are
considered relevant in all the different countries. Yet there may not be a general
consensus on what features are important -- a particular difficulty in a study of
social assistance_ where its salience within social security as a whole varies
considerably between countries. Since this project was commissioned initially by
the UK Department of Social Security. there is naturally an interest in how other
countries deal with issues and problems encountered in the UK system. It is
recognised. however, that there are other perspectives and these are highlighted
where appropriate.
1.3 Why study social assistance?
Before moving on to describe the structure of the report, it is worth asking why it
might be considered important to study social assistance schemes and what the
policy context is for such research. In answering these questions we review very
briefly the development of social welfare systems. the growing interest in forms of
social protection based on selectivity and the previous research carried out in this
area.
Public welfare in most of the countries in the study be gan with forms of local poor
relief which represent the antecedents of contemporary social assistance schemes.
In the course of the first half of the 20th century, Poor Law provision in most
countries was overlaid, if not entirely superseded, by systems of social insurance
and, later, categorical non-contributory benefits, which served purposes wider than
simply the relief of poverty. Social assistance schemes themselves were substantially
revised and codified in many countries in the decades following World War H,
although some have retained more of their poor relief features than others.
There are many different ways of looking at the developments in social welfare
systems in the 20th century. The most basic view might be that two main traditions
have emer ged - those countries with systems of social protection based primarily
on contributory social insurance and those relying mainly on other arrangements.
Alternatively the traditions could be seen as those where means-tested assistance
schemes were increasingly seen as residual elements of social protection, as in most
of the countries of continental Europe, and those where targeting through income-
and means-testing became an increasingly important strategy. Examples of the
latter tradition would be the antipodean countries and, to a lesser extent, the UK
and the USA.
Both these approaches are over-simplistic, however. since the welfare mix which
different countries have adopted is more complex than that suggested by a single
dichotomy. A number of more comprehensive typologies have been developed to
classify and explain the nature of welfare states, among which one of the most
influential has been that of Esping-Andersen (1990). He classified countries into
three `welfare regimes', based on indicators of social stratification and on scores of
what he calls 'decommodification'. This refers to the extent to which entitlement to
benefits (particularly pensions, sickness and unemployment benefit) frees workers
from dependence on competition in the market place. Thus those countries with
flat-rate, universal benefits based on minimum qualifying periods score more highly
than those relying on contributory and earnings-related benefits. His three regime
types were Conservative/Corporatist, among which he includes Austria, France.
Germany and Italy-; Liberal, including Australia. Canada and the USA; and Social-
Democratic, incorporating the Scandinavian countries.
There have been many criticisms of Esping-Andersen's typology. Lewis (1992), for
example, has argued that the concept of decommodification is over-identified with
the position of male workers and gives insufficient attention to the contribution
women make to the enhancement of welfare through unpaid work. Bradshaw et
al.'s (1993a) study of child support suggested a rather different grouping of regime
types if family benefits were taken into account. Castles and Mitchell (1991) have
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also suggested that Australia is wrongly allocated to the liberal grouping on the
basis of its means-tested system, without recognition of the outcomes deriving from
it. and have proposed a fourth regime type based on countries with a labourite
tradition. In general. Esping-Andersen's model is relatively insensitive to variations
between countries with extensive social assistance schemes, and later chapters of
this report attempt to map these differences onto his typology of welfare regimes.
Most countries have seen periodical re-enactment of debates about the basis on
which social protection should be financed and delivered. However, since the oil
shocks and the so-called `crisis of welfare' which ensued from the international
economic problems of the 1970s (O'Connor. 1973; Gough, 1979), these arguments
have increasingly centred on an opposition between 'universal' and 'targeted'
benefits. To some extent it can be argued that this is a false dichotomy. As
Atkinson (1993). among others. has pointed out, it is difficult to give any examples
of true `universal' benefits anywhere in the world. Genuine universalism requires
some form of basic or citizenship income. In practice virtually all existing benefits
involve some degree of conditionality or are targeted in some way, either towards
certain categories of people, such as those with children in the case of child benefit,
by contingency in the case of disability benefits. or on the basis of contribution
records for social insurance benefits. Means-testing is but one form of selectivity.
Arguments for selectivity on the basis of resources do appear to have been gaining
ground, however- for a number of interconnected reasons. First, the view that a
level of social security expenditure which requires relatively high taxation and
employer costs can damage economic effort, particularly in the context of global
competition, has become increasingly dominant in international political and
economic discourse. This is a view which has been forcefully expressed by the UK
government in negotiations with its EU partners on the social dimension of the
Union. It is also a common thread which runs through the OECD's analyses of
member countries' recent economic performance. as well as through the Jobs
Study, which examined unemployment and proposed strategies for coping with
labour market change (OECD, 1994a). While the European Commission and many
of the EU governments have resisted any wholesale reduction of insurance-based
social protection, and indeed have recently emphasised the importance of the social
dimension (Commission of the European Communities. 1994a). the White Paper
on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment (Commission of the European
Communities, 1994b)_ nevertheless recommends a range of measures aimed at
increasing employment, which include reductions or restructuring of employers'
non-wage costs and boosting of work incentives through income-related
supplements to earnings.
A further, parallel stimulus to interest in social assistance has been the
identification of a growth in what has been called `new poverty' in the European
and other developed countries (Room- 1990). This poverty is thought of as new in
two senses: first there has been a `rediscovery' in a number of countries that
genuine problems of poverty exist in spite of overall increasing affluence; and
secondly there have been changes over time in the composition of the poorest
groups. There is some debate as to how new much of this poverty actually is and
even more on how it should be measured on a comparative basis. Various
researchers (for example, Deleeck et aL. 1992: Gustaffson and Lindblom, 1993;
Bardone and Degryse. 1994; Hagenaars at al., 1994; R.amprakash, 1994), have
carried out or evaluated a range of different statistical approaches - all broadly
based on measures of percentages of households with incomes or expenditures
below proportions of the average - and have found that the results are highly
sensitive to both the percentage line drawn and the equivalence scale used. It is
often pointed out that such measures are not in themselves indicators of poverty as
such but of relative inequality (Veit-Wilson, 1994a). It is also necessary to
remember that when looking at countries such as those in this study we are talking
of poverty in rich countries (Townsend. 1992), so that. for example, the official
USA poverty line is more than six times the average per capita income of India
( Atkinson. 1993). In many ways the debate about relative versus absolute poverty
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has become somewhat sterile. It is now a truism to say that poverty is relative, but
as Saunders (1994, p.21) has argued,
To accept that poverty is relative is not to equate poverty and inequality.
but rather to acknowledge that needs - the only basis for a poverty
standard - are defined and determined in a social context.
This is where social assistance schemes are particularly important, because they
become de facto poverty lines, based on what governments decide are minimum
income levels below which no one should be expected to fall. How far these lines
are based on needs is another question. As the study shows. and as Veit Wilson
(1994b) has also demonstrated, it is unusual to find a contemporary 'minimum
income standard' which is clearly based on a scientific or consensual measure of
what different households need.
Nevertheless, in spite of the caution necessary when discussing poverty and
inequality in OECD countries, one pervasive feature of the many different studies
is that they tend to show broadly similar groups falling into the lowest parts of the
income distribution in most countries. Thus we find that households headed by
lone parents, by unemployed people, by women, by older people, large households.
those without any member in employment or headed by a person with a low level
of education, households in certain regions and, in some countries, those working
in farming and agriculture, are all more at risk of relative poverty, as measured in
the studies, than other groups.
On the other hand. poverty is not necessarily greater in countries where the groups
who are particularly vulnerable make up larger proportions of the population
(Hagenaars et al., 1994). This is partly because levels of inequality are affected by
the general levels of social protection available in different countries and by the
extent to which social security measures are directed at particular risk groups.
Nevertheless, one of the characteristics of contemporary poverty in Europe is that
it increasingly stems from the limitations of existing social security arrangements -
particularly those based on status maintenance through insurance principles - in
dealing with changes in demography, family forms and behaviour, and the labour
market. Thus many of those facing poverty do so through the lack of a continuous
contributory record, either. in the case of youth unemployment, because there has
been no opportunity to build up a record, or through exhaustion of entitlement
because of long-term unemployment. or through interruptions in labour market
participation because of caring responsibilities or family breakdown. Although the
prevalence of poverty is not entirely correlated with low levels of spending on
social protection in different countries, it does appear to be relatively high where
systems of minimum income protection are less fully developed (Bardone and
Degryse, 1994). If social assistance is generally becoming more salient, as we show
in the next chapter, this is particularly because of increases in long-term
unemployment, in lone parenthood, in low pay and in primary earnings
inequalities.
In this context the extent to which there are safety nets and the role such schemes
play in relation to other parts of the social security system, both in poverty
prevention or relief and in social reintegration, become important questions. The
arguments for greater 'targeting' are well known. In particular, benefits targeted on
those most in need are thought to be more effective and efficient at closing poverty
gaps than universal payments, which may go in part to people who do not need
them. In times of economic stringency, when excessive public spending is widely
seen as detrimental to competitiveness and high taxation as a disincentive to
individual effort, the idea that poverty can be more effectively alleviated by
reallocating existing transfers is attractive. On an international level, targeting is
seen as the most effective tool. as suggested by the World Bank's 1990 World
Development Report, which stated that:
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... a comprehensive approach to poverty reduction calls for a program of
well-targeted transfers and safety nets as an essential complement to the
basic strategy. (World Bank, 1990, p.3 -- quoted in Atkinson. 1993)
In line with this strategy, economic aid from the international financial institutions.
including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. to the
transitional economies of Eastern Europe has also increasingly been weighted
towards the establishment of means-tested safety nets to back up their limited
insurance-based systems. Within the European union, one response to research
findings suggesting high levels of poverty amongst its citizens has been to adopt a
Draft Recommendation (Cor (91) 161), urging member countries to institute
guarantees of minimum resources conforming to a set of broad common principles
and to supply reports on progress achieved. Basic outlines of such provisions are
now included in the annual social security tables produced by the Commission's
Management Information System on Social Security (MISSOC) project.
Yet in spite of this growing interest in benefit selectivity, there are also a number of
well-known drawbacks of the targeted approach. It is not necessary to elaborate
them here (see. for example Deacon and Bradshaw, 1983; Saunders. 1991:
Atkinson, 1992, Gough. 1994), but they include potential problems of intrusive
enquiry, stigma, social divisiveness. low take-up, poverty traps and high
administrative costs. There is also a danger in concentrating on poverty relief to
the exclusion of other possible legitimate objectives for social security: these might
include protection against risk ; horizontal equity, redistribution over the lifecycle,
and the promotion of social cohesion (Commission on Social Justice, 1994).
Finally, it is commonly argued that focusing benefits on the poor may undermine
the wider support for social security which is necessary in order to finance targeted
schemes which are generous enough to be effective (Saunders, 1991). Overall, there
is a general problem of whether targets themselves are adequately defined and
whether policy instruments are designed in such a way as to be able to hit them
(Whiteford, 1994a). However. the arguments for and against targeting are often
presented at a level of principle which assumes that all forms of means testing are
alike. In fact, as we have already stated, there are important distinctions. As
mentioned earlier, some Australian social policy analysts in particular have argued.
from the perspective of their almost totally means-tested or income-related social
security system, that generalised critiques of targeting need to be tested more
closely against the outcomes of differing policy arrangements (Mitchell, 1991;
Mitchell et al,. 1994).
From a policy maker's perspective, it is important to understand both how far
reliance on targeted or means-tested benefits in the developed welfare states
actually has increased over the last decade, whether there are any distinctive
patterns or differences emerging in the way safety net benefits are designed and
delivered, and the extent to which particular approaches to common policy
problems have been successful or ineffective. Given the increase in many countries
of long-term unemployment. a key theme here concerns both the work incentive or
disincentive effects implicit in the structure of assistance schemes and the
effectiveness of programmes of `insertion' or integration into the labour market.
The role of assistance schemes in relation to the wider social security systems and
the labour market also cannot be fully understood without some assessment of the
relative value of benefit payments to different household types in the countries
studied.
Although there is a growing number of comparative studies of social security
provision, to our knowledge no one has previously carried out a systematic study
of social assistance schemes on the scale of the study reported here. Euvrard (1989)
has surveyed the key principles of the main minimum income schemes in the
European Community for a conference on basic income in Europe, while Liebfried
(1991) included a broad overview of the range of assistance schemes in a wider
study of convergence in social welfare in Europe. As part of the strategy adopted
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with the Draft Recommendation mentioned above, the European Commission in
1992 sponsored a working party of national experts who have produced reports
from the member countries on their systems for guaranteeing minimum resources,
to which we have had access. As was mentioned above. the MISSOC project has
also begun to include basic descriptive tables on minimum income schemes for the
EU countries, but at present they only provide an outline of provision and cannot
give any indication of the spread or impact of social assistance.
A number of important studies have been mounted of groups of related countries,
in particular Scandinavia, such as that by Fridberg (1993). Overbye (1994) has also
looked at the ways different European countries have combined insurance and
assistance schemes, such that the distinction can be blurred but in ways that vary
between countries for different risk groups, Stjerno (1994) has compared assistance
schemes in the Nordic countries with a number of other European countries to see
how their institutional features conform to the common idea of the `Nordic model'.
One study, by Lodemel and Schulte (1992), has compared the broad principles and
features of social assistance schemes in a selected number of EU countries to see
how they impact on welfare state typologies such as that of Esping-Andersen. They
highlighted four main features which. they argued, differentiated social assistance
regimes from one another:
• the existence of generalised minimum income schemes as opposed to those
only for specific categories of people
• an emphasis on income maintenance rather than on social integration and
treatment
• the balance between legal rights to benefits and discretionary access
s central versus local (or regional) responsibility for legislation,
administration and finance.
On this basis Lodemel (1992) posited four regime types, as follows:
1. Nordic: including all the Scandinavian countries, with decentralised and
largely discretionary systems aimed at `marginal' groups and emphasising
social work treatment.
2. Latin: including the southern European and Mediterranean countries, as
well as France, with less developed general assistance schemes and an
emphasis on 'insertion".
3. Continental: including Austria. Belgium, Germany. Luxembourg and the
Netherlands, with common roots in Bismarckian social insurance, general
rights-based assistance alongside categorical schemes, emphasis on
subsidiarity but a lesser degree of decentralisation than in the Nordic
countries.
4. British: the UK model is seen as a distinct tradition, deriving from limited
social insurance provision which led to more extensive assistance. This
became nationally organised, with a complex set of rights and entitlements,
and is based almost entirely on income maintenance with little social work
involvement.
We discuss in later chapters how far Lodemel's typology is supported by the more
detailed evidence available from this study.
Another approach taken by Mitchell et al. (1994) i Australia has been to use
Luxembourg Income Study micro-data for a number of countries to look at the
outcomes, in terms of benefit generosity and poverty alleviation, generated by
different policy mixes of universal and targeted benefits. Their argument challenges
what they see as a Eurocentric, and in particular a Nordocentric, obsession with
the instruments of provision rather than the actual outcomes, and they conclude
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that by these criteria the means-tested Australian system performs relatively well
compared to other countries with different policy mixes.
The present study cannot produce a systematic assessment of outcomes. Nor can it
present an exhaustive evaluation of the different schemes (though Chapter Eight
suggests a series of criteria against which such an evaluation might be carried out).
The report does aim. however, to present a more comprehensive mapping of social
assistance schemes in the developed world than has previously been attempted.
1.4 The structure of the report
The report continues in Chapter Two with a discussion of conceptual problems in
classifying social assistance schemes. This chapter then examines the trends in
expenditure on social assistance and the numbers and types of people receiving
benefits. Chapter Three compares the principles and key features of assistance
schemes, concentrating on conditions of eligibility and entitlement, approaches to
means-testing. and forms of support for housing costs and exceptional needs.
Chapter Four then looks at issues of administration and delivery of benefits,
including the central/local dimension. This is followed by a discussion of current
debates on poverty and approaches to minimum income support, taking in the role
and influence of 'poverty lobbies" in the different countries, and examining the way
in which benefit rates for assistance schemes have been determined. Chapter Six
then analyses the structure and value of income packages derived mainly from
social assistance and compares these both across and within countries, in relation
to insurance benefits and average wages. The next chapter looks at the incentive or
disincentive effects, primarily in relation to work. inherent in the various benefit
structures. Chapter Eight concludes the report with an analysis of how systems are
evolving and changing in the face of common pressures and a discussion of how
the evidence of the study might contribute to a better understanding of welfare
regimes.
The information and data drawn on in the following chapters is, unless otherwise
referenced, based primarily on that supplied to the researchers by official
respondents in the respective countries through the pro forma questionnaire, or in
the form of statistical and other reports provided separately. Some gaps in this
information were filled by the academic respondents. drawing on published
statistical reports or other research data. Fuller descriptions of the individual
countries" assistance schemes, and more detailed referencing of sources, can be
found in Volume Two of this study.
25
Chapter 2 Social Assistance Across the
OECD: Patterns and Trends
Chapter One included an attempt to define social assistance for the purposes of the
study, and briefly outlined the ways in which different forms of provision have
been categorised. This chapter begins by proposing a more explicit comparative
taxonomy of social assistance schemes so as to impose some order on the great
variety of national programmes which the study has covered. Without such a
taxonomy it is impossible to discern patterns and trends in the salience of social
assistance in different countries. The second part of the chapter presents data on
national variations in expenditure on social assistance in 1992 and on trends since
1980. Lastly, we turn to the recipients of social assistance and analyse such data as
are available on their numbers and composition, again presenting a static picture of
the situation in 1992 and a dynamic one of changes since 1980.
2.1 A taxonomy of social assistance
As was stated in the previous chapter. the term `social assistance' does not have a
fixed or universal meaning. In some countries social assistance extends to embrace
a wide range of non- resource-tested but categorically-targeted social aid for such
groups as orphans, immigrants and older people. In others (but also frequently the
same countries) it excludes means-tested or income-related benefits which are
administered as part of social insurance. The first task, therefore, is to identify that
set of social programmes which constitute the main focus of investigation.
There are three, and only three, basic mechanisms by which the state can directly
allocate income or services to individuals or households (see for example Atkinson,
1989). The first mechanism is the 'universal' or contingency benefit allocated to all
citizens within a certain social category. These benefits are not related to income or
employment status. Secondly, there is social insurance. where the benefit is related to
(a) employment status and (b) contributions paid in to the scheme. Both of these
conditions can be interpreted more or less stringently. The third comprises means-
tested or income-related benefits where eligibility is dependent upon the current or
recent resources of the beneficiary. though other categorical conditions may also
apply. This study focuses principally on the third category of resource-tested benefits.
Resource-tested benefits are sometimes referred to as 'targeted' benefits. although
this is not always a particularly helpful term. All existing benefits and services are
targeted in some way on people in certain defined circumstances (Miller and
Tomaskovic-Devey, 1990; Saunders, 1991). Moreover. both contingency and social
insurance programmes can be directed at low-income groups or at those in other
categories of acute need. Contingency benefits and services can be aimed at groups
highly correlated with extreme need, such as homeless children or long-term
unemployed people. Social insurance programmes can build in minimum pensions
and other benefits to provide an income floor below which no members of the
scheme should fall. The present study addresses these schemes only in so far as
they involve resource testing.
Within resource-tested programmes Gough (1994) makes three preliminary
distinctions:
2
- Directly` restricts this to the provision of cash or non-cash benefits by state agencies. Other indirect
methods include tax allowances and mandated private benefits or services. ' Individuals and households'
means that services targeted on specific spatial locations arc excluded, though geography may enter into
the definition of the contingency which the benefit or service is designed to meet.
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1. The first is between 'poverty testin g ' and ` general means or income
testing'. The former is concerned to provide resources to people who
would otherwise fall below a certain, usually officially-defined, minimum
standard of living. This minimum standard will often reflect a political
judgement rather than a scientific assessment (Veit-Wilson, 1994a). It may
or may not he referred to as a poverty standard. but there is some
recognition of providing a floor or 'safety net' below which nobody should
fall. General means-testing, on the other hand, is concerned to relate
benefits to current resources across a broader range of income groups -- it
may be no more than a means to restrict access by the well-off (cf.
Eurostat, 1993, p.6).
2. There is also a distinction between cash and 'tied' benefits. The former
provide money benefits. These may be emergency relief payments to cope
with disasters or exceptional needs, or more regular payments. 'Tied"
benefits entitle the recipient to free or subsidised use of a specific service.
or to a refund of rebate for all or part of the charge for a specific service 3 . A
particularly important tied benefit in many countries is housing assistance.
3. Referring back to the definition of contingencies, there is in practice an
important distinction between schemes for all people within a certain
income/resources group and those awarded to more specific categories
within this group. such as older or disabled persons.
These three distinctions generate eight combinations, as shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure _'. I: A taxonomy of means-tested schemes
1 ? l] groups Specific
groups
Poverty-tested
Cash 1 2
Tied 3 4
General means-tested
Cash 5 6
Tied S
Our concern to study only those schemes for people whose resources are officially
held to be insufficient would suggest that we ignore all general income-related
benefits in cells 5--8, such as the growing number of income-tested family
allowances. However, this causes problems in Australia and New Zealand which
have no social insurance features. Their social security systems are, in the terms
introduced above, wholly means-tested or income-related, but they are not focused
solely on those with minimum incomes. To limit our study to `poverty-tested'
programmes would be to exclude all antipodean social benefits except for the
residual Special Benefits. Since these two countries have played an important role
in the evolution of social assistance they could not sensibly be excluded. Moreover,
whether or not the benefits extend to those with higher incomes, the purpose of
such schemes is still to provide a minimum level of subsistence (however defined)
to those at the bottom. As such they must be included in the study.
Nevertheless, extending the scope of social assistance in this way raises problems
elsewhere. To be consistent we then have to include Family Credit in Britain.
income-related family allowances in Italy and Belgium, the Earned Income Tax
Credit in the USA. Arbeitslosenhil¢e in Germany, housing allowances in Sweden,
and so on.
Similarly, to exclude all tied benefits or benefits in kind from the study would be to
hinder comparison with countries where these are important, as is the case, for
example, with Food Stamps in the USA. Moreover, the extent to which housing
allowances are integrated with social assistance varies considerably across
Since a tied benefit, such as a housing allowance. can be paid in cash, this term is less misleading than
referring to 'in-kind' or `non-cash benefits.
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countries, so to exclude them would distort comparisons. The difficulties involved
in taking account of housing costs in international comparisons are discussed in
Chapter Six.
It was therefore decided to obtain information on all forms of resource-tested
benefits, but to categorise them in the following way.
1. General assistance: provides cash benefits for all or almost all people below
a specified minimum income standard (cell I above): for example, the UK
Income Support or the Belgian Minimex.
'. Categorical assistance: provides cash benefits for specific groups (cells 2+6
above). Examples include unemployment assistance in Germany and the
Netherlands, social pensions in Italy, or almost all Australian and New
Zealand benefits.
3. Tied assistance: provides access to specific goods or services in kind or in
cash (cells 3+4+7+8). Because of the importance of housing assistance, and
because its relationship with cash assistance varies across countries, tied
assistance is further divided as follows:
3a. Housing assistance
3b. Other tied assistance.
It should be noted that our definition of categorical assistance includes, in some
countries, schemes which are not always regarded as assistance within the countries
themselves. Thus, where unemployment assistance, or supplementary pensions for
older or disabled people, involve an income test which restricts payments to those
with low incomes, these are included in our definition, even though these benefits
may also have a contributory element. This applies particularly to Austria,
Germany and Switzerland. There is also an argument for taking note of the fairly
substantial expenditure in Canada on income-tested supplements to the federal
pension schemes, even though they are not generally seen as 'last resort' assistance
payments. We therefore include Guaranteed Income Supplement and Spouse's
Allowance as categorical payments in the following tables. Insurance benefit top-
ups with no general test of income are excluded, however.
In this chapter social assistance refers to all three categories together.
Table 2.1 allocates all the major resource-tested programmes in the OECD
countries to one of these categories. The table applies mainly to the situation in
1992. unless otherwise specified. This is to allow for the comparison of expenditure,
on which data is not available for many countries after this date. Where major
changes to the structure of benefits, such as the introduction of a new housing
benefit scheme, have taken place since 1992, these are noted. It should also be
noted that general assistance schemes often cover some or all of housing costs,
either through higher basic payments or through a supplementary element based
on the costs of housing. Some countries have separate and discrete housing benefit
schemes, as shown in column 3 (and some have both). The ways that countries
offer help with housing costs are discussed in more detail in the next chapter. The
table excludes separate schemes for one-off payments, which are also dealt with in
Chapter Three. Finally, the table includes some schemes which, according to the
taxonomy above, extend benefits to people with incomes above the poverty or
minimum income line.
a Housin g allowances are the subject of a separate comparative study for the UK Department of Social
Security by .Kemp, involving a smaller number of OECD countries.
Table 2.1: A taxonomy of national resource-tested assistance programmes (1992)'
Country General assistance Categorical assistance
Australia Special Benefit Age Pension; Service Pension;
Disability Support Pension;
Wife Pension; Carer Pension;
Sole Parent Pension; Sickness Allowance;
Unemployment Allowances; Family
Payments
Austria So iialhilfe, for people in
private households
Supplementary Pensions;
Unemployment Assistance
Belgium Alin:Men- Perm( Garanli pour Per,sonnes Agess;
Allocation pour Handicapper;
Allocation .Ptmliluale Garantie
Canada Canada Assistance Plan
(as framework for provincial
programmes)
Guaranteed Income Supplement
Spouse ' s Allowance
Denmark Social Bistand
Finland Living Allowance
France Rerenu Minimum d'Insertion
(RMI)
Minimum Vieillesse; Allocation our
Adu/tes 11ondicapes (AAII); Allocation
de .Poront I.sotll (API); Minimwn
Itavalidite; Allocation Veuvage; Allocation
de Solidarite Spectfique; Allocation
d7nscrlion
Germany Soialhilfe; subsistence aid 4rbeitslasenhi.fle
Greece Scheme Err Unprotected Children; Scheme
for the Protection of Maternity; Scheme
for Non-insured Elderly
Iceland Financial Assistance Income and Household Supplements to
Basic Pensions
Ireland Supplementary Welfare
Allowance
Unemployment Assistance;
Pre-retirement Allowance; Old Age,
Widow's and Orphan's Non-Contributory
Pensions: Deserted and Prisoner's Wife
Allowance; Carer's Allowance; Lone
Parent Allowance; Disabled and Blind
Person 's Maintenance Allowance, Family
Income Supplement
Housing assistance' Other tied assistance
Rent assistance and rent rebates (but
expenditure included in overall social
assistance figures)
Means-tested So:ialhilfe for
persons in institutions
Canada Mortgage and 1-lousing
Corporation programmes
Housing Benefit (from I-. 4)
Housing Allowance
Allocation I ngenu snt Farnilrale (AI, Ii');
Aide Pe'rsonnali.scie au Logeinent (4 P1.,);
Allocation Lngcnte;rrt ,Soeiaic (ALS)
II itlnageld Sn ialhilfe: aid in special
circumstances
Housing benefit for non-insured elderly
Housing Allowance
Table 2.1: A taxonomy of national resource-tested assistance programmes (1992)' contd.)
Country General assistance Categorical assistance I lousing assistance' Other tied assistance
Italy Local cash assistance
(If in limo I"dole)
Pensioxe Son/ate; Pensione di Inohilita;
Veteran Is Pension; Assegno al Nrscleo
E nailicrre
Local assistance services
Japan
_ ~~
Livelihood slid (plus
Education Aid, Housing Aid.
Medical Aid, Maternity Aid,
Occupational Aid, and
Funeral Aid)
_inns
Luxembourg
_sins
Revenue Minimum Gwarti;
AVC
{llocrrtiura pour Personnes Crravemcnt
Handieappes; Allocation de Soios
Allocation de Chrarr{fag>e
Netherlands Algetnene Bijstond (ABW) Regulation for Unemployed Employees
(RWW); Income Provisions for Older and
Partially Disabled Workers (IOAW),
Income Provisions for Formerly Self-
Employed (IOAZ). Supplementary Benefit
(TW)
Housing Benefit
New Zealand Special Benefit
snnnsns
Unemployment Benefit; Training Benefit;
Sickness Benefit; Invalidity Benefit;
Widows Benefit; Domestic Purposes
Benefit: Transitional Retirement Benef
New Zealand Superannuation; Family
Support
Accommodation Supplement (from 1994)
Norway Social Economic Assistance Transitional Allowance State Housebu.nk [lousing Benefit;
Pensioners' 1-lousing Benefit
Portugal Family Allowance; Supplementary
Allowance; Nursing Allowance: Orphan's
Pension; Social Invalidity Pension; Social
Old Age Pension; Young People's
Integration Benefit: Survivors Grant
Housing Benefit
Spain Ingreso Minim() de .Inserolon Means-tested Aged pension; Means-tested
Di:_bility Pension; Unemployment
A-;si•,r_;i ne
Sweden Social Assistance KBT-Municipal .housing allowance for
pensioners; SK.BT-Statelmunicipal
housing benefit
Switzerland Aide ,Soeiale/So:tale
Pursorge
Supplementary retirement and invalidity
pensions
Turkey Social Assistant: and
Solidarity Scheme
Old Age and Disability Assistance
_sins
Green card medical
assistance
?'able 2.1: A taxonomy of national resource-tested assistance programmes (1992) 1 (contd.)
Country General assistance Categorical assistance Housing assistance
2 Other tied assistance
UK Income Support Family Credit: Disability Working
Allowance
Housing Benefit Community Charge Benefit
(later replaced by Council
Tax Benefit); Free school
meals
USA Food Stamps; General
Assistance
Aid to Families with Dependent Children;
Supplemental Security Income; Veterans'
Pension; Earned Income 'fax Credit
Federal Housing Assistance; Low Income
Home Energy Assistance
Medicaid; School Lunch and
Breakfast programme;
Special Supplementary Food
Programme; Job Training
Partnership Act; Head Start
Notes
Unless otherwise indicated
2 i.e. separate housing assistance programme, excluding those integrated into other assistance schemes
Only Portugal and Greece lack any sort of general, non-categorical assistance
programme. and that of Italy is limited. This. however. says nothing about the
coverage, let alone the benefit levels, of general assistance schemes in the remaining
countries. Most also have one or more categorical assistance schemes. but these are
particularly salient in Australia and New Zealand, the USA. Belgium. France.
Ireland. Italy. Luxembourg, Netherlands. Portugal and Spain. In particular, older
and disabled people are separately catered for in different programmes. This is the
case in France (also for lone parents and widows), Belgium. Portugal. Italy and
Spain: and in Austria. Iceland and Switzerland, if the income-tested pension
supplements are included.
Japan is somewhat difficult to place. It has several different types of aid, for people
with different types of need: yet the different forms of benefit are highly integrated
and assessment takes place under the same rules. It seems most appropriate to
regard them as part of one, general assistance scheme. but it should be recognised
that treating them as such affects the way expenditure figures are viewed in the
tables below.
In Austria. Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands there are separate assistance
schemes for unemployed people. The USA is unique in the range and size of other
tied assistance programmes. The majority of all these programmes are targeted at
low-income households, families or individuals, but in several countries there are
now income-tested programmes, of which family allowances are most common,
which extend their benefits further up the income scale through extensive earnings
disregards or tapered benefit withdrawal rates. Australia and New Zealand are
unique in the extent of such schemes.
2.2 Expenditure on social assistance
Comparable data on social assistance expenditure are highly problematic. In a few
countries. accurate national expenditure figures are not available at all, while in
others the definition of what constitutes social assistance expenditure varies
substantially. Data are not necessarily available broken down consistently by the
analytical categories adopted for the study and even where they are, figures are not
always available for each category of benefit. This inevitably makes the exercise of
identifying trends and patterns akin to a jigsaw puzzle where many pieces are
missing and some belong to a different box. The following section, therefore,
represents only a first attempt at making sense of the overall picture. Estimates are
based on a number of unavoidable. but less than ideal, assumptions and have to be
read along with the numerous caveats and explanations provided as footnotes to
the tables. The tables provide a basis on which we and others can improve in the
future.
Table 2.2 gives an estimate of total public expenditure on all social assistance in
1990 as a proportion of three figures: Gross Domestic Product (GDP), `social
protection' and 'social security' all as calculated by the OECD. `Social
protection' includes all public social spending in cash and in kind, excluding
education. but including health: 'social security' measures all government social
security and welfare transfers to households. It should be noted that the databases
from which the two latter measures are drawn are collected separately, from
different sources, and `social security' in this context cannot simply be read as a
subset of 'social protection'. They do, nevertheless, provide the best sources of
reasonably consistent comparative data, although figures are missing for some
countries. It should also be noted that the OECD estimates of social security
spending. on which Table 2.2 and subsequent tables are based. differ considerably
in some cases from estimates provided by individual governments for this study.
The latter are used substantially in the individual country chapters of Volume Two,
and sometimes result in estimates of the proportions of spending devoted to social
assistance which differ from those in this volume.
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Table 2.2 shows the considerable variation in the importance of social assistance in
different countries. Total assistance expenditure varied as a share of GDP from 0.2
per cent to 12.5 per cent; as a share of social protection expenditure between less
than two per cent and 65 per cent: and as a share of social security expenditure
between two per cent in Switzerland and 100 per cent in New Zealand. These were
much wider variations than for spending on other social programmes, such as
social insurance. However, the higher proportions of expenditure derived
particularly from Australia and New Zealand: without these outliers. the range of
variation narrows considerably.
A minority of countries spent substantially above the average on all means- and
income-tested benefits. Whether we take more than two per cent of GDP, more
than ten per cent of the social protection budget, or more than 30 per cent of social
security as measures, the same five countries emerge on top: Australia, Ireland.
New Zealand, the UK and the USA. The Netherlands also spent more than two
per cent of GDP. and Iceland might be in this group if spending on its pension
supplements were included. Those countries apart, the social security systems of the
English-speaking' world clearly rely more on means-testing than elsewhere. This
group of countries is similar to those with low `decommodification' scores,
according to Esping-Andersen (1990. p.52). 6 Medium spenders on social assistance
include France, Germany and Italy, plus Canada, Denmark, Sweden. Austria and
the Netherlands. Those with small spending levels on social assistance (less than
one per cent of GDP) are a mixed group. They include Japan (although national
estimates of social assistance expenditure as a proportion of social security
spending put it in the `medium' group); the other European countries except
Austria and Sweden; the southern European countries excluding Italy; and Turkey.
We include Canada in this group, while acknowledging that it is also French-speaking.
G This grouping maps less well on to his cluster of countries scoring highly on 'liberalism': Japan and
Switzerland were present in Esping-Andersen's list but are absent from ours. Indeed, they were the two
countries with the lowest expenditure on social assistance.
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Table 2.2: Total social assistance expenditure in 199091' as a percentage of GDP, social protecoo
and social security
Country % GDP % Social Protection % Social Security
Atlistralia = 5.2 40.6 89.2'°
Austria 1.4 4.6 6.0
Belgium` 0.6 2.5 2.9
Canada' 2.0 10.7 18.6
Denmark 1.2 4.4 7.0
Finland 0.2 0.8 2.0
France 1.8 6.8 9.7
Germany I-8 7.6 11.8
Greece 0-1 0.6 0.9
Iceland' 0.2 Ilia 1.4
Ireland 4.3 21.6 39.9
Italy 1.4 5.6 8.8
Japan ( 0.3 2.5 4.1
Luxembourg 0.4 1.4 nrta
Netherlands 2.3 8.0 11.8
New Zealand 12.5 65.4 100.0
Norway 0.8 2.8 4.8
Portugal' 0.5 3.0 4.6
Spain' 1.1 5.5 8.1
Sweden 1.0 3.1 6.7
Switzerland' 0.8 n/a 7.1
Turkey' 0.5 n'a nr a
UK 3.0 i 3.4 30,9
USA 2.7 I8.9 32.8
Unweighted average 1.9
Sources: Numerators: Data supplied by national officials and academic respondents.
Denominators: Social Protection (includes health spending): OECD (1994b), Social Security; OECD
Household Transfer Database (OECD. 1994d), unless otherwise stated
Notes:
For some countries figures are for calendar rather than financial years
2 National, not OECD, estimates of social security
Includes expenditure on federal Guaranteed Income Supplement for older people, plus Spouse's
Allowance (totalling 0.7 per cent of GDP)
1988. Excludes expenditure on maternity scheme and frst-time job seeker's allowance, for which
figures were not available
Does not include expenditure on income-tested pension supplement, for which data were unavailable
Japan is one of the countries where expenditure estimates provided by the national government
differed most from those based on the OECD data. Japanese Ministry estimates give social
assistance expenditure in 1990 as 9.5 per cent of total social security policy
1992
Includes expenditure on income-tested age and invalidity minimum pension supplements. Data are
for 1992
1993
Although virtually all benefits in Australia are resource-tested. this figure is less than 100% because
the Household Transfer Database definition includes other Commonwealth and State transfers
which are not counted nationally as part of social security expenditure.
To keep matters simple. the succeeding tables normally use GDP as the
denominator, but the differences in country rankings brought about by using social
spending measures should not be overlooked. Expressing expenditure on resource-
tested benefits as a proportion of total social spending reveals its relative weight
and helps to identify different welfare regimes.
Table 23 divides total estimated spending as a share of GDP (this time for 1992)
into the four cate gories of programme distinguished in Table 2.1. The table uses
the term `cash assistance ' to denote the total of expenditure on general and
categorical schemes. though it should be noted that both types of scheme in some
countries can involve the provision of services as well as cash. Looking first at
general, non-categorical assistance programmes, the UK stands out - spending 2.5
per cent of G.DP on Income Support in 1992 - followed by Canada and Denmark.
When categorical schemes are considered, the distinctive patterns of New Zealand
and Australia. but also of Ireland. are clearly revealed. Putting the two together we
find the English-speaking countries in the lead in spending, with the notable
34
exception of the USA. In most continental EU member countries, categorical
assistance for specific groups is more important than general programmes.
Britain leads the world in spending on specific means-tested Housing Benefit
(which goes to people other than just those with incomes at the assistance level),
followed by two very different countries: France and Sweden. When cash and
housing assistance are aggregated. the country patterns identified in Table 2.2
begin to emerge. The English-speaking nations, minus the USA and Canada, spent
the most on social assistance. The relatively low spenders comprise several distinct
groups of countries: Austria and Switzerland (even when insurance pension
supplements are included): Japan; low-income Turkey and Portugal; two Nordic
countries - Norway and Finland, and two other EU members Luxembourg and
Belgium.
Other tied. means-tested benefits are prominent in three countries. On the one
hand there is the USA, notably as a result of its unique medical assistance
programme Medicaid. On the other hand, Germany and Austria spent the bulk of
assistance monies on residents of homes for older people and in payment for other
care services. This may be a feature of social assistance expenditure in other
countries which is not always apparent from official statistics.
Table 2.3: Social assistance expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 1992
Country General
assistance
Categorical Cash
assistance assistance
Housing
assistance
Cash+
housing
Other tied
assistance
Total
social
I l l 121 1 1+2 1 131 assistance (4] assistance
11+2+3] 11+2+3+ 41
Australia 0.1 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.8
Austria 0.1 0.7 0.8 n.;a 0.8 0.4 1.2
Belgium 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7
Canada 1.8 0.7 2.5 n'a 2.5 2.5
Denmark 1.4 n-a 1.4 n/a 1.4 1.4
Finland 0,4 - 0.4 n/a 0.4 - 0.4
France 0.2 1.2 0.8 2.0 - 2.0
Germany 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.2 1.1 0.9 2.0
Greece' - 0.1 0.1 nia 0.1 0.1
Iceland 0.1 0.1 = 0.2 n/a 0.2 0.2
Ireland 0.3 4.8 5.1 5.1 - 5.1
Italy 0.2 2.7 2.9 2.9 0.4 3.3
:japan 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3
Luxembour g 0.4 0.1 0.5 n/a 0.5 0.5
Netherlands 0.8 1.4 2,2 Ma 2.2 .. 2.2
New Zealand 0.1 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0
Norway 0.5 0.2 O.? 0.2 0.9 0.9
Portugal nia n/a 0.4 nia 0.4 0.4
Spain 0.03 1.0' 1.1 - 1.1 1.1
Sweden 0.5 - 0.5 1.0 1.5 1.5
Switzerland 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.8 - 0.8
Turkey' 0.5 n=%a 0.5 - 0.5 n'a 0.5
UK 2.5 0.1 2.6 1.2 3.9 0.3 4.1
USA 0.4 0.9 1.3 0.3 1,6 2.1 3.7
Notes: Expenditures refer to programmes shown in Table 2.1 unless otherwise stated.
Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
indicates that there are no substantial forms of expenditure within the particular category, whereas
n/a indicates that information is not available.
1988
1993
Estimate of expenditure on income-related pension supplements, based on Table 11.1 in volume
Two
Excluding means-tested age pension (for which expenditure figures not available)
Sources: Numerators: Data supplied by national official or academic respondents
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The variety of ways in which social assistance is organised complicates
comparisons, especially over time. Table 2.4 shows trends in estimated spending on
'cash' social assistance that is. column 3 of Table 2.3 - as a share of GDP
between 1980 and 1992. However. for the three countries with significant housing
assistance programmes - France. UK and Sweden - it also gives figures including
these programmes.
Four countries exhibited an increase in social assistance spending over this period
of more than one percentage point of GDP: Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and
the UK (over two percentage points when housing assistance is included). Japan is
the only country for which we have reliable data which apparently registered a
declining share - Switzerland did so for group assistance schemes only.
When we turn to proportionate rather than absolute increases. the picture changes.
It is the Nordic countries which have witnessed the most rapid growth of social
assistance spending, albeit from a low base. They are followed by the UK and
France (both exacerbated by fast-growing housing assistance), Germany, Ireland,
New Zealand and Belgium. The result is some slight narrowing of the gap in
national expenditure on cash resource-tested benefits. As a footnote to the table
indicates, the figures on categorical expenditure in France are likely to be a
substantial underestimate, though the percentage change is probably more
accurate.
Another perspective on changes since 1980 is given in Table 2.5, which shows total
means- and income-tested expenditures (the last column in Table 2.3) as a share of
total social security expenditure. It reveals a rising share of the social security
budget spent on assistance-type benefits in every country (for which we have data)
except Canada, Japan and Switzerland. The decline in spending for Canada,
however, is only as a result of a decrease in Spouse Allowance payments (which, as
we have seen, are not generally regarded as part of social assistance). Canada
Assistance Plan spending increased over the period by 2.4 per cent. The fastest
growth is still in some of the Nordic countries (excepting Sweden where high but
constant housing allowances swamp the rise in cash assistance). Otherwise the
proportionate increase is remarkably similar across all the OECD countries. All
types of welfare regime exhibited a rising share of expenditure on means-tested
schemes in the 1980s - a notable convergence of otherwise disparate national
patterns.
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Table 2.4: Cash social assistance as a proportion of GDP. 1980 -92
Country' 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 Change Index:
1980492' 199211980'
(% GDP) 1980 = 1110
Australia' 5.4 6 6.0 5.2 6.1 6.8 1.4 126
Austria' 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.2 1.3 0.3 124
Belgium 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.2 156
Canada 1.6 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.5 0.9 156
Denmark n'a 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.4 ma ttia
Finland 0.1' 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 438
France4 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 196
:::incl housing 0.4 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.3 0.7 205
Germany' 1.0 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 0.6 160
Greece 0.1' 0.1 0.1 na na 0.0 100
Iceland nia n.a 0.2 0.2 0.2 n/a n/a
Ireland 3.0 4.5 4.3 4.7 5.1 2.2 174
Italy I.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 0.4 135
Japan 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 --- 0.1 60
Luxembourg n.'a n/a n1a 0.4 0.4 n!a nia
Netherlands 1.7 2.5 2,3 2.2 2.2 0.5 133
New Zealand' 8.6 9.2 12.5 13.5 13.0 4.4 151
Norway 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5 486
Portugal 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.2 221
Spain 0.3 0.8 IA 1.1 1.2 1.0 473
Sweden 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.3 272
::: ins l housing 0.8 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.5 0.7 186
Switzerland n1a n'a na n/a 0.8 rt%a n/a
Turkey r~/a n/a n a rua 0.5` n/a n;a
UK 1.4 2.1 1.7 2.1 2.6 1.2 190
incl housing 1.8 3.0 2.6 3.2 3.9 2.1 212
USA 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.3 0.2 115
Notes: See footnotes to Table 2.3.
Increase to 1991 or 1990 where no data for 1992
Social assistance data for financial years (117 to 30116) related to later calendar year; eg 1991192 as
proportion of 1991
Includes means-tested cash payments to residents in non-private households (such as residential care
homes)
Includes Revenu Minimum d'Iscsertion, Allocation de Parent /sole and Allocation agcy ,dup es
Handicapes only
Social assistance data for financial years. These ran from 14 .. 31 3 until 1990, then from 117-3016.
Social assistance data related to earlier year until 1990 (eg 1988189 as proportion of 1988) and to
later year after 1990 (eg 1991/92 as proportion of 1992)
1982
1981
1993
Sources: Data supplied by national official and academic informants
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Table 2.5: Total social assistance expenditure as a proportion of social security. 1980-1992
Country 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 Change Index:
1980-92' 199211980'
(
'
%n social
security) 1980 = 100
Australia 67.62 81.2 89.2 90.1 90.3 22.7 134
Austria 5.7 5.2 7.2 6.6 6.7 1.0 117
Belgium 2.3 2.2 2.9 3.1 3.0 0.7 129
Canada 19.6 19.9 18.6 1.8.5 18.9 -0.7 96
Denmark n/a 6.1 7.0 7.6 7 .8 n'a n a
Finland 0.9 2 1.3 2.0 2.1 rya 1.2 240
France' 3.5 5.2 6.5 6.5 6.4 2.9 184
Germany 7,1 11.0 11.9 Ma n/a 4.7 167
Greece 1.3 1.2 0.9 n?a Ma Ma nia
Iceland nia Ma 1.4 1 3 1.2 n a n a
Ireland 30.9 34.7 39,9 41.2 Hitt 10.3 133
Italy 9.1 8.7 8.8 9.6 9.1 0 100
Japan 7.3 5.5 4.1 3.8 3.7 3.5 51
Luxembourg n%a 1.1 nia n/a 1.4 Ma nia
Netherlands 8.3 12.4 11.8 11.2 .10.9 2.6 131
New Zealand 82.8 85.5 1.00.0 100.0 100.0 30.3' 137
Norway' 2.5 3.7 4.8 4.8 4.8 2.3 191
Portugal 2.3 6.1 4.7 4.1 3.8 1.5 167
Spain 2.1 2 6.0 8.1 7.9 8.4 6.3 403
Sweden 4.6 6.7 6 5.4 6.3 6.7 2.1 146
Switzerland` Ma a: Ma n a 1.8 a/a n?a
Turkey Ma n<t n-'a n:t Ma nett na
UK 21.9 30.2 30.9 30.8 33.0 11.1 151
USA 29.3 32.7 32.8 36.5 39.8 10.5 136
Notes: See footnotes to Table 2.3.
Increase to 1991 or 1990 where no data for 1992
1982
As in Table 2.4, the figures for categorical assistance in France are based on a low estimate of
assistance spending
4 General assistance only
Because of the way the figures in the OECD Household Transfer Database are derived, and because
of changes in the tax benefit year, percentages for New Zealand in 1990 and 1992 were greater than
100. The change figures represent the actual estimate of change since 1980
1986
Sources: Numerators: Official national informants
Denominators: OECD Household Transfer Data Base, except for Australia (1990 onwards).
Belgium (1985 onwards), Iceland, Luxembourg, Portugal (1990 onwards), UK (1992) - where
Government calculations of social security used. These different denominators can affect the
shares shown; for example, the shares for Germany are considerably higher than those in
German Government sources
2.3 Recipients of social assistance
We turn now to estimates of the numbers of people receiving social assistance,
which are beset by problems similar to those which apply to expenditure data.
Table 2.6 gives an estimate of the total number of beneficiaries of the various
schemes identified in Table 2.1 in 1992, expressed as a share of the total population
in each country. This provides a broad indication of the salience of social
assistance in the different countries. Unless otherwise stated, all the tables in this
section refer not to the number of recipient families or households, but to the total
numbers of beneficiaries in these families or households.
One of the first difficulties is that a household, or its members, may receive more
than one benefit. Column 3 of Table 2.6 adds together the beneficiaries of general
and group assistance schemes where it is known that they are mutually exclusive.
Where they are not, the higher of the two numbers is inserted to indicate the
minimum potential numbers receiving assistance benefits at that time. This is why
for some countries the figure in column 3 is not the sum of those in the first two
columns. The same issue arises for recipients of housing assistance and other tied
assistance. Here the table gives the proportions receiving each benefit, though
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again we are justified in taking the highest figure in columns 3. 4 and 5 to indicate
the relative scale of means- and income-tested programmes in the population.
It should he noted that none of these tables take any account of the level of
benefits provided: whether a family is receiving 50 pounds or 50 pence a week, its
members will show up as beneficiaries. Similarly. a benefit unit will be counted
whether it receives payments for one week in a year or continuously throughout
the year. Discussion of benefit levels and duration of spells of claiming is held over
to later chapters.
Column I of Table 2.6, giving the numbers of individual beneficiaries of general
assistance schemes, shows the scale of Income Support in the UK. It delivered
benefits to 15 per cent of the British population. a higher proportion than covered
by any other single programme in the OECD area. The US Food Stamps
programme, provincial schemes in Canada, and in recent years the Finnish Living
Allowance, all delivered to about ten per cent of their populations, whilst
assistance in Sweden and Germany covered more than five per cent.
Table 2.6: Individuals (including children) in f al flies receiving social assistance in 1992, as a
percentage of total national populations
Country General Categorical Cash Housing tither tied
assistance assistance assistance assistance assistance
111 121 13=1+2l (net 141 151
nos)
Australia 0.2 17.6 17.8
Austria 0.7 4.1 4.8
Belgium 0.5 8.1 3.6
Canada 9.9 5.1 15.0
Denmark 8.3 8.3
Finland 9.2 9. 2
France 1.1 1.2 2.3 8.8
Germany 4.5 0.7 5.2 2.8` 2.3
Greece 0.7 0.7 -
Iceland' 2.9 6.8 9.7
Ireland 0.5 11.9 12.4
Italy= 4.6 4.6
Japan 0.7 0.7
Luxembourg 2.7 0.6 2.7 0.03
Netherlands' 1.5 2.2 3.7 6.3
New Zealand 25.0 25.0
Norway 4.O z 1.0 4,0 1.9
Portugal' -- 2.1 2.1
Spain 0.3 2.7 2.? ma
Sweden 6.8 6.8
Switzerland 1,8 2.3 2.3
Turkey
UK
na
15.3
Ma
0.6
na
15.9
n%a
7.6 11.6
USA 10.0 7.55 10.0 2.2 11.2
Notes: Beneficiaries of programmes shown in Table 2.1 unless otherwise stated_
Cash assistance numbers = col I + col 2 minus estimated numbers receiving financial Assistance
who are 65 years and older
1991
Social Economic Assistance `cases`. As some people may claim in more than one municipality during
one year. the number of recipients is somewhat lower (around six per cent lower in 1992).
Recipients . of all non-contributory benefits. Hence this figure is a considerable over-estimate of the
numbers receivin g means-tested benefits
1990
r Supplemental Security Income and Aid to families with Dependent Children only
Medicaid only
Sources: National official and academic informants
When categorical schemes are included, New Zealand and Australia predominated
- a quarter of New Zealanders and one in six Australians received resource-tested
benefits. Ireland also joins Britain among the high-coverage countries, along with
Canada if recipients of Guaranteed Income Supplement and Spouse's Allowance
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are included. Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Supplemental Security
Income covered 7.5 per cent of the US population, but these mainly overlapped
with Food Stamps (though not entirely, which under-estimates the total number in
the USA). In the next group, with the USA. were Finland. Iceland (if its pension
supplements are included). Sweden and Austria (mainly on the basis of
Unemployment Assistance and pension supplements). At the other extreme, only
two per cent of the population. or less, received cash social assistance in France,
Greece, Japan, Portugal, and Switzerland.
France, the UK and the Netherlands are exceptional in the coverage of their
housing assistance schemes. In Britain, the beneficiaries overlap with those of
Income Support to a great extent, but in France they far outnumber the recipients
of R.MI. or the other assistance schemes, substantially raising the profile of means-
testing in France. Evidence on other tied benefits is sketchy, but two countries
stand out: the USA with over I I per cent receiving Medicaid. the most extensive
assistance programme in the country. and the UK with a similar share receiving
Community Charge Benefit in 1992. When housing assistance and Sonialhife for
people in special circumstances arc included. Germany too joins the ranks of those
countries with extensive proportions of their populations receiving resource-tested
benefits.
The overall conclusion seems clear - in 1992 the English-speaking countries
operated the most extensive social assistance programmes. Of the remaining
nations, the following stand out: Iceland (only on the basis of its pension
supplements). Finland, France. Germany. the Netherlands and Sweden. Those with
the lowest numbers receiving assistance included Japan; Austria and Switzerland;
and Portugal and Greece.
Table 2.7 reports trends in beneficiaries of cash assistance (column 3 of Table 2.6)
as a proportion of total populations since 1980. The absolute changes range from
the UK at one extreme (a growth in share of population of nearly seven percentage
points) to New Zealand at the other (a decline of over five points). The latter is in
contrast to the expansion of New Zealand expenditure on social assistance, and
i mplies a more focused targeting of benefits.
Table 2.7: Individual beneficiaries of cash assistance. as a percentage of national populations..
1980-1992
Country 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 Change Index: 19921
1980-92 1 1980 1
(% pop) 1980=100
Australia 13.6 14.9 14.8 15.9 17.8 4.2 131
Austria 5.2 5.0 4.8 4.8 4.8 -- 0.4 92
Belgium 1.92 2.3 3 3.6 3.4 3.6 1.7 189
Canada 11.22 13.2 12.7 13.7 15.1 3.9 135
Denmark nra nra ttia n;a 8.3 nia na
Finland 3.5' 4.9 63 7.9 9.2 5.7 265
France 0.8 1.0 2.0 2.1 2.3 1.5 296
Germans 4.0 5.2 7.0 6.2 6.8 2.9 172
Greece na nla 0.7 0.7 0.7 na n:'a
Iceland' nta n a 3.8 3.6 3.7 irrat n . a
Ireland 8.8 10.23 10.8 11.6 12.4 3.7 142
Italy 3.4 3.8 4.6 4.6 nla 1.2 135
Japan 1.2 1,2 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.5 59
Luxembourg na 2.83 n/a nia 2.7 n%a nrz:
Netherlands 2.6 4.1 3 3.8 3.7 n%a 1.1 143
New Zealand 30.7 32.3 37.3 24.4 25.1) ....5.7 82
Norway 1.5 2.6 3.9 4.0 4.0 271
Portugal' 0.9 3.2 2.4 2.2 2.1 1.2 241
Spain n%a n'a t o u. a 2.7 n tt n a
Sweden 4.1 6.4 6.0 6.2 6.8 2.7 164
Switzerland' 1.8 2.0 n/a 2.4 2.3 0.5 130
Turkey na na na nia na na nia
UK' 8.6 14.6 12.2 13.4 15.3 6.7 177
USA: FS 8.4 8.3 8.0 8.9 10.0 1.5 118
USA: (SSi±
AFDC)
6.5 6.2 6.6 7.1 7.5 1.0 116
Notes: See footnotes to Table 2.6.
Increases up to 1991 where no data for 1992
1981
1986
Categorical assistance schemes only
Excluding pension supplements
h Income Support only
Recipients of all non-contributory benefits
Sources: Data supplied by official and academic national informants
Most countries recorded a substantial expansion in the number of beneficiaries as a
percentage of the population, especially Britain, Australia. Canada. Ireland.
Germany and the Nordic countries. The proportionate increase was greatest in
Scandinavia (except Sweden. although claimant numbers have grown substantially
there since 1992) and in several EU states, including France. Germany, Belgium
and Portugal. The expansion of coverage of the major schemes in the USA (with
the exception of Earned Income Tax Credit) was one of the lowest in the OECD -
a likely reflection of the USA's record on job growth and unemployment. Overall.
country differences in the coverage of social assistance narrowed over the period.
In several there was a marked expansion in the early 1990s.
Types of assistance beneficiary
It is difficult to obtain comparable data on the categories of assistance recipients,
but Table 2.8 displays what information it has been possible to gather for four
major groups: older people, disabled people, lone parents and the unemployed.
These groups sometimes overlap and the table is dependent here on the statistical
and classification systems adopted by different nations. Usually classification is
based on whoever in the benefit unit actually makes the claim.. on the 'head of
household', or on the ' key person'. In countries with a basic general safety-net
scheme, the data are derived from official statistics on such schemes. In countries
where categorical assistance programmes predominate, the numbers are usually
equated with those receiving specific benefits. as detailed in Table 2.9.
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The numbers in each group are still expressed as a proportion of the total
population, not the population in each category, since comparable information of
this kind is not available for many of the countries. Thus the proportions in the
table are influenced by the relative importance of each group in the national
population. There are clearly limitations to this way of presenting the data, but
given the wide divergences in programmes this at least ensures some level of
comparability across countries. Some chapters on individual countries in Volume
Two include further information on beneficiaries as a proportion of the particular
population group.
Table 2.8: Main categories of social assistance beneficiaries, 1992
Social assistance beneficiaries in each category as "n of total national populations_ Cash benefits only
Country Aged Disabled Lone parent Unemployed
Australia 8.5 2.8 1
.
6 4.4
Austria` 3.4 Ma 0.2 0.7
Belgium 1.1 2.0 0.3 n/a
Canada 5.2 2.0 2.8 4.5
Denmark n'a n/a 2.9 Ma
Finland 0.3' II/a 1.3' 3.8
France Ma 1.0 0 . 2 nta
Germany 0.9 1.3 1.0 0.8
Greece 0.3 0.6 0.4 Ma
Iceland 6.8' 1.8 1.3' Ma
Ireland 3.2 0.8 0.9 6.2
Italy' 1.3 2.2 n/a nia
Japan4 0.3 0.3 0.1 n/a
Luxembourg 0.6 0.6 0.2 nia
Netherlands 0.2 nra 0.8 2.1
New Zealand 14.8 0.9 2.8 5.0
Norway 0.2 0.4 1.0 1.2
Portugal 1.3 0.5 n/a nia
Spain 0.1 0.2 Ma 2.4
Sweden 0.4 Ma (}
.
72 n/a
Switzerland 1.8 0.5 n'a nia
Turkey n at rva Ma nia
UK 3.3 1.2 4.7 5.1
USA 0.6 1.6 4.8 0.5
Notes; Total column taken from Table 2.6. col 3 unless otherwise stated. Columns do not necessarily
sum to total.
Calculated from household data, assuming all are single person households
2 Estimated from number of households, assuming 1.5 children per adult
1991
4 Estimated from number of households by applying average ratio of beneficiaries to households for
each year. derived from tables in Volume Two
Including recipients of supplementary pensions
Sources; Internal statistics of main general assistance scheme unless shown otherwise in Appendix Table
(2.9) below
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Table 2.9: Definitions and sources of data for categorical schemes in Table 2.8
For countries not listed below, data comes from internal statistics of main general social assistance scheme
Country .Aged Disabled Single parent
eat_
Lin .iployea'
Australia Age pension and wifelcarer pensions Disability Support Pension Sole Parent Pension U13 _ JSA + NS
Austria Supplementary Pensions Unemployment Assistance
Belgium Revenu Gorunti pour Personifies Agee..? Allocation pour Hondieappes Only those receiving Minimcx
Canada Guaranteed Income Supplement
Spouse's Allowance
ta.aaa
France 1W/nininonn Vieillessc A/tocolions mix rld.tlaes Ilandicapes Allocation pour Parent Isolus
Germany Receiving Sodialhrlfe in institutions Female headed households with children
receiving ,So:ialhilfe
Receiving Soeioilrilfc and giving
unemployment as main reason
Greece
_ea .
Non-ic:nreil Older Person Scheme Receiving disability benefits Unprotected children scheme
Iceland Rc eeivu2 pplr -:;;.ants to age pension Receiving supplements to invalid Y
pension
Ireland Old Age Non-Contributory Pension
(including adult dependants only)
Disabled Persons Maintenance Allowance Lone Parent Allowance (excluding
dependants)
Unemployment and Pre-retirement
Allowance (applicants only . excluding
dependants)
Italy .1'ensione Soria& Disability pension
Luxembourg Allocation pour Personnnes Grarenttent
Ilanndieapes
Netherlands ABW, 65 years and over ABW or RWW
.t
Receiving RWW/WWW
L _at
New Zealand National Superannuation s Guaranteed
Retirement Income
Invalids Benefit Domestic Purposes Benefit/
aa a.
Unemployment Benefit
Norway Receiving Social Economic Assistance
and elso Disability Pension
Receiving Transitional Allowance
Portugal Old-age Social Pe ion Invalidity Social Pension
tat_ .
Spain Non-contributory Pension Disability Assistance Unemployment Assistance
Switzerland Supplementary Pension Supplementary Pension
USA Supplementary Security Income (SST) SSI AFDC AFDC-UP
Older recipients of means-tested benefits are. not surprisingly, numerous in
Australia and New Zealand. which have no social insurance schemes, but also in
the UK and Ireland, where assistance benefits supplement relatively low basic
pensions. In the UK. for example. 20 per cent of Income Support recipients in
1993. were aged 60 or over. All these countries, except for Britain, have a lower
relative share of older people, so that the impact of the benefit system is greater
than these shares would suggest. Older recipients are relatively insignificant in most
other countries. except for some European countries with means-tested social
pensions built into or alongside the social insurance pensions, as in Belgium,
Iceland, Italy and Portugal. In Sweden, for example. only two per cent of
recipients in 1994 were over retirement age.
Assistance recipients with disabilities (and their families) constituted more than one
per cent of the population in most countries for which we have data, and notably
more in Italy. Belgium, Iceland. Australia, Canada and the USA.
One group for whom there is rather more information is that of lone parents. They
formed a relatively large group of assistance beneficiaries in the USA. Canada, the
UK and New Zealand. reflecting in part their incidence in the populations, and
were significant also in Australia and Finland. Elsewhere they made fewer
demands on social assistance in terms of their percentage of the overall
populations, for reasons which vary according to the country, but include low
numbers, their rate of labour participation and the relative success of other income
maintenance systems in supporting separated parents with children. Nevertheless,
they made up a significant proportion of all assistance claimants (as opposed to all
beneficiaries) in a number of countries. In Iceland, for example, 35 per cent of
recipients of Financial Assistance in 1992 were lone parents, while in the
Netherlands they made up nearly half of all those receiving General Assistance
(ABW) and around four per cent of Unemployment Assistance (RWW) recipients.
Other countries with substantial assistance receipt by lone parents included Canada
(around 27 per cent), Denmark (22 per cent), Austria (around 20 per cent) and
Belgium, Germany and the UK (all around 18 per cent). In the USA. AFDC
recipients, most of whom are lone parents. made up about 30 per cent of all
assistance programme recipients. The AFDC claimant population overlaps with
that of Food Stamps, however, so lone parents would constitute an even greater
percentage of recipients overall. In most of the other countries, between nine and
15 per cent of recipients in 1992 were lone parents.
There is surprisingly little comparable information on the proportion of assistance
beneficiaries who are unemployed. They were. however, the largest proportionate
category of recipients for most countries where there was information. By 1992,
unemployment was the cause of a significant demand for means-tested benefits
across the OECD countries, but especially so in all the English-speaking countries
except the USA.
One further pattern which emerges from the data collected for Volume Two is that
in most countries between half and two-thirds of recipients in 1992 were single
people and only around one-third of recipient families, on average, had children.
What these data conceal, however, is the high proportion of women in the
assistance-receiving populations of many of the countries in the study. Breakdowns
of family types by sex are not available for all the countries, but it is noticeable
that benefit units headed by single women and female lone parents made up
between one-third and 60 per cent of all recipients in the countries for which we
have information. In the Netherlands as many as 80 per cent of General Assistance
and one-third of Unemployment Assistance recipients were women. Although, as
we have seen, older people make up only a small proportion of assistance
recipients in most countries, they are often single women. When these women are
counted along with others in couple families, it is clear that what has been called
the `feminisation of poverty'. while varying among the countries studied, is a
significant feature of social assistance provision in the OECD countries.
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Changes in assistance populations over time
Table 2.10 brings together the sparse information available on changes in the
composition of social assistance beneficiaries. again as a proportion of total
population rather than the particular population groups. This is supplemented with
other information provided in the country studies in Volume Two.
Of the 11 countries with data on elderly recipients of social assistance. six exhibited
a decline and one showed no change - only in New Zealand was there a significant
growth. In Portugal the numbers declined after 1985 with the expansion of social
insurance, and the same is likely to be true of Spain and Greece. Old age is.
generally speaking, a diminishing reason for people to claim means-tested benefits
- in absolute as well as relative terms. One exception to this pattern was Iceland.
where changes in the structure of pensions brought a large number of older people
into receipt of means-tested supplements.
Disability. by contrast, appears to have fuelled a growing demand for assistance
payments in all countries for which we have information, except Japan (where
overall numbers on assistance have fallen steadily). In the USA, Australia and
Belgium growth in claims by disabled people has reflected both widening
entitlements and more generous benefits. The rapid expansion in Italy is thought to
be due partly to the use of disability benefits as a substitute for other contingencies.
such as unemployment, for which there is no clear entitlement.
Table 2.10: Changes in main categories of beneficiaries 1980-1992
Percentage cif total national populations. Cash benefits only
Country Aged Disabled Lone parent Unemployed
Australia -0.8 0.8 0.8 2.3
Austria -0.8 0.6
Belgium 0.4 1.0
Canada -0.2 1 4.1
Denmark
Finland 0.5
France 0.3 0.1
Germany -0.1 0.4 0.4 0.6`
Greece -0.1
Iceland
Ireland
Italy 1.3
Japan --0.1 0.3 --0.1
Luxembour g 0.3
Netherlands '- -0.7 --0.4 1.3
New Zealand 1.9 0.4 1.7 4.3
Norway 0.0 0.7
Portugal 0.6 0.4
Spain' 2.1
Sweden 0.32
Switzerland 0.3 0.2
Turkey
UK 4 -0.3 0.7 2.9 0.4
USA --0.2 0.6 0.4 0.3
Notes: See Table 2.9 for sources and definitions.
Only refers to decrease in number at Spouse's Allowance recipients
Increase to 1991
Increase from 1982
Increase from 1981
Beneficiaries of Arheitslosenhilfe
Consistent time-series data on lone parent recipients are available for 12 countries,
and there is some evidence on other countries in the individual chapters in Volume
Two, I.n all, except japan and the Netherlands, a growing number of claimants are
single parents. and this is also true for Austria and Ireland. Their expansion has
been especially dramatic in Britain and New Zealand, though not, surprisingly, in
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the USA. In Australia and New Zealand the rise has been fuelled by rising
numbers and more generous entitlements and benefits.
It is, however, unemployment which appears to be the principal cause of the rising
social assistance clientele since 1980 1 . Data on unemployed claimants are sparse,
but this pattern holds for all the countries in Table 2.10, except the USA and the
UK. The country reports in Volume Two show that this is also true for Finland
and Sweden in recent years and for Ireland throughout the period. It has pushed
another four per cent of New Zealanders and Canadians on to social assistance
over the last decade.
The impact of unemployment on social assistance claims is mediated by country
differences in entitlements, the range and generosity of alternative benefits and
changes in the definitions of unemployment. In Germany, and several other
countries, it is the growth of long-term unemployment which has had the greatest
impact. In Canada. recent cuts in unemployment insurance have led to more
people claiming under the Assistance Plan, whereas in Denmark rising
unemployment has had little impact on the demand for assistance because of a new
non-contributory benefit. In New Zealand, the growth of unemployed claimants
has been fuelled by a combination of rapidly rising numbers, more generous
entitlements and benefits, and a rising take-up rate. On the other hand, the number
of out-of-work recipients in the Netherlands has fallen since 1984 (this is hidden in
Table 2.10) and those in the UK have risen only slightly, despite a big increase in
unemployment in both countries since 1979. In both cases this is probably due to
the removal of young persons from social assistance onto special employment
schemes.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter has described the pattern of expenditures on, and recipients of, social
assistance in 1992 and trends in each since 1980, in so far as comparable data have
been available. Certain national patterns have begun to emerge which will be
fleshed out in subsequent chapters. In the final chapter we return to the issue of
welfare regimes and propose an overall typology to make sense of the national
variations across the OECD world. In spite of the differences. common trends have
been uncovered. The share of social assistance expenditures expanded in every
country, except Japan and Switzerland, during the 1980s and early 1990s, while
over the same period the proportion of the population receiving assistance benefits
rose in every country except Japan, Austria and New Zealand. The growth of
unemployment and of lone parenthood appeared to be the main significant factors
in this expansion, though expansion of provision for disabled people, as well as
some use of disability payments in lieu of unemployment benefits, also contributed.
Generally older people are becoming less likely to have to rely on social assistance,
although changes in pension structures in a few countries have increased the
numbers of older people receiving means-tested supplements. A significant
proportion of recipient families are headed by women.
The next chapter looks in more detail at the basic principles and structures of
assistance schemes.
Though care must be exercised in comparing particular years, since the business cycle affects demand
for benefits, something not accounted for in Table 2.10.
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Chapter 3 The Structure and Principles of
Social Assistance Schemes
3.1 Introduction
Chapter Two looked at ways of classifying the various income-related and means-
tested benefits provided by the countries in the study and showed that the role of
social assistance expanded in most OECD member countries during the 1980s. We
now move on to compare the structure of these benefits and the rules governing
eligibility and entitlement, looking at how far common principles and practices can
be discerned across schemes, the level of policy convergence or divergence and
explanations for differing or unusual policy approaches.
We saw earlier that social assistance regimes have been classified according to their
position on four continua - general versus categorical, income maintenance versus
social work, legal rights versus discretion, and central versus local (Lodemel and
Schulte. 1992). These are important dimensions of analysis for trying to create
primary groupings among countries, but it could be argued that the four criteria
are both insufficiently comprehensive and simultaneously too broad in themselves
to capture the full extent of similarity and variation between schemes. This chapter
takes a more multi-dimensional approach to the structure of assistance, looking at
the underlying principles; basic conditions of eligibility; inclusion and exclusion;
legal rights and discretion; units of entitlement and assessment; and resource
testing. It also examines how different schemes deal with housing costs and with
exceptional needs.
We start by considering the basic aims and principles of assistance schemes.
3.2 Aims and principles
The purposes of social assistance schemes are generally outlined in legislation or
policy statements, and a number of countries with written constitutions have
included within them some expression of the obligation of the state to guarantee its
citizens a minimum standard of living. Australia is one of the countries which
expresses most directly the links between social assistance and wider economic and
social objectives, subjecting policy proposals and amendments affecting means-
tested benefits to annual review for their contribution to a wider strategy of `Social
Justice'. However, this explicit link is perhaps made partly because all benefits are
of the assistance type.
Government respondents were asked for a statement of policy aims on social
assistance. Those provided, which included both statements enshrined in laws and
constitutions and expressions of policy by officials. were fairly similar across the
whole range of countries. They basically encompassed three main principles:
1. the schemes are there to guarantee a minimum standard of living to people
whose incomes are insufficient
2. people must lack the ability to support themselves adequately by other
means or by access to other resources
3. schemes are not meant to encourage dependency but should incorporate
measures to promote self-sufficiency and independence.
The relative emphasis placed on these three principles varies between countries, as
does the definition, in so far as it is given. of the 'minimum'. In some countries,
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including Austria, Germany and Luxembourg, reference is made to 'decent'
standards or those in keeping with human dignity': others refer to `reasonable' or
`adequate' resources. As Chapter Five explains, the basis for the establishment of
the reference minimum for assistance schemes differs widely between countries.
Several, especially the Northern European and Nordic countries. place a particular.
expressed emphasis on the principle of `subsidiarity', or the necessity of drawing
upon all other available help or resources before being entitled to public assistance.
However, the practical application of this principle again varies considerably, both
in terms of the range and level of' personal resources which are exempted from
means testing and in the extent to which it is expected that the resources of other
people should be called upon before an individual has a right to public assistance.
Around half of all the countries explicitly state that one of the purposes or
functions of assistance is to promote self-reliance and social integration, but no
clear pattern emerges amongst these countries: they include representatives of all
regime types. including both Australia and New Zealand, where all benefits are
income-related or means-tested, and others where assistance benefits are a minor
element of social security.
One indication of how serious a country is about restricting long-term dependence
on assistance is whether duration on benefits can be time-limited. However, there is
a basic conflict here between the promotion of independence and the provision of a
last-resort safety net. Thus, although time limits have been introduced or tightened
in several countries for entitlement to unemployment insurance or assistance, limits
in general assistance schemes are untypical. The exceptions include mainly those
countries with more discretionary or less comprehensive schemes, including Spain,
Italy (for non-elderly and able-bodied people), Austria, Denmark, Switzerland and
Turkey (where assistance is generally assumed to be temporary and time limits are
discretionary), France (the RMI and some of the social minima) and the USA
( General Assistance only, in some states). A number of other countries impose time
limits on some of their categorical schemes, including Portugal and New Zealand
(Job Search Allowance for those aged 16-17), but mainly these limits relate to age
or duration in a particular population category. Once entitlement has expired
claimants can often become eligible for a different benefit.
Overall, there seems to be little sign of any general movement towards limited
duration in assistance, partly because, in spite of a widespread concern about the
consequences of long-term dependence on benefits, it is the pressures of
unemployment and social change which are leading to longer-term claiming. In
these circumstances the imposition of time limits risks defeating the purpose of a
safety net. The emphasis is therefore more on work incentives and job promotion.
as discussed in Chapter Seven. Even in the USA, where the Clinton administration
has taken a tough line on welfare and has proposed to limit receipt of AFDC to
two years, it is recognised that this can only work if the jobs programme element of
the package is made much more effective (Finn, 1994).
Policy principles for social assistance schemes are inevitably presented at a
somewhat rhetorical level and the formal similarity in aims disguises considerable
differences between countries, particularly, as we show later in this chapter, in the
extent of coverage offered by the benefits available and in the practical
interpretation of the requirement to exhaust other resources.
Establishing a claim for a social assistance benefit almost invariably requires a two-
stage process of assessment. First it has to be determined whether an applicant is
eligible for the benefit --- that is, whether s/he falls into a category of person for
whom the benefit is intended. This might be by reference to age, family type.
labour market status or hours of work, residence or nationality, or various other
criteria. Secondly, if eligibility has been established, it then has to be determined
whether the claimant is entitled to benefit on the basis of their needs and their
resources. We look first at conditions of eligibility.
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3.3 Conditions of eligibility
Table 3.1, stretching over the next few pages, provides a broad, comparative
outline of some of the main conditions of eligibility for the resource-tested benefits
in the countries studied. The picture provided is inevitably over-simplified and
partial: for more detail the reader should turn to the individual country reports in
Volume Two. However. this form of graphic presentation helps to illuminate
patterns of similarity and difference. We concentrate here on income-related or
means-tested benefits providing either general or group-specific cash help. and
exclude the separate ' tied' benefits, such as housing support. The table includes
both what were described in the last chapter as `poverty-tested' benefits and the
other important allowances which go further up the income scale. It also indicates
whether the main general minimum income benefit available is organised
predominantly on a national or a sub-national basis and whether it is primarily
rights-based or discretionary. The table shows the main features of eligibility,
including the target population group. the minimum (or maximum) age for
individual eligibility, the main residence or nationality requirements_ whether there
are work-seeking requirements, any limits to the number of hours claimants can
work and still receive benefit, and any other important country- or benefit-specific
criteria. Availability for work requirements are discussed in more detail in Chapter
Seven.
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Table 3.1: Main conditions of eligibility for income-related and means-tested benefits in the OECD countries
Minimum (max.) age Residence/nationality Work tests
16 Resident of and in Australia Yes
16 (60 women, 65 Yes
men)
18 (60 women, 65 Yes (unless
men) over 60)
60 or 65 10 years residence, No
including 5 continuously
55 women, 60 men Resident of and in Australia No
(10 years for Allied or
Commonwealth vets.)
16 (60 or 65) Either Aus, resident when No
incapacity started, or 10
years residence, or
dependent child of resident
21, unless claimant or None No
partner has child
(60 or 65) Must be in Australia No
£'ountry General benefits Categorical benefits "Target group
Australia Special Benefit' People with severe
(national, regulated) financial needs and no
other entitlements
Job Search allowance Unemployed under 18 or
in first year of
unemployment
New Start Allowance Unemployed over 18 or
alter 1 year
Age Pension Older people
Service Pension Veterans
Disability Support Disabled people
Pension
Wife Pension Partners of age or
disability pensioners
Carer Pension Resident carers of
severely disabled people
No
10 hours per week
30 hours per week At least 20 %
impairment and
continuing incapacity
for work
No
full-time work
Working hours limit Other
Must be providing
constant care in the
person's home and be
living with or next to
them.
16(60or65)
No minimum age
Sickness Allowance Short-term sick
Sole Parent Pension Lone parents
Also:-
Family Payments
Resident of and in Australia No
Resident at becoming sole No
parent, or 5 years
continuous residence, or 10
years overall
8 hours per week if
unemployed
No Must seek child support
from ex-partner
Table 3.1. Main conditions of eligiliilil:y for ncome-related and means-tested benefits the OECD coules (remni.)
Country General benefits Categorical benefits Target gn)up Minimum (max.) age Residence/nationality Work tests Working hours limit Other
General 14
Unemployed whose (retirement. age)
entitlement to insurance
benefit has expired
Older people whose Retirement age
insurance pensions
are below minlrnurn
13ebtian and EU (titbit is,
pins accepted refugees.
Must also be registered as
resident in municipality
6£I (women) Citizenship (incl. ELI), plus
residence for 5 years before
claim or It) during life
Same (with some
exceptions)
Austria Sozialbille
(Provincial ;
discretionary)
Unemployment
Assistance
Supplementary
Pensioi, i
Residence in relevant
province. Some provinces
also require Austrian
citizenship, but Eli
nationals and recognised
refugees also covered
Yes, unless No
e xe 111171
Yes l= ull-time work
No No Contributory
Belgium Minimex
(national, regulated)
18 (unless parent or
pregnant.)
General
Revemt Garanti noun Older people
Personnes Agees 65 (men)
20 (65)Allocation pour
Handicappes
Allocation l= amiliale
(i aranti
Disabled people
No nationality. condition,
Families/children (18 or end of full- but 5 year parental
ti me education.) residence
Yes, unlcs No
exempt
No No
No No
No No
Canada Canada Assistance Plan
(Provincial, regulated)
Yes, if
regarded as
'employable'
Guaranteed Income
Supplement and
Spouse's Allowance
it in 3 provinces, in-
work benefits
Denmark Social Bistatnd
(local, regulated/
discretionary)
GeneraI
Low income families in
work
General
18 or 19, depending Residence in Canada. Some
on Province provinces also require
minimum period of
residence in province or
municipality.
Accepted refugees eligible
25 (66) Danish or Nordic citizen.
Youth allowance for and refugees. EU citiz a is ' '
those 18..24 resident for 3 years
Yes. Not eligible if' in Must have been subject
Special work full-tithe work to major event affecting
integration ability to earn a living
schemes for
young people
Older people
Table 3.1: Main conditions of eligibility for income-related and means-nested benefits the OFC) countries (contd)
Country General benefits Categorical benefits Target group Minimum (max.) age Residence/nationality Work tests Working hours li mit Other
Finland Living Allowance
(local, discretionary)
France Revenu Minim um
d°Insertion
( national. regulated)
General
General
Social nuinima:
Vieillesse Older people
Ilandieapes Disabled
No official lower
limit but in practice
18
25. unless parent or
pregnant
Under 25:
discretionary aide
sociale
65, or 60 if disabled
20 (60)
Residence and registration Al the No
with a municipality discretion of
local authorities
Rsc.iproctl agreement with
y'nrdr- countries
Fr:nch nationality or, for Yes, with No
foreigners, 10 years `insertion'
residence or three years contracts
legal residence and
employment
Current legal residence No Specified level of
disability
Yes
Paren [sole Lone parents
Invalidate Sick or disabled
Veuvage Widows with children (55)
Solidarite Specifique Long-term unemployed 25 (65)
Child under 3.
Sick or disabled
through non-work
accident and unable
to work.
Unemployment
insurance exhausted.
Must have worked 5
of previous 10 years
People not entitled to
unemployment benefits
Insertion Yes25 (65)
No lower age limit
or other minima
Germany Sozialhilfe General
(national/regional.
regulated)
Residence only, but. Yes, unless No
restrictions for non-German exempt
citizens, including refugees
Arbeitslosenhilt'e Unemployed For those without
entitlement to insurance
benefit. Includes
contribution test
Yes
Scheme for unprotected Children needing support
children through orphanhood or
the father being unable to
provide
No specific ago limit
for parent
Payable until child is
16
Minimum pension Older people without 65
adequate social insurance
First-time job seeker's cover 20 (29)
allowance
Greece No generalised social
assistance
Categorical schemes
are national and
regulated
Not specified No
Generally Greek citizenship No
and two years residence in
province required
Refugees and asylum
seekers eligible if they have Yes
permit to stay
3itble 3.1: Main conditions of eligibility for come-related and means-tested benefits in the OECD countries (contd.)
Minimum (max.) age Residemelnationality Work tests Working hours limit Other
16 Legal residence Yes unless No
exempted
Reciprocal agreements with (though varies
Nordic countries by area)
67 or 16 (66) for No No For invalidity, working
invalidity capacity must have
been reduced by at
least. 75 per cent
Residence in Ireland Yes, if Must not he in full-
circumstances time work (30 hrs
permit per week)
Unemployed 18 Yes Up to 3 days work.
per week
Country General benefits Categorical benefits Target group
Iceland Financial Assistance
(local, regulated,
discretionary)
General
Ireland Supplementary Welfare
Allowance
(national, regulated)
Unemployment
Assistance
Supplementary
retirement and
invalidity pensions
Pensioners with little or
no incomes besides
minimum insurance
pensions
General 18
Pre-retirement
Allowance
Old Age Pension
Blind Person's
Pension
Widow's Pension
Deserted Wife's
Allowance
Prisoner's Wife's
Allowance
Orphan's Allowance
Carer's Allowance
Lone Parent
Allowance
Disabled Person's
Maintenance
Allowance
Family Income
Supplement
Unemployed over 55 55
years
Older people 66
Blind people 18
Widows who have not 18
remarried.
Women deserted by 4t)
husband.
Women with husband in 40
prison for 6 months or
more.
Orphans (18 or 21 if in full-
ti me education)
Full-time c a ors of 18
pensioners or
disabled people
l.., one parent or prisoner's 18
wile with chi.ld(ren)
Disabled for at least 1 16 (65}
year
Working families 18
with child. en
No Must not have Must have received
earnings over £25 unemployment
per week assistance for i5
months
No No
No No
No No
No No
No No
No No
No Must not be in
employment outside
the home
No No
No Must be verified as
arable to work
No Must be working at
least 20 hours pax.
v.
Table 3.1: Main conditions of eligibility for incot elated and means-tested benefits in the OECD countries . (contd.
General benefits Categorical benefits Target group
Minim() Vitale General
(local, discretionary
Pensione Sociale Older people
Disability Pensions L)isahlcd people
(Also family
allowances)
Country
Italy
Minimum (max.) age Residence/nation ality Work tests Working hours limit Other
Residence in niunicipali Yes, including Discretionary
and legal residence in Italy, insertion'
including 1AJ citizens schemes
65 No
Includes benefits for Yes unless
children and for fully incapable
adults lit r of work
Japan Livelihood Aid
(national, regulated)
plus Educational Aid
Housing Aid
Medical Aid
Maternity Aid
Occupational Aid
Funeral Aid
Luxembourg Resenu Minimum
(.laranti
(national, regulated)
Allocation de Vie
Chore
General No specific litttits Japanese nationals and Yes, subject to No
others ai.ith long-term discretion of
resid_ ce licence social workers
General 30 Resident for 10 otrt of Yes, unless No
previous 20 years and exempted
registered with local
authority
No
Allocations pour Disabled and needing 3 (65)
Personnes substantial care
Gravement
Llandieappees
Allocations de Soins People with high care 65 Residence for 10 out of last No
needs 15 years
IS Residence in Netherlands. No, except lone No
Non-Thatch citizens only if parents with
covered by agreements children over 5
tInemployment
Assistance (RW) Unemployed 18 Yes No
I OAW Unemployed. and aged 50 No No
over 50 or partially
incapacitated
Netherlands Algernene f3istand
(nil tronal.reg ulatcd)
General
Self-employed who have Usually 55 (65), but
had to give tip work can he younger
No, unless No
younger than
55
1OAZ
tcable 3.1: Main conditions of eligibility for income-related and means-tested benefits in the OPCT) countries ecrntd. i
Country General benefits Categorical benefits Target group Minimum (maxi) age Residenceinationality
New Zealand Special Benefit'
(national, regainted) 1..Jnem loyment
Benefits:
General 16 Current residence
L`B Unemployed 15 12 months prior residence
independent
Youth Benefit
Young unemployed 16 (17)
55+ benefit Older unemployed 55
Train inis Benefit
Sickness Benefit
invalid Benefit
People on short training
courses
Short-term sick
Permanently
incapacitated
16
16
16
t0 years prior
5 years prior
Domestic Purposes
Benefit
Widows' benefit
Transitional
Retirement
Benefit
Lone parents, divorced or
separated women over
50. or non-spouse carers
Widows
Retired people not yet
entitled to
superannuation
18 or 50
16
60
5 years prior
10 years prior
Norway Social Economic.
Assistance
(local, discretionary)
General 18 Legal residents, plus other
Nordic citizens
Transitional Allow-am: Lone parents (with
children tinder 10)
18
Work tests Working hours limit Other
Yes No
Yes
Yes
Yes, but less
stringent.
Yes
Training
No Yes
No
No No
No
No
Yes No
Yes, but only No
when youngest
child hers
finished school
year after
reaching 10
years
Unemployed people not
entitled to insurance
benefit
Older people without
insurance pensions
Disabled people without
insurance cover
Unemployment
Assistance
Social Pension
Disability Pension
General
General
fable 3.1: Main conditions of eligibility for income-related and means-tested benefits
Country General benelits Categorical benefits Target group
Portugal (national,rcgulated) Family Allowance Families/children
Supplementary Disabled children &
Allowance young; people
Constant Attention For those receiving
Allowance Stapp. Allowance
Integration Benefit Young people
Social Pension Disabled and older
people
Special Education To cover costs of
Allowance special education
Nursing Allowance Maternity costs
Orphan's Pension Orphans
Survivor's Grant Survivors
Spain Ingreso Minimo General
d 'Insercion
(regional, regulated)
Sweden Social Welfare
Allowance
(local, discretionary)
Switzerlandmm Soziale Ftirsorge/Aide
Sociale
(local, discretionary)
25 (65) No nationality condition Yes. if No
but min. of. 1 year residence economically
in region. Also applies to active
EU citizens
Single 45 (651 Legal residence Yes No
with family 18 (65)
65 10 years residence in Spain No
(including 2 preceding
claim)
18 (65) 5 years residence in Spain No
In principle 15, but Legal residence in Sweden, Yes No
normally 18 Reciprocal arrangements
with Nordic countries
No specific age limit Swiss citizens and legally Yes, unless No
resident foreigners. exempt
Entitlement based on
the OECD Countries (contd. )
Minh-man x..) age Residencelnationality Work teas .Working looms liiii t Other
i n.
14 for independent
claims (up to 25 if in
full-time education)
(18)
Resident nationals of
Portugal, plus resident EU
citizens and others where
bilateral agreement exists
No No
16
18 Yes
No
(18)
Also depends on
length of time since
insurance exhausted
and on contributions
Minimum 65"/+,
incapacity
cantonal residence
Supplements to
insurance age and
invalidity pensions
Contributory
Table 3.1: Main conditions of eligibility for income-rebated and means-tested benefits in the OECD countries (contd.)
General benefits Categorical benefits Target group Minimum (max.) age
Social Assistance and General 18
Solidarity Scheme
(national, regulated)
Old Age and Disability Older and disabled 65 for older people
Assistance people not covered by 18 (65) for disabled
insurance schemes
Also . Medical costs
Green Card scheme
Assistance for actors
and musicians
Two other small
schemes for children,
students etc in need
I)K Income Support
(national, regulated)
Family Credit Working families with No minimum age
children
Country
Turkey
Other
Must be in need and
capable of becoming
independent with
minimum educational
and training assistance
Minimum 400
incapacity
Y' , unless y ~ . In hours per
>: rtnperd week (24 for
partners of
unemployed
claimants)
No Minimum of 16
hours per week
Residence/nationality. Work teats Working hours limit
Ail residents, including Yes N~-?
refugees
Turkish nationals No
Yes, within
capacities
Normally 18, unless 'Habitually resident' in 1 K,
parent or in hardship unless 'worker' under Ell
regulations or accepted
refugee. Other restrictions
relating to immigration status
General
Also:
Disability Working Disabled people in work
Allowance
Council Tax Benefit Local tax relief 18 (if liable for
council tax)
No Minimum of 16 Depends on being
hours per week currently or recently in
receipt of a specified
sickness or disability
benefit
No
Table 3.1: Main conditions of eligibility for income-related and nears-tested bendits in the OECD countries (contd. i
General benefits ategorical benefits Target group
_
Food Stamps -_--
(nationa.l, regulated)
General Assistance
(State, regulated)
Aid to Pan sties Lone parents and two- No minimum age US citizens or lawful alien, Yes, unless Maximum of 100
with Dependent parent families with and resident of State in exempt hours per month
Children unemployed main earner which application made
Supplemental Aged, blind or disabled 65, unless blind or IJS citizen or lawfully No No
disabled admitted alien, including
some whose status is being
decided
Medical costs for aged, No age limits
blind, disabled, families
and pregnant women
Veterans Pensions Disabled veterans and
their survivors
Country
USA Gene
Minimum (max.) age
Normally IS (In
independent claims
Normally 18
ResialerccelnatiorBality
ere_
US citizens or lawfully
resident aliens
Depends on state
Work tests Working hours limit Other
Yes, unless
exempted
Yes, in some
states
Vaaries, in sonic states
only available to
disabled or `chronically
nerdy'
Security Income
Also:
Medicaid
No No
Based on service in forces No Pen nanent and total
disablement from non-
service connected
causes
No
Because social security is virt .ally' all income- or means--tested, general cover is provided through the combination of categorical benefits, and Special Benefit is at subsidiary benefit with relatively few claimants
The first point that is evident from this table is that the policy of guaranteeing
minimum incomes through one generalised, all-encompassing means-tested benefit
is still fairly unusual. and is confined mainly to the Nordic states (the Norwegian
Transitional Allowance is income-related. rather than means-tested. and is not
regarded within Norway as part of social assistance). Canada has one broad
national assistance framework. but the provincial autonomy of regulation and
administration has the effect of creating a set of regional sub-systems of assistance.
Under new Federal funding arrangements, to be introduced from 1996 :';J 7,
provincial autonomy will increase further. though with reduced central finance
Volume Two, Chapter 5). Japan is a marginal case, since the assistance s
there has a unified structure. but is divided into a number of functional elements. It
could be argued that Austria and Switzerland also belong to the unit.ry
since categorical schemes outside the main assistance benefits are 'i t
supplementary pensions and short-term unemployment assistance. The ;
with some of the Scandinavian countries a high level of regional or local on.
The majority preference is still for separate coverage by popul _.egorv.
here a number of approaches must be distinguished from one any>t Tier. One grou o.
principally the southern European or Mediterranean countries. including C r C_
Italy. Portugal. Spain and Turkey, organise limited minimum income protection
principally in relation to specific groups, such as older or disabled people. families
with children. or unemployed people (with unemployment assistance usually
available only on a temporary basis). In some of these countries there is then a
discretionary local assistance back-up. Althou gh the scale of assistance provision in
the USA is much greater than in any of these countries. it may he argued that the
structure is not dissimilar. although welfare in the USA is identified particularly
with lone-parent families.
Another group. including the UK and the other northern European countries. have
one primary and inclusive national assistance benefit. together with a s a ving
number of other categorical benefits which serve somewhat different funetin s. In
the case of the UK. for example, Family Credit and Disability Working A.
have a specific function related to work incentives and low pay, an thus
potentially reach further up the income scale than does Income Support. In-work
benefits for families available in three Canadian provinces and in Ireland fulfil a
similar function. The various categorical minima in Belgium and Luxembourg
allow less restrictive rules to apply to groups such as the elderly. who might be seen
as more `deserving', and have different sources of finance. In the Netherl_
_-
different schemes relate primarily to claimants' labour market status. mace and
Ireland may be seen as fallin g in this group. althou gh the extent of coverage
derives more from the range of group-specific benefits rather than fr one over-
arching one. Finally. Australia and New Zealand have to be seen t~. gether as a
separate case, where comprehensive coverage derives from their fully rem. , _.r
tested categorical benefit systems. None of these divisions. however, can be --
absolute. All countries have developed individual approaches based on n:
history and policy traditions. and it is not possible to understand how v idely
income protection is offered through different systems simply from the clu; ers of
population groups named as the target beneficiaries. One way of _ more
closely at coverage is in terms of inclusion and exclusion of population, c o~ ins by
age and by nationality or residence.
3.4 Inclusion and exclusion
Minimum age thresholds
Lookin g first at the minimum age at which individual claims can be made for
general-purpose assistance benefits, it is clear that the most common ~'d is
18. Australia and New Zealand both differ in makin g special unemployrnec t or
training benefits available from the age of 16, and Gc:'many- and Japan have no
specific lower age limit. though the assumption is still parents would normally
support children at least until they leave school. ,act, most countries do not
make assistance benefits. as such, available to students in higher education, and
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parents are normally regarded as responsible for them until the end of their
courses. This policy, however, has to be seen in the light of wider educational
policies and the availability of student grant aid --- topics which are not covered in
any detail in this study.
France and Luxembourg stand out in restricting access to the Revenu Minimum
d'inser•tion (RMI) and the Rcreuu Minimum Garanti (RMG) to those aged at least
25 and 30 respectively (though minimum age thresholds are generally not applied
to persons looking after dependent children). While in France some unemployed
people under 25 may have access to insurance benefits on the basis of previous
work. or to training courses and special employment schemes, it is clear that young
people are relatively lacking in support through social assistance compared to those
in most other countries with general schemes. The exclusion of people under 30
from eligibility in Luxembourg is regarded by national commentators as a major
shortcoming of the RMG in principle. In practice, however, low unemployment
and the availability of non-contributory access to temporary Unemployment
Benefit for those under 21 completing full-time education. have tended to reduce
the impact of this restriction.
In general, while comparison shows that restricting access to benefit in normal
circumstances to those over 18 is not unusual, this policy also has to be seen
alongside broader policies on youth training and employment, and on access to
non-means-tested unemployment benefits. In a number of other countries,
including Belgium, Denmark. Finland. Norway and Sweden. if young people are
unemployed they may have access to non-contributory unemployment benefits,
even if these are sometimes set at a level below that of social assistance. Others.
such as Germany. the Netherlands and the UK, attempt to meet this need through
special training or employment schemes. but with varying degrees of success.
Residence and nationality conditions
One of the other ways in which access to generalised social assistance benefits may
be restricted is through nationality or residence conditions. The European Union's
policy of free movement of workers in a single market makes this a live issue at
present, particularly in the light of controversy over immigration from outside the
Union. Table 3.1 gives an abbreviated account of nationality and residence
conditions. which are often complex and closely inter-related with legislation on
migration and citizenship.
More than half the countries in the study require some period of prior residence. in
addition to citizenship of the relevant country or of another with which there is a
reciprocal agreement. Within the European Union, the main exceptions are
Belgium, Germany. Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. The most
restrictive are. again, France and Luxembourg. where eligibility for the main
assistance benefit is limited to those with ten years residence (or three years
continuous, employed residence), and ten years residence out of the previous 20
years respectively. In Luxembourg, registration with a municipality is also required.
Until 1992 Belgium required five years recent residence or ten years over a lifetime,
but this was abolished as a result of a ruling in the European Court. Now only
formal registration with a municipality is required, though this can still act as a
further restriction - particularly for homeless people or others without fixed
addresses. Denmark requires three years residence from EU citizens, while some
regions in Spain impose their own varying prior residential conditions. In this
context, the UK's recent decision to adopt an `habitual residence' test for access to
means-tested benefits is not especially anomalous, though it has been criticised for
moving against the general trend of opening up access to benefits across the Union.
One of the groups most likely to face exclusion from or separate treatment in social
assistance are recent migrants from outside the EU, especially refugees and asylum
seekers. As the previous chapter showed, the economic vulnerability of refugees
and other recent migrants means that in some countries they make up a substantial
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part of the social assistance caseload. There is clearly a tension between principles
of inclusiveness, which are often expressed in policy statements, and anxieties about
immigration, dependency and abuse of welfare benefits. In principle, the majority
of countries take a broadly similar approach to this question, which gives people
accepted as refugees, and accorded rights of residence, the same eligibility for
assistance benefits as other citizens or legal residents. During the period where
refugee or asylum status is being considered, the predominant pattern is for
countries to make separate provision for emergency or reduced payments, either
through special social security benefits, through non-governmental organisations
such as the Red Cross, or through other private institutions. Frequently such
benefits as are available carry no legal entitlement or rights of appeal. In Sweden.
where local authorities have to meet most of the costs of providing assistance,
central government provides extra funds to meet the expenses of help for refugees
during the first three years of their residence in the country.
Countries with lengthy residential qualifying periods. such as France and
Luxembourg, are in effect denying recent refugees and asylum-seekers access to
assistance benefits. There has been some discussion in Luxembourg about
amending regulations for this reason, but no proposals have yet been announced.
Australia too has long qualifying periods for access to age pensions, and New
Zealand for most benefits other than unemployment allowances, but since there is
no insurance basis to their benefits, these restrictions should perhaps be seen partly
as means of ensuring that recipients make a minimum tax contribution to the
economy.
The economic and political pressures arising from both legal and illegal
immigration have led some countries in the last few years to place further
restrictions on benefit entitlement. Germany-, for example, which has accepted
substantially higher numbers of both war refugees and economic migrants than
most European countries since 1989, faces particular pressures both from re-
unification and from its geographical position on the borders of the Union. Since
November 1993 asylum seekers have lost eligibility for general assistance and have
to rely on special, reduced cash or in-kind payments. Debates in a number of other
countries too have focused on apparent cases of fraud among immigrants, or
special treatment accorded to them, though frequently the real situations turn out
to be less dramatic than suggested by newspaper reports. Overall, the question of
inclusion or exclusion within eligibility for social assistance benefits by age and by
residential or nationality conditions is likely to remain a live issue in many of the
countries in the study. This was highlighted by the Proposition passed in 1994 in
the US State of California, which denies illegal migrants access to welfare and
other social services.
Having established that an applicant is eligible to receive a particular benefit, the
next part of the assessment process involves establishing entitlement. Under the
principles outlined above, this invariably involves some test of resources.
3.5 Conditions of entitlement
The principle of means-testing implies a series of administrative decisions about
what constitutes the private resources of a benefit applicant, with whom these
resources are assumed to be shared, who in a family or household should be
expected to contribute personal resources to the upkeep of other individuals, and
how much of the available private resources should be consumed before there is a
call on public assistance. The decisions different countries take on these questions
may reflect wider attitudes concerning the balance of responsibilities between the
state and the individual/family.
Table 3.2 below lays out, in a schematic and abbreviated way, some of the main
elements of the assessment process for entitlement to assistance benefits in the
countries in our study. It relates primarily to the main, generalised assistance
benefits where they exist. One difficulty involves making comparative sense of all
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the many and varying ways in which assets are treated and the forms and levels of
income which are disregarded in the test of resources. As a way of classifying the
treatment of earned income, countries are divided into four categories:
1. those applying no disregard
.? those applying a minimal earnings disregard (up to 15 per cent of the
standard single person rate)
3. those applying a medium disregard (between 16 and 40 per cent)
4, those applying a higher disregard (over 40 per cent).
It should be noted that these are approximate calculations. since disregards are
often made up in different ways. apply only to earned or unearned income, or vary
for different family types. Sometimes they are only available for limited periods or
are reduced over time, and this is indicated in the table.
The treatment of assets is also very complex. In order to provide a basic
comparison, it is presented in two parts. First countries are divided into two
groups:
I. those which take all liquid assets into account, applying only a small
disregard or none at all
?. those applying a higher disregard to capital.
Secondly, they are partitioned according to whether they tend to disregard the
value of a private dwelling or might expect claimants to sell their homes before
drawing on assistance.
There is also variety in the range of other income, including social security
benefits_ which are counted or disregarded in the means test. As an indicator of
approaches to one key area of policy of contemporary relevance in a number of
countries, the table shows whether child maintenance is counted as income. Unless
otherwise stated, the information applies to the year 1994.
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.Table 3..2: Conditions of ml I.o the main assistance benefits
Country Benefits Legal and administrative Benefit I„,nit Resource t [nit Treatment of Treatment of Assets ~ m
framework Income Maintenance
counted?
pii a Disr‘ a
home?
	_
. . .. . ~ .
Australia Niniom
--~
Gmy G«R 4(am taper) Yes Yes but with
v4«y tration more for the disregard
unemployed. and
partly
individualised
(from 199 9
Y> if not Yes but only
excessive towards dnld's
but CK; neods
can mRa
charge on
the equity
HouseholdAustria a rk Household ( . .
grandparents)
Provincial mainlv
n.Qoep
myem Re vein/ Min Munn
tI T.vistence
Yes in full4 (hut reducedFamily (but
recoverable from after 1st year)
ahem
mm§¥
%a6al regulations «§
Local administr. t !
to_
Canada ("aikido Assistance Pa %Wenal framework. Provincial Family Yes Yes Cull3 (but varies
regulations and administralion between
provinces)
_ ___.__. __ .
Social » National regulations
Local administration
Family (cohabitants
separaie)
Family me not
cohabited
4 (but
d SCt'Cti nary)
. , 3&l
Social since allowance
---
...
o
..
National regulations
Local adininistration
Family QQ% !(m!
discretionary)
Yes Yes in full
Re ,Minimum
a''Inser/ion
Complex national and local
framework
National mat s
mj
g rates ad gads 6a
Fannly
am «
a6§
fiousehoki (and
recoverable outside)
~.
!
3-4 depend ya
Land
Yes
Yes
, m full
Yos in full: :
Finam
. . . __to,
Local administration and Family (cohabitants Family (but not Yes Yes in full
regulations. but much discrotion separate)
~~ . . _ _to
coin)
.~. ~
o schemes &z G.regulations and Family Family cw. Yes Yes in full
Sipplomon/arr Welfare administration w«K g
_ it/U/1cm :
asviwtam .e
t
Mini, > Local and dia ;e Varies, but normally Varies, bu madly Gwm3ap but ; Disco-et aw e
Del ma&
£mGd
a
Germany
Iceland
i d\u
D&
GQ§ hw : likely to be I
T. fable 3.2: Conditions of entitlement to the main assistance benefits (car p i.)
Country Benefits Legal and administrative
framework
Benefit Lnit Resource Unit 'Freatment of
Income
Treatment of Assets Child
Maintenance
counted?
Capital Disregard
home?
Japan I,irehhood 4id National regulations
Local administrations
Household Household Ma I but
discretionary
'Yes if not
excessive
Yes in dill
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Rerenu Minimum Garanri
a.
A/germane Bistimd and
Unemployment assistance
(RW#W)
National regulations
Local administration
National regulations
Local administration
Household
(will) exceptions)
f=amily--
Household
Family 2
2
Ua~h: it bow
sp cified
levels
No
No
New Zealand All National regulations and
administration
__.
a Y aaaiiy, 4 (with taped Yes Yes in full
Norway Social and Eeonomir
Assistance
National framework
Local discretion
Family (cohabitants
separate)
Family (not
cohabitant)
2 (mainly lone
parents)
1 Yes (if
reasonable)
Yes in full
(bait partial
disregard for
Transitional
Allowance)
Portugal No general assistance National regulations
Ten social minimum schemes
Family Family 1 I Yes Yes in full
Spain Ingram Ivlininu~
de lnsercion
National framework
Regional and local regulations
and discretion
_ .....
tFamily (cohabitan s
separate)
Family ] Yes Yes in full
Sweden Social Velftme Allowance National framework
Local discretion
Family Family, I l No if
alternal jive
housing can
be found
Yes in full
SW Crldald S0i:M1a F'airsarge Cantonal and municipal
d iscration
-
Household Household (discretionary) but
likely to be I
(discretionary) Yeti if'
but likely to be disabled but
Yes, taut
discretioiaary
I discretionary
Turkey ,SOCfCtI asiidsta3. is and
solidarity
National regulation 's"i
Local administration
Household ouschold I 1 131K Yes, in full
U Income support National ri;ulations Family Fa Y 2 (but Family
Credit adds viper
effect)
2 Yes Yes in full
(bait partial
disregard for
Family Credit)
USA I. AFDC'
2. Fooditfamps
3. GA
4. SSI
State
FederallState
State/County
federal/State
Family
Household
Family
Individual
Family
Household
Family
Individual/
family
3
4
varies by Stale
4
2 Yes
2_ Yes
1-- 2 depending Some can
on State take a charge
on the equity
2 Yes
1. Yes, but
with
disregard.
Others:a.
varies
Benefit and resource units
The first point to note is that although many countries describe entitlement to
benefit as `individual' - that is, anyone can be assessed for benefit on the basis of
their individual entitlement -- the actual unit for whom benefit is payable is still
normally the claimant, plus spouse and dependent children in the case of non-
single households, ie. the nuclear family. Only Austria, Luxembourg and Japan
count other non-dependent adults in the household as part of the benefit unit (and
thus include their needs in the calculation of benefit due). and in Luxembourg there
are many exceptions to this rule.
The differences become more marked, however, when we look at the resource unit --
that is, whose resources must be taken into account when applying the test of a
claimant's means. Again, the majority of countries take into account only the
resources of the claimant and their spouse if they have one. Generally the resources
of dependent children are fully or partly exempted and if counted, this is normally
only against amounts of benefit specifically payable in respect of children. In the
UK. non-dependant deductions from housing costs imply an assumption of resource
sharing within the wider household, but the expectation of intra-family support does
not extend beyond this point (except for child maintenance). But there are a number
of countries where expectations of family support extend further. In Austria,
Germany. Switzerland and Japan, social assistance claimants may be expected to
seek support from parents or grandparents, or in the case of older claimants from
children and grandchildren - even, in Switzerland, potentially from other siblings -
before having recourse to public assistance. It is also of interest in this respect to
note that in Switzerland there are no standardised means tests: benefits are assessed
according to a detailed and individual investigation of both resources and needs,
using standard household budgets as a template. In France, local Aide Sociale for
older people (but not the RMI) is subject to a prior test of their (future) inheritors'
means: monies paid can be reclaimed from these family members or by first claim
on any assets left on death. In Belgium too, regulations were recently introduced
which oblige local authorities to seek to recover assistance payments from parents
or adult children of claimants. How these rules work in practice varies considerably
and social welfare workers often have the discretion not to apply them, but what
these countries have in common is a strong tradition of family responsibility and
obligation, backed up in several countries by laws which specify duties of intra-
family maintenance which go beyond that of spouses or of parent and child.
At the other end of the spectrum is a small group of countries which do not place a
maintenance or resource-sharing obligation even on spouses unless they are legally
married. In Denmark and Norway. the resources of a man cohabiting with a lone
mother are not taken into account as part of her resources for an assistance claim,
although some expenses may be taken as shared. In Iceland and Spain too.
cohabitees have to register as living together and sharing resources - a reversal of
the more common situation - and in Iceland there is no duty of maintenance within
cohabiting couples unless a child of the relationship is involved. Although in a few
countries. including the Netherlands. there has been some debate about
cohabitation in terms of the equivalence structure of payments. the subject seems to
excite little of the kind of controversy which has periodically been a feature of the
UK system. particularly in the case of lone parents (although the wider issue of
assistance for lone parents has. of course, been highly controversial in the USA). It
should be acknowledged, however, that the local and discretionary nature of many
schemes potentially allows greater scrutiny of individuals' circumstances than may
be apparent from a formal description of the systems, particularly in those countries
where people have to register their place of residence. Policy concerns about lone
parenthood and cohabitation are also likely to be influenced by numbers of lone
parents claiming assistance. As we saw in Chapter Two. the percentage of lone
parents in receipt of assistance payments varies considerable between countries.
Although no countries have gone as far as general individualisation of means-
tested benefits, several, including the Netherlands and Ireland. have introduced the
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possibility of splitting payments between partners. In an interesting development,
Australia has also introduced (from 1995) a partial individualisation of income
support for the unemployed. The income test will be applied separately to each
partner in a couple, and one spouse's earnings will only be be counted against the
payments due to the other once the higher earner's income exceeds the cut-off
point for entitlement. This was designed primarily as a work incentive measure,
rather than as an explicit move towards independent incomes for women, and its
impact has yet to be seen (Saunders. 1995).
The tie( truant resources
Turning to the question of the assessment of resources. we find a substantial group
of countries which apply. or have the potential to apply, a relatively strict
approach to the principle of subsidiarity. But they are an interesting and
apparently paradoxical combination. Looking at the treatment of earnings. it is
first of all the group of Latin and Mediterranean countries, along with Austria and
Switzerland, which operate the most stringent tests and allow the least amounts of
extra earnings to be retained. In the same group are the Nordic countries of
Iceland. Sweden. and in effect Finland. since it is reported that discretionary
disregards are not often applied. The same applies to Denmark, even though the
guideline earnings disregard is rather higher. Ireland comes into this group for
Supplementary Welfare Allowance, although disregards are available for
Unemployment Assistance. The UK falls into a small group with relatively low
disregards, including Norway and the Netherlands, though it should be born in
mind that in the UK higher disregards apply to lone parents and that Family
Credit in effect provides a tapered earnings disregard. It is not clear what levels of
disregards normally apply in Japan.
Amongst the countries with higher levels of disregards, which includes the
antipodean countries and the USA. these vary between client groups and some are
available only for a specific period. It is noticeable, however, that Australia and
New Zealand. the two countries with entirely selective benefit systems. have means-
tests for most of their basic benefits which cut in at a considerably hi gher level in
proportion to benefit rates than do many of those in Europe. This effect is
accentuated by the tapered withdrawal rates of benefit, which is unusual outside
the English-speaking countries.
A similar picture emerges when we look at assets. In the group which takes more
capital and assets into account. we first of all find Austria and Switzerland, with
their highly discretionary and locally-based systems. They are also. as we saw,
among those countries which pursue family financial obligations further than most.
But this group also includes several of the Scandinavian countries, normally
regarded as the most socially liberal. It was among these countries that we saw the
principle of family financial obligation appearing weakest in relation to the
resource unit for social assistance. Yet in Sweden, for example, it is re garded as
reasonable that, before having recourse to social assistance, people might well be
expected to sell their house, and a car if they have one. unless there are no public
transport alternatives for essential travel. A number of other countries, including
the Netherlands. can insist on a home being sold if the value is above prescribed
limits, while in Austria and some states of the USA (for General Assistance only).
the authorities can take a charge on the equity of a claimants' house to recover
benefit if the house is sold.
As regards child maintenance, it is interesting to note that while the political
controversy over the Child Support Act in the UK has fuelled calls for
maintenance to be at least partly disregarded for Income Support, the UK is within
the OECD mainstream in counting it in full. Only the Netherlands and
Luxembourg discount it entirely. and Australia and the USA (for AFDC) apply
partial disregards. Norway applies a disregard for lone parents receiving
Transitional Allowance, of up to 30 per cent of maintenance received above the
minimum guaranteed level. Child benefit or family allowances are also normally
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counted in full, unless benefit rates are structured so as not to include child
dependency additions.
How should we interpret these different patterns? First, it has to be emphasised
that these elements of the benefit structure cannot be seen in isolation. We need to
take into account other important features of the different systems. not least the
value of benefits in relation to earnings, in order to see what apparently strict or
more
g
enerous means tests actually mean in the context of different countries.
Nevertheless. these findings do lead to some interesting speculations. For example.
the apparent paradox of finding the toughest means tests in social-democratic
Scandinavia. co-existing with a non-traditional view of family types and obligations
(and, as we show later, relatively generous benefits but tough work tests), may not
be so difficult to explain if we look at the broader social security systems and the
role social assistance plays within them. In all the Nordic countries receipt of social
assistance is seen as. in principle at least. a short-term, last resort measure.
Normally°. loss of earnings through unemployment or sickness would be dealt with
through the social insurance system and the priority is to return to the labour
market as soon as possible. Longer-term unemployment and family change may be
putting some strain on this model, but at present social assistance recipients are
still regarded as needing individualised, locally-based and discretionary help, only
part of which may be in the form of cash. Earnings disregards may simply trap
people on benefit and any high replacement rates which may result are seen as
largely irrelevant, because the work tests and general work ethic, and the stigma
attached to receipt of social assistance, should in most cases provide sufficient
motivation. In this context. the greater individualisation of benefit entitlement.
which stems from achievements made in emancipation and opportunities for
women throughout society and results in an official view of cohabitation which
differs from that in many other countries, is not inhibited by considerations of
excessive cost.
In a system such as in Australia, on the other hand, where virtually all benefits are
income and assets-tested (though at varying levels). stigma appears to be much less
of a factor. Poverty alleviation and the encouragement of work effort then requires
a more sophisticated range of instruments, including substantial assets disregards
and earned-income ' free areas'. The UK falls somewhere between these two points,
and while Income Support itself has only a very limited set of income disregards. it
has been necessary to create Family Credit in order to provide some kind of
incentive structure within an extensive, national means-tested benefit structure.
As regards approaches to the benefit and resources unit, it is perhaps most
interesting to note the relative uniformity. With a number of exceptions where
wider family obligations have retained a strong legal foundation, the nuclear family
is the norm, in spite of some tentative moves towards forms of individualisation.
Efforts to shift obligation back on to the wider family seem to be unsuccessful
where it has been attempted. Belgian efforts. for example, to oblige local welfare
centres to recover benefits from relatives have apparently been difficult to enforce
(Lambrechts and Dehaes. 1986).
3.6 Housing costs
Housing costs are often a crucial element of the income requirements of low-
income households, and many countries either include all or part or the costs of
accommodation within the assessment of needs for social assistance, or provide
some form of separate income-related or means-tested housing allowance to people
on low incomes. The relationship between housing needs and low income in a
comparative perspective is. however, a matter of considerable complexity. To do
justice to this area of assistance, a separate, comprehensive study would be needed
and for present purposes only the key elements of housing assistance are examined
here. Table 3.3 summarises the main forms of help with housing costs in the
countries in the study.
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Table 3.3: Means-tested help with housing costs
Country Help available? Form of housing assistance
Australia Yes Separate rent assistance for pensioners and beneficiaries in
private rented housing
Public sector tenants have rents subsidised through
Commonwealth State Housing Agreement
Other subsidies for home buyers
Austria Yes, but vGtries by Payment as addition to social assistance
province
Belgium Only on a local Social assistance payments (RMG) are meant to cover At discretion of
discretionary basis housin g costs, No generalised housing benefit system local welfare
centre
Subsidies mainly in 'bricks and mortar'
Canada Yes, from Federal Shelter costs included in assistance payments, up to Both private
and provincial maximum levels set by province renters and
governments owner-occupiers.
Social housing tenants pay rents according to their incomes but some
provinces require
reimburse-ment
of increased
equity
Tenures covered Extent of housing
costs covered
Renters only For private tenants,
up to 75N of rent
over specified
thresholds
Public sector tenants
pay 20-25% of their
incomes in rent
Varies according to
province. Can meet
full costs or fixed
amounts
Usually renters
only.
To prevent
homelessness
authorities can
take over
mortgage
payments
Actual housing costs
up to provincial
maximum
Denmark Yes Separate housing benefit scheme open to all those on low Both renters and
incomes owner--occupiers
Finland Yes. but Supplementary payments of social assistance can he made to Both renters and
discretionary meet housing costs owner occupiers
Also. three other income-related housing allowance schemes;
general: for older people: for students
France Yes. Separate housing benefit scheme Both renters and
owner occupiers
Full costs over a
threshold graduated
according to
household
composition and size
Up to 80% of
housing costs
covered. Social
assistance recipients
can receive help with
remaining 20%.
Generally only part
of costs met.
depending on
household
composition and size
Germany Yes Supplementary payments to meet 'reasonable housing costs Both renters and
can be made to social assistance recipients, at the discretion owner-occupiers
of local authorities (but within guidelines)
Separate income-related housing benefit scheme (Wohngeld)
for low-income households
Payments of
mortgage interest
only. up to local
maxima
Greece Yes, but only for Income-related housing benefit scheme for older people Private tenants
the elderly without full insurance-based pensions only
Various other loans/subsidies and tax exemption schemes for
building homes
Social assistance
recipients can
receive full housi
costs, including
heating
a
Rent paid direct to
landlords
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Table 3.3: Means-tested help with housing costs -- come/. )
Country Help available? Form of housing assistance
Iceland Yes Housing policy tends to favour owner-occupation. Means-
tested loans are available for up to 90% of cost
Financial Assistance includes component for rent. but since
January 1995 local authorities have the power to operate
separate housing allowance schemes
Private and Mortgage assistance
housing limited to interest
association only
tenants and Otherwise full costs
owner-occupiers met minus £IR 5 per
week
Local authority tenants have rents related to their Public tenants
incomes,aecording to rules set by each local authority
Italy No housing Small number of public housing places for those on low
allowance scheme incomes
Japan Yes Housing Aid Renters and Can cover housin g
owner occupiers deposits, rent and
necessary repair
costs. up to locally
determined maxima
Tenures covered Extent of housing
costs covered
Both renters and For house buyers,
owner-occupiers interest rate for loans
set according to
income. household
size and family type
For renters on social
assistance, only
about a third of
average rents likely
to be met within
Financial Assistance
Ireland Yes Rent and mortgage supplements available through
Supplementary Welfare Allowance
Luxembourg Yes Rent allowances payable only as part of Revenu Minimum Renters only
Garanti
Difference between
gross rent and 10%
of RMG payment to
household, up to
specified maximum
The Netherlands Y Social assistance payments meant to cover housing. but
separate housing benefit available to meet particularly high
costs. Administered separately from social assistance
Where costs exceed specified ceiling, temporary supplement
available through social assistance. Recipient supposed to
seek cheaper dwelling
New Zealand Yes Accommodation Supplement Renters, boarders Supplement meets 65
and owner- per cent of costs over
occupiers threshold (25 of
'base benefit rate' for
renters and 30% for
home owners), up to
specified regional
li mits
For owner-occupiers,
both interest and
capital payable
Norway Yes Payable as supplement to social assistance payments Renters and Full rent and both
owner-occupiers interest and capital
payments met if
'reasonable'. Capital
element may be
li mited
Portugal Yes Means-tested housing allowance administered by Ministry Renters only Fixed amounts,
of Public Works. Recipients must have suffered 30% limited to 12 months
reduction in monthly income or have income at level of the duration
non-contributory social pension
Renters and Cost met above
owner-occupiers specified level and
in flats or houses below set limit
(single room
tenants not
covered)
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Table 3.3_ Means-tested help with housing costs %enured i
Country Help available? Form of housing assistance Tenures covered kxtent of housing
costs covered
Spain No general
scheme
The table shows that only three countries (Italy, Spain and Turkey) do not have
either a generalised scheme for housing assistance or an element within social
assistance payments to meet housing costs. However, there are also differences
between countries in whether the housing clement of social assistance is paid as a
specific supplement or is meant to be met out of the standard assistance payment.
Belgium and the Netherlands are the two main examples of the latter approach.
although where claimants face particularly high housing costs any extra help
available is purely discretionary in Belgium, whereas there
ing
access to a regulated
Housin g Benefit scheme in the Netherlands. As with other elements of assistance in
Switzerland, help with housing costs is largely discretionary and varies according to
the canton or municipality.
Countries which operate general housing benefit schemes open to all those on low
incomes_- as well as assistance recipients. include Denmark. France, Germany.
Sweden and the UK. Portugal also has a time-Iimited general scheme, while
Finland and Greece both have limited schemes for certain categories of people.
Sweden Yes Social assistance recipients can have housing paid as Renters and For assistance
supplement to assistance standard if `reasonable' owner-occupiers recipients_ full costs
met if reasonable.
Interest payments
only on mortgages
Also general, income-related housing benefit scheme
administered by regional social insurance office
Pensioners can also receive income-related mug
housing supplement
Switzerland Yes Assistance payments can include housing costs Renters and Discretionar
owner-occupiers
Help also through social housin g aimed at low-income
groups
Turkey No housin g
assistance scheme
Housing Benefit scheme open to all tenants. Administered Private and Income Support
by local authorities. Rules of eligibility. entitlement and public tenants recipients can have
means test aligned with Income Support £except for double full rent met if
capital limit) reasonable. For
those with incomes
above this level,
maximum benefit is
reduced by 65p for
each £1 of extra
income
Mortgage interest
only. subject to
Owner-occupiers can receive help with mortgage interest Owner-occupiers maximum level of
payments as supplement to Income Support (but not Family mort gage. If
Credit). claimant under 6€1
years. only 50' of
interest met for first
16 weeks
USA No national Various state and local schemes for rental and mortgage Renters and
housing assistance assistance, based on reducing housing payments to fixed owner-occupiers
percentage of income. Rental schemes mainly through low-
cost housing projects or vouchers
Also. Low-Income Energy Assistance Program (LIHFAP)
permits states to provide assistance to low-income households
with heating, air conditioning and weatherproofing of homes
United
Kingdom
Provision of
assistance
geographically
uneven and limited
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One important aspect of housing support is whether it can cover mortgage
payments for owner-occupiers as well as rents. The picture is somewhat more
complicated than it appears from Table 3.3, because there are often other forms of
subsidy outside benefit systems for both tenants and owner-occupiers, including
public house building. tax reliefs, rent controls and special loan arrangements.
However, it is clear that the predominant pattern among the OECD countries
which have housing allowances is for means-tested help to be available directly
through social assistance to house buyers and tenants alike. The exceptions are
Australia, Austria (normally). Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal. Within this
broad pattern. however. there are differences as to whether support is available to
owner occupiers in the same way as for tenants. Some countries. for example. meet
only the interest element of mortgage payments. whereas others meet capital
repayments too. As we saw earlier. some countries, including Austria and some
states of the USA. for General Assistance, have the power to take a charge on the
equity of claimants' housing property. The U.K has recently introduced limits on
the level of mortgage for which interest payments can be made through Income
Support. There have also been calls in the UK for a form of housing benefit to be
extended to owner-occupiers because of a perceived imbalance in the support
available to Income Support recipients compared with others on low incomes.
The costs which can be covered often include heating and other services, as well as
rent or mortgage interest, but what is more difficult to judge from the information
gathered for this study is how far in practice assistance recipients' full housing costs
are met in different circumstances and how much has to be met out of the main
benefit payments. The model family approach taken in Chapter Six provides some
further information on this question for a number of family types living in rented
accommodation.
3.7 Meeting urgent or exceptional needs
Methods of meeting urgent or exceptional needs falling outside those expected to
be met from normal benefit payments have been a subject of some controversy in
the UK for many years (Craig, 1993). Some similar debates have taken place in the
USA. where the welfare rights movement has used discretionary exceptional needs
as an organising technique to expand payments. Yet in looking at other countries it
is difficult to escape the conclusion that this is to a large extent a peculiarly Anglo-
saxon controversy, linked particularly to the historical development of assistance
schemes which provide for the livelihood of substantial proportions of the
population, and for some on a long-term basis. Although most countries have
some arrangements for meeting exceptional needs, these are frequently
discretionary and highly individualised, and generally administered at the local
level. Rarely do they appear to provoke intense debate. and it is often difficult to
obtain either statistical information on claims and expenditure or more qualitative
details about guidelines or practices, since the data are often not collected
separately at a national level.
An earlier report gathered some information on one-off needs in 15 countries
{Bradshaw et aL, 1993b), and a further brief comparative survey was undertaken
by Craig (1993) in his review of alternative policy approaches to the UK social
fund. Table 3.4 summarises methods of dealing with one-off needs. drawing on
both these studies and new data obtained for the current study. More detail,
including. for some countries- expenditure on one-off payments, can be found in
the country reports in Volume Two.
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Table .3.4: Methods of meeting urgent and one-off needs
Arrangements for meeting
special or one-off needs
Regulated or
discretionary.?
Forut of payment lbfaira types of need metCountry
Australia Special Benefit
Lump-sum work'study grants
available
Disaster Relief
Regulated. Capital linnt of
AS5,000
Regulated
Regulated, not only for
assistance recipients
Grant
Austria Range of special payments,
additions to normal benefit,
plus 'support to meet special
contingencies in life'
Mainly discretionary.
Dietaare, furniture and
clothing needs bring
notional entitlement
Both, but loans more
corrmion. Repayment by
individual agreement
p
eople in severe financial need and not entitled to any
other benefits (received by only around one per cent
of all assistance recipients)
Long-terra unemployed starting Cull-time work or
study ($50-200 available once only with 12 months}
One-off payments equivalent to two weeks benefit
plus family payments and rent assistance
Needs arising from unexpected events. Special diets,
essential furniture and clothing_ essential travel, such
as to funerals
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Loans also available for business start-up
Discretionary payments
must not exceed fixed local
budgets
In January 1989 12 per cent of assistance recipients
also received supplementary payments, averaging BF
9,504)--10,500. Most common items were fuel costs
(around a third of all payments), rent arrears and
deposits, special health costs, winter support, school
trips, telephone bills and connections and other
arrears
Wide variation between province:. Typical needs
met include home repairs, travel expenses, moving
expenses, baby supplies. In Ontario in 1990 average
expenditure by municipalities on special items varied
from `h49 .... $532 per recipient
Also, in some states, children's winter clothing
allowances, back-to-school, and employment start-up
allowances available
_ __nee septet.
Grants Items include medical and dental treatment, education
costs, removal expenses. No fixed amounts for
specific needs
In 1992 approximately 84,000 people received one-
off payments
Assumption that most special
needs can be met within regular
Minimex payments, but
Supplementary Assistance
available.
Discretionary, but. subject
to appeal
Normally grants, but
interest free loans can be
given at discretion of
local welfare centre.
Receipt of money advice
may be condition of
payment:
Needs test for assistance
includes special and emergency
needs
p rovincial discretion, but
some have local regulations
Crisis payments can he
made is loans.
Otherwise grants
Longstanding element of social
assistance
Discretionary. No fixed
budgets
Tuttle 3.4: Methods of meeting urgent and one-off needs coml.)
Regulated or
discretionary?
Form of payment Main types of need met
Discretionary. No fixed
budgets
Grants Includes housing costs, medical and funeral costs and
'other necessary expenses'
Grants to avoid long-term dependency, such as to
families in crisis, for training or rehabilita€tion,
mortgage capital repayments etc.
Expenditure on preventative payments in 1992 was
ELM 17.1 million
Largely discretionary Both grants and loans Medical costs. heating costs, other debts
Arrangements for meeting
special or one-off needs
Supplementary allowance
payable in addition to regular
assistance
`Preventative' allowance
France Aide Social(' and Action
Sneicrie at state, regional and
local level can all include
special and one-off payments
Country
Finland
Germany Both general assistance and
`help in special circumstances'
can include one-off or special
payments
Depends on type of need,
Essential furniture, clothing
and household needs carry
legal entitlement, but
authorities can use
discretion to decide how
needs should be met
Both grants and loans,
also in-kind.
Payments for debts such
as heating arrears usually
recoverable
General assistance can include lump-sum payments
for clothing. furniture, beds, cookers, refrigerators,
arrears. Also urgent or emergency cash payments.
Average one-off payments tend to he around 20'L of
applicable scale rate
Greece Special state assistance
Iceland Payable as addition to I=iana.ncial
Assistance
Some types of special
circumstances payments
are recoverable, such as
help with self-employed
business start-up
Subject to national Grants Available in cases of natural disaster or for
regulations, but payable at individuals (and especially large tau:ities) in financi l
discretion of Prefectures. emergency. Payments from DR t .lif!(s to maximum
Subject to detailed of 200.000 in one year
household means test
Discretionary. Only Both grants and loans can i f o meet emergencies such as loss of home or
available to assistance be made, but loans possessions following a natural disaster, or for
recipients and payments uncommon special requirements such as funeral or removal costs
have to be met within
overall local assistance
budget
Table 3.4: Methods of meeting urgent and one-off needs ... (cone d.)
Arrangements for meeting Regulated or Form of payment
special or one-off needs discretionary?
Payable as extra payments National guidelines, but Grants
within Supplementary Welfare officer discretion
Allowance
No specific system of one-off National regulations. but
payments for special needs, individual payments at local
though Livelihood Aid discretion.
incorporates several categories
of paytatent.
Emergency or unexpected
needs can be met if necessary
Country
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Limited help available through Discretionary, local
local communes, charities and
voluntary organisations
Mainly benefits in-kind
and servic.
Grants Livelihood Aid covers normal subsistence needs.
Other aids available for educiido=i, housing, medical
treatment, maternity, training, and funerals
Depends on local criteria, but includes crisis or
disaster payments, rent and h.: sting costs. clothing,
footwear etc
Emergency Needs Payments for hot.'Miu, fuel,
clothing, funeral, birth and travel costs tc
Urgent Needs Payments for fire, flood or similar
disaster
Main types or need met
Luxembourg Revolt! AI in/mum Gararib
meant to cover most needs, but
also local Supplementary
Assistance
Discretionary, local Grants includes heatnag costs. clothing etc. Little information
available about extent of payments
Netherlands Normal assistance expected to Largely discretionary
cover most needs including Fixed local budgets
larger items, but Special
Assistance also available
In 1990 expenditure on special
assistance was .Fl_, 172.5
million, or 1.5 per cent of total
assistance expenditure. This
percentage halved in 1991
following a move to a block
grant system of financing
Both grants and loans
System of municipal
credit banks for social
loans. Loans usually only
available through
assistance and special
assistance if bank has
refused to help
1 oa lump-suit items
claimants can be asked to
contribute up to a
maximum yearly
threshold (in 1993) of FL I50
Can include both continuous payments, cg. for extra
costs of illness and disability, and one-off payments:
most common are furniture, dietary costs, heating,
special medical costs, fares to hospital, retraining
costs. child care, other transport costs and household
help. In December 1990 7,400 continuing special
payments were made to people under 65 and 23,200
to older people
Special assistance also covers loans to people starting
or attempting to maintain self-employed work.
Maximum loans are FL 40,000 for setting up and Fl,
200,000 for maintenance
Th'rble 3 F_ Methods of meetin g urgent and one--off needs I contd.)
Arrangements for meeting Regulated or
special or one-off needs discretionary??
Form of payment Main types of need metCountry
Regulated, but with
discretionary elements
New Zealand Special Needs Grant
t ,-Eenditure on SNG in 1993/4
was NZ$67.9 million
Grants and leans. Food
payments non-
recoverable, clothing
payments recoverable
Need must have arisen in an emergency. Items
covered include food, clothing, housing deposits, fuel
costs, essential appliances, school costs and unitorans,
ear safety restraints for children, medical expenses
and essential travel
Applicants may be
referred first to local
l a oodbank and for
budgetary advice
Payments available under Mainly discretionary °. but
section of assistance law legal entitlement to birth
covering help to overcome or grants
adapt to 'a difficult life ,situation"
Most costs expected to be met Discretionary
from normal assistance
payments. but one-off extra
payments available
Switzerland No special arrangements for Discretionary
one-off payments. All
assistance is discretionary and
can be one-off or continuing
Maximum amount NZ)200. Only one grant can be
made for similar needs at one time and aggregate
maximum for specific items in one year, eg. NZS150
for food for a single person.
To meet situation of continuing income deficiency
relating to special costs
Expensive dental treatment, special tsrecliciaaes, winter
clothing.
Receiving counselling may be condition of award
Grants or benefits in kind Depends on local criteria.. May be linked to receipt
of counselling
No national data, but in Barcelona in 1991 Caritas
(on behalf of the municipality) distributed payments
for housing and .fuel costs (about a thine of the total).
food, children's meals and school costs, needs of
older people, health and disability costs etc.
In 1991 loans from Caritas for housing costs of the
elderly totalled 35 million pesetas
Grants. Can be condition Typical payments include funeral costs, dental and
that claimant undergoes eye treatment.
debt counselling
Cost of loan repayments not covered
Special Benefit.
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
[.Long tradition of discretionary Discretionary
one-off payments through
local authorities and charities
Casually grants or benefits
in kind. Less commonly
loans can he made
One-off and emergency
payments available through
local authorities and charities
Payments are funded by central
government, local taxes and
lotteries
l)iscretionary Both grants and loans,
and benefits in-kind
Grants, but all " assistance Part of general discretionary assistance, which can be
payments are notionally one-off or continuous depending on individuals '
repayable assessed needs
Table 3.4: Methods of meeting urgent and one-off needs (contd.)
Country Form of payment
Turkey Mainly giants
Arrangements for meeting
special or one-off needs
Lump-stint payments for
emergency needs under Social
Assistance and Solidarity
Scheme.
Regulated or
discretionary?
Discretionary and budget-
li mited
Main types of need net
Items likely to be covered include health costs.
funeral expenses, clothing. food. heating and school
expenses
UK
Net expenditure in 1993/4
(after repayment of loans) was
.228 million, or about 1.4% of
Income Support spending and
0.3% of total social security
expenditure
Social Fund
2. Other payments
discretionary within.
national guidelines, with
right of review
1. Maternity, funeral and
cold weather payments
regulated and with legal
entitlement and right of
appeal
USA Emergency Assistance to
Needy Families with Children --
linked to AFDC
Federal guidelines, but
optional and state-
administered (currently in
37 states)
SSI emergency need payments Federally regulated
Food Stamps.....urgent payments
General Assistance -
Emergency Assistance
Programmes (some states only)
State, optional and
discretionary
Maternity, cold weather
payments and community
care gr ants all non-
recoverable. Funeral
payments recoverable
from estate
Other payments made as
loans. Repayable at
varying percentage of
income support rates
Grants, payments in kind
and services
Grants, mainly repayable
from future benefit
Grants
£10(7 for maternity needs.
Variable amount for funeral costs.
Cold weather payments for weekly periods of
exceptional cold in an area
Crisis Loans: for emergencies
Budgeting Loans: for lump-sum items such as
essential furniture and household equipment
Community C'an'e Grants: mainly to help people to
move out of residential care or to stay in the
community, for travel expenses, or to relieve
exceptional pressure on families.
Payments (except crisis loans) only for people
receiving other specified means-tested benefits
To prevent destitution. Includes medical payments.
vouchers, cash, counselling and services. Payments
cannot exceed 30 days in any 12 months. Average
US monthly caseload in 1992 was 52,906, with
average family payments of x421.
Interim cash payment while SSI claims pending. or
vouchers to meet urgent needs.
Household in immediate need and with little or no
cash assets should be given expedited service and
provided with foodstamps within five days of
application.
One time only cash assistance to nerdy f-" :_:pi g: in
ti mes of crisis. Examples include I=
'.tnie rEe<;_roycd by
fire or natural disaster, utilities cut off 1(-tr non-
payment of bills, family has run out of food or fads
eviction.
There are a number of points which emerge from an examination of this table and
from the more detailed information in Volume Two. First, most countries do have
some form of provision for exceptional or urgent needs falling outside what is
expected to be met from regular payments. The countries without substantial
traditions of special one-off payments include Australia (except for disasters) and
Japan (although the different categories of Livelihood Aid can be seen as
performing some of the same functions).
The predominant pattern, however. is for payments of this kind to be made at the
discretion of local social welfare staff. While in some countries they will be working
within national or local guidelines, it is rare for there to be detailed specification of
allowable items of the kind which existed in the former UK single payments
scheme. A few countries. including Austria, Canada. Germany. Norway, UK and
the LISA, have regulated entitlement to certain limited items. while mainly
providing discretionary support, though there is no obvious pattern in the range of
needs falling into the former rather than the latter category. The Netherlands is
one of the countries with the most developed range of special provision for
exceptional needs, both through Special Assistance (BB), other municipal schemes
and through its social loans sector, but again this is largely discretionary and
provision varies substantially across the country. The local municipal provision in
particular has been the subject of criticism for its variability and inefficiency (van
Oorschot and Smolenaars. 1(993). Germany too has a wide range of special forms
of assistance provision through the branch of Soialhilfe dealing with `help in
special circumstances'. but this includes long-term support for older people in
residential care and several other types of continuing assistance in addition to one-
off payments.
In spite of variation in the methods of delivery of exceptional payments, the kinds
of expenditure covered are not dissimilar across the countries studied. although the
extent of overlap between them varies. Broadly speaking, most countries with one-
off cash assistance schemes provide for some or all of the following needs: large
items of household expenditure such as essential furniture and appliances; funeral
and birth expenses; travel costs in some exceptional circumstances; heating costs:
special dietary costs; medical and dental costs over and above those covered by
national health schemes or insurance; back-to-work costs (including child-care
costs in some countries): special costs associated with children, including school
clothing and other educational costs; high housing costs and arrears; other clothing
and footwear needs; and unpredictable crises. It is not easy to discern which are the
most commonly awarded items overall or which consume the greatest proportion
of expenditure, since few countries collect or publish this information in any detail.
Items like essential furniture, cookers and children's clothing are likely to be
difficult for people on assistance to afford in most countries, so it is not surprising
to find them high on the list of common items. Medical costs were also mentioned
in a number of countries, but the kind of items covered depends on the particular
health insurance or national health system in individual countries.
One-off or emergency payments in most countries are made mainly as non-
recoverable grants rather than loans, though there are some important exceptions.
The bulk of UK exceptional payments are now made as loans, and recoverable
payments and social loans are important in the Netherlands. Some payments in
Germany and Spain can be in the form of loans. and payments for food under
New Zealand's Special Needs Grant are also recoverable. In theory, any assistance
payments are recoverable in Austria and Switzerland, though it is not clear how
often this happens. Although one-off payments made in the Scandinavian countries
are generally not expected to be repaid, the discretionary and individual nature of
arrangements in local municipalities may allow for variations in practice. Where
payments can be made through a mixture of grants and loans, a distinction also
often appears to be made between items like arrears payments, which are more
likely to be recoverable, and essential purchases or medical costs, which are more
likely to be met through non-repayable grants. A number of countries, including
Belgium, Portugal, Norway and the USA. explicitly associate the award of some
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payments with receiving money advice or counselling, but it is likely that this also
commonly takes place in other countries. such as the other Nordic states, with a
strong social work element in their social assistance.
The role of non-governmental organisations in debates around poverty and social
assistance is discussed in a later chapter, but it is clear that in certain countries,
mainly those of southern Europe and the Mediterranean but including, more
recently, New Zealand, exceptional needs of low-income families are at least partly
met by charities, churches and other voluntary organisations. The international
organisation Caritas is particularly involved in this work in the Catholic countries
of Italy. Spain, and Portugal. and often works with regional or local authorities in
the provision of both services and cash help. Although charities and voluntary
organisations play a role in this field in northern Europe too, their work is
secondary to that performed by agencies of the state.
It is difficult to get a clear comparative picture of expenditure on exceptional needs
as a proportion of all spending on assistance. or of social security spending as a
whole. because few countries separate out their expenditure in the same way. For
those countries where such a breakdown is available, it appears that spending on
one-off payments is a uniformly minor element of all expenditure. In Finland, for
example, in 1992. spending on ' preventative' payments (which can be both one-off
and continuing) amounted to one per cent of total assistance expenditure. while in
the Netherlands in 1990, spending on Special Assistance represented 1.5 per cent of
the total on assistance (and only 65 per cent of Special Assistance was in the form
of one-off payments). In New Zealand in 1993. payments of Special Needs Grants
made up 0.6 per cent of all benefit expenditure. I.n the UK. total net expenditure
on the Social Fund in 1993/4 represented 1.4 per cent of expenditure on Income
Support, and thus an even smaller percentage of spending on means-tested benefits
as a whole.
While the provision of one-off payments has been lar gely uncontroversial in most
countries, in the UK. the USA, and to a lesser extent in Canada. it has been an
issue around which welfare rights movements and campaign groups have
traditionally organised. To some extent this has reflected views about the
inadequacy of the basic scale rates. but it has also been connected with
longstanding debates about rights versus discretion in the provision of assistance
payments. There also appears to be some relationship between the level of debate
concerning the meeting of exceptional needs and the relative importance of
assistance in relation to social insurance schemes and other elements of social
security. The trend currently appears to be moving in two different directions.
depending on the nature of different assistance schemes. The response by
governments in both the UK and the USA has been to attempt to move away from
entitlement-based exceptional payments by establishing more categorical income
support premiums (in the UK) and more standardised budget guidelines (in the
USA). leaving other needs to be met on a more discretionary basis and within fixed
budgets. In the Netherlands too, the trend is towards allowing local authorities
more discretion on how they distribute Special Assistance, but again within a cash-
limited framework. In the southern European countries, on the other hand, where
assistance schemes are less comprehensive or already largely discretionary, and
where the charitable and voluntary sectors play a greater role in one-off help, there
is a gradual trend towards a greater codification and regulation of entitlements.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter has summarised and discussed the aims and principles of social
assistance schemes in the countries studied, the main conditions of eligibility and
entitlement, and the ways in which provision is made to meet housing costs and
exceptional needs. It was suggested that although the basic principles informing
different schemes are not dissimilar, the realisation of these principles in practical
policy varies considerably. The first major distinction is whether minimum income
guarantees are provided across the board, through a generalised scheme, or
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whether people are addressed within different cate gorical population groups, which
may either exclude certain groups or offer preferential treatment to particular
g
roups seen as more important or deserving. At present the preference of the
majority of countries is still to offer protection by category.
In terms of inclusiveness, most general schemes allow independent claims no earlier
than the age of 18, unless young people have or are about to have children, or face
particular hardship. There is little evidence available about whether this causes
widespread problems. or whether the presumption of parental support below this
age is well-founded. This would need to be the subject of a special study. Minimum
age thresholds also have to be seen in the context of other forms of support
through training and labour market programmes. Two countries which stand out
in restricting eli g ibility by higher age limits are France and Luxembourg both
also countries with the most restrictive residence conditions. In general, more than
half the countries studied. including half the EU members. have some prior
residence conditions, as well as limiting the availability of help for refugees and
asylum-seekers.
Although all assistance schemes are based on the assumption that other income
and resources must be exhausted before public assistance is available. this principle
has, in practice, been modified in a variety of ways. There is a wide variation in the
level and type of earnings or other income exempted from means-testing, based on
different countries' expectations of family support, the emphasis placed on work
incentives, their attitudes to cohabitation and lone parenthood, and the relative
importance of assistance schemes in wider income maintenance systems.
Most countries meet some or all of the housing costs of people with incomes low
enough to receive social assistance, and this help is generally extended to owner-
occupiers as well as to tenants (though sometimes with some restrictions). The
main distinction is between those countries which provide help as part of the
general social assistance payment (and only for assistance recipients) and those
with a general housing benefit scheme open to other people on low incomes. Some
countries do both of these, but those in the first category might be expected to
have greater problems with work incentives.
The differences between countries are also reflected in approaches to meeting
exceptional or urgent needs. The question of discretionary and geographically-
variable decision making, which governs exceptional payments in most countries, is
subject to criticism and debate in a number of them. Yet the low profile of social
assistance, combined in some countries with payments which are relatively
generous. have contributed to what appears to be a greater consensus or legitimacy
in this area in many countries than might be expected from a UK perspective.
The next chapter takes this discussion further by looking at the administration and
delivery of assistance benefits.
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Chapter 4 Administration and Delivery of
Social Assistance Benefits
4,1 Introduction
Administrative structures and procedures for the delivery of social assistance
benefits are inevitably complex. There is no such thing as a simple social assistance
scheme. Moreover, as we have seen, there are important differences between
countries in the way they organise and deliver the administration of social
assistance benefits. Some, like the United Kingdom. have a predominantly
integrated and national scheme with common rules of eligibility and common levels
of payment. There are, conversely, other countries such as Norway and
Switzerland where responsibility is devolved almost entirely to the local level. In
some countries there is a single, national ministry, with responsibility for the
administration of benefits: in others there are a variety of agencies and authorities.
Similarly there are variations in funding principles and procedures. This chapter
seeks to report the range of delivery systems, the extent to which they are complex
or simple and the division between central and local responsibilities. For more
detail on the administrative structure and operations of social assistance schemes
readers are referred to the individual country chapters in Volume Two.
4.2 Centre-local responsibilities
Countries which have devolved responsibility for both the financing and
administration of benefits to the regional or local level (including Austria, latterly
France for the RMI, Italy. Spain and Switzerland) frequently face a dilemma: it is
often those regions or local authorities with the lowest potential funding capacity
which have the highest demand on social assistance benefits. This contradiction
does little to promote social cohesion or spatial equity. There is little evidence that
regionally organised schemes take account of increased cost of living in, for
example, capital cities. Indeed it is the perception of many experts (such as Pfeil,
1994, commenting on Austria) that debates about levels of responsibility and
accountability for social assistance between regions and national authorities are
often more concerned with the distribution of political power or control of
expenditure than with the efficient management of social assistance arrangements.
These tensions are being experienced in Canada, where the Federal Government
decided, in .1990, that it could no longer be held accountable for expenditures over
which it had not control and `capped ` spending in the wealthier provinces of
Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia, and has since embarked on a more radical
programme of reform which gives provinces and territories more autonomy but
less central finance.
Belgium too has experienced some difficulties in the distribution of finance for the
Minimex. Administrative structures are highly complex, and responsibility for
funding the Minimex is split between national tax revenue and the municipalities.
There is some evidence that the poorer local authorities (with the highest numbers
dependent on Minimex) are under increasing financial pressure, with consequential
differences in treatment of similar claimants in different areas.
In Finland, social assistance has been administered by municipal offices of social
welfare in local communities, within general guidelines set by the Ministry of Social
Affairs which provided broadly common conditions of eligibility and procedures
for claiming. In 1991. however, under pressure from rising levels of unemployment,
many of the normative directives were abolished, leading to greater municipal
discretion and increasing variation of treatment. The financial burden on local
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authorities means that in some locations there are more rigid enforcement and
compliance procedures, and research suggests that discretion is often applied in a
negative direction. There is currently considerable demand from local authorities
for increased central funding.
In France a three-tier structure of social assistance has developed which covers the
social minima, other income-tested benefits (including housing and family benefits)
and local social assistance. which is frequently in the form of services rather than
cash. The group of eight social minima. nationally regulated and mostly funded
from the central state, are now dominated by the Revenu Minimum & Insertion
(RMI), which has become the principal assistance benefit for people of workin g
age. The various minima, being partly supplements for insurance benefits, are
administered by the different branches of the social insurance system. Several
benefits (RAH, Allocation aux Adcltes Handzcapes, Allocation de Parent Isole are
delivered by the local Caisse d'Allocation Familiales; the Minimum Invalidite is
administered by the Branche aladie; the Allocation Veurage by the Branche
Vieillesse; the Allocation de Solidarite Specijgr.re is administered by the Brunelle
Chomage. Some of these benefits are partly financed by contributions and the
remainder by variable levels of support direct from the state. The interaction
between various benefits is complex and not always well understood.
Luxembourg also has a somewhat complex system, which divides responsibility for
assessment of benefit between local and central government. Administration is co-
ordinated by a series of inter-ministerial bodies. In principle, payments for the first
three months of a claim are the responsibility of the local authority. after which
time it should be assumed by the Fonds National de Solidarite. In practice,
however, claimants often receive payments from the local office for up to a year.
As these are at a lower rate, and are often subject to delays and inconsistencies,
this can cause a number of problems (Wagner, 1994).
Until recently, social assistance in the Netherlands has been 90 per cent financed
by central government. This proportion has been reduced to 80 per cent in an
attempt to provide incentives to contain expenditure, and Special Assistance has,
since 1991, been provided by means of cash-limited block grants rather than by
reimbursement of actual expenditure. In Japan. 75 per cent of the costs of social
assistance are met by central government, while in Sweden the bulk of assistance
expenditure is borne by the local authorities. out of local income tax revenues.
Central government finances local authority help for refugees in their first three
years of residence. In Norway, local authorities receive funding for social
assistance in the form of block grants from central government, based on the
numbers of people in receipt of assistance.
Switzerland is perhaps the extreme case here, since, although national guidelines
for social assistance exists, the schemes are administered within the framework of
cantonal law. and with further decentralisation to the communes. As a result there
are, in effect, more than 3,000 different schemes operating. These schemes are
funded at a local level. Complex rules exist which require inter-cantonal
reimbursements when people move from one area to another. leading to an
intricate administrative network.
The system of social assistance in the USA is extensive, fragmented and
categorical. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Food Stamps are both
federally funded and administered, with optional additions to SSI paid by some
states. General Assistance provides local social assistance in most, but not all,
states. Aid to Families with Dependent Children is a jointly-funded and state-
administered scheme, which is federally regulated. There is a high degree of
complexity and only limited co-ordination between the schemes.
The main examples of large-scale social assistance schemes which are both
organised and funded nationally are those of Australia, New Zealand and the UK.
The potential for co-ordination of schemes, such as the development of unified
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eligibility criteria, means that these schemes are also characteristically simpler and
cheaper to administer. This is also the case for those elements of social assistance
which have a national structure in other countries. such as the USA. Standards of
administrative justice are commonly perceived to be higher in such schemes, mainly
owing to improved consistency of decision making. though defenders of the locally-
organised systems argue that they are capable of greater responsiveness to
individual needs.
Several countries are currently undergoing a period of transition between
centralised and decentralised systems, reflecting a shifting balance of priorities.
Canada, for example, is in the process of a major upheaval in social welfare which
will result in greater provincial autonomy. but which critics argue is influenced
primarily by a perceived need to reduce social security expenditure. In Denmark,
on the other hand_ municipal discretion has been reducing steadily since 1976, with
an increasing number of central directives being issued specifying eligibility criteria
and benefit levels. This does not appear to be contentious. in contrast to Norway
where municipalities have been seeking to control levels of payment_ which are
primarily locally financed. Spain is still in the process of moving towards a
decentralised system after years of highly centralised administration. Whether
political and expenditure control is thought to he achieved more readily by
centralised or decentralised systems may reflect fundamental cultural and historical
differences between countries.
4.3 Making a claim and receiving a payment
In most countries it is necessary for individuals to initiate their claim in person by
visiting their local social security office (see Table 4.1 below). In Canada, in
addition to submitting the application in person each applicant must be
interviewed by a case worker either in the applicant's home or in the case worker's
office. However, there are exceptions to the requirement to make claims in person:
in Australia. if a claimant is old, has certain disabilities or lives in a remote
location, postal application is allowed. The UK is unusual in that the preferred
method of claim (except for the unemployed) is by post. In France. Germany, and
Turkey claims may be made either in person or by post, as the claimant wishes. In
the USA claims for Supplemental Security Income may be made by telephone
using a free telephone service. Outreach facilities have been developed in Australia
in order to improve access for homeless people. minority groups and other people
living in remote areas.
A variety of payment mechanisms exist: in Australia over 95 per cent of benefit
payments are made directly to claimants ' bank accounts. In Austria. long-term
benefits tend to be paid by credit transfer, but short-term and one-off payments are
usually paid in cash from a district office. In Finland it is virtually unknown for
claimants to receive benefits in cash, with transfers being direct to the recipient's
bank account. Cash payments in an emergency are available in a number of
countries including Belgium, the UK and Sweden. In Ireland, particular benefits
have tended to be associated with particular payment methods, but there are now
moves to streamline payment systems, with the majority of people receiving
payment via an order book or post office draft. Bank credit transfers appear to be
increasingly used in the majority of countries. In certain situations. individuals may
be required to attend an office personally to collect a payment. This happens in
Luxembourg during the initial period of a claim, and can cause significant delays
and inconvenience. Personal collection of payments may also be used as a sanction
where fraud is suspected. as happens in the UK in a minority of cases.
Table 4.1 summarises the administrative procedures for claiming assistance,
reviewing entitlements and controlling fraud and abuse.
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Table Claiming social assistance. verification and fraud control
Canada
Belgium
Austria
Country
Australia
Claims for the Minirnex can be made to the
l ocal OCMW centre in person or in writing.
If the person needs immediate help then
some nay be given but not always in the form
of cash. The centre must then appoint a
social welfare officer to make a `social
enquiry'. A decision trust be made in 30
days and claims are backdated. The
payment can be in the forth of a postal
order, giro cheque or credit transfer, lit the
OCMW's discretion.
All the provinces require applicants to
apply using prescribed forms and to submit
their- forms to the nearest office. Some
provinces demand periodic re-verification
of claim. Depending on case and province,
benefits may he paid monthly or fortnightly
by cheque. cash, direct payment for goods
and services, credit transfer, or voucher.
Direct payment is becoming the most
common method. and vouchers are the
most unpopular.
Longer-term benefits are normally paid
directly into clients' bank aect>unts, while
short-term payments are usually paid in
cash.
Making a claim
Generally clients have to make personal
applications at the offices of the OSS. In
certain cases. such as remote dwelling, old
age and disability. postal applications are
allowed. Visiting services exist for remote
communities, and in 1993 trials were put in
place with mobile vans to provide a direct
service to the homeless. Aboriginals and
Torres Strait islanders, and remote
communities. Over 135 per cent of
payments are made directly to claimants'
bank accounts.
Application for Snricrl/zilfiis usually made Documents needed to authenticate a
in person, but can be made in writing;. claim include identity cards, residence
registration, proof of income and tenancy
coin ruts. The actual procedures for
verification are not legally regulated and
vary between local authorities.
Itome visits may be used to verify
information in cases of longer-term
awards.
No information
Applicants mast. provide evidence of
identity and circumstances in the tornn
of birth certificates, social insurance
number, medical certificates, bank books
and cheque stubs.
They must also sign a form authorising
officers to check bank accounts and other
m
t
estments.
Procedures for verification of identity ,
People must satisfy proof of identity
requirements (POI). When initially
claiming service pensions applicants need
to provide a valid tax file number and
produce identity of age and service. Other
forms of identity can be birth certificates
and proof of assets.
Review of eligibility
Clients are selected for review to check
continued entitlement by data-matching
risk-based selection according to client
group. Additional reviews, either in person
or by mail are carried out. at intervals which
vary according to the client group.
fraud control
Full reviews of entitlement for the Minirnex
take place only once a year, though
claimants have to report changes in
circumstances
Some provinces demand periodic formal re-
application (monthly for young
`
enaployaables', quarterly or annually for
longer-term cases). Other provinces require
clients to return payment cheque stubs as
part of the ongoing process of claim
renewal,
Local social workers carry out
substantial checks on claims to detect
and prevent. fraud. No evidence on its
extent.
The prevention of fraud is a major issue
for the provinces Measures include
`double verification' (by two officers).
personal collection of payment cheques,
direct payment into hank accounts, and
increasing information-sharing between
jrnisdictions and departments.
d
The DSS has a comprehensive system for
controlling fraud, involving careful
checking of claimant details and ID
before payments are made, and extensive
computer data-matching with income
Tax and other external agencies
Payments for people in retirement homes or- Information supplied by the client is
oil fixed long-tern benefits (such as checked and verified with the Social
pensioner's) are usually' reviewed annually Security Institute, the Labour Eixefi ange,
and local registration offices. There is
little evidence on the extent of fraud.
Tc btu 4-1: Claiming social assistance, verification and fraud control (eontri.J
Country Making a claim Procedures for verification of identity Review of eligibility Fraud control
Denmark People apply in person within their
municipality by attending their local office.
Social workers produce booklets to help
claimants understand their rights and
entitlements.
Payment made monthly, normally into bank
or pc-tat office accounts by credit transfer.
There are no rules governing identity: it is
Up to the n.=..inicipa.lity to identify the
client. However, applicants must have an
address to claim.
Recipients must report changes of
circumstances, but no specific
arrangements for review or renewal of
claims. Varies according to the local
authority.
The mumcipahty has the right to request
computeosed Infoamat.ion about
claimants from other sources
Finland Applied Ella : an be made either in writinl?
or in pin -',--~n I I the welfare office. Renewed
claims can be made by telephone.
Most claimants receive benefit by credit
transfer to their bank account. Paying
benefits in cash is only possible in an
emergency such as for food.
Payment is usually monthly,
The claimant needs to produce an identity
card, proof of income, bank statement and
municipal registration form
The review date varies from once a month
in rural areas, to up to six months in areas
with large caseloads
No special arrangements exist and the
onus is on officials to detect and control,
The Social Welfare Act obliges the tax
office to co-operate with the social
workers.
France Claimants can apply by post or in person
and they are normally invited for interview.
There are no cash payments, except to
homeless people. Benefit is normally paid
directly into hank or postal accounts.
.,.
Identity has to be proved 'by any
recognised means'
No information During 1994, the growth in claims for
the RMI in the Paris region has
accentuated concerns over fraud. I-Ionie
visits are more frequent.
Germany CI in a nts are usually expected to apply in
person at a social welfare office, although
claims can also be made in writing.
Payments are normally made monthly and
claimants are encouraged to have them paid
directly into bank accounts. Emergency
payments can be made over the counter and
more frequent or cash payments made in
special circumstances.
No Information , ll y reviewed annuallyClaims are genera y Local social welfare officers are
supposed to setuianrse claims thoroughly,
but there has not been much debate about
fraud. If the office is suspicious there
will he an investigation, but generally the
claimant is trusted. Anonymous letters
are only taken notice of if some suspicion
of fraud already exists.
Greece Application in person or by post to relevant
organisation
Identity card and declaration that
circumstances are honestly presented
No information Concern about fraud exists, but there are
no special measures
Iceland Applications in person at welfare office Proof of legal residency required, plus
proof of income (bank statements and tax
returns)
Claims reviewed every I to 3 months,
depending on local authority
Ministry of Social Affairs issues guidelines
on detection of fraud. Social Service
committees have access to information
from employers on wages and to the
computerised systems of the National
Insurance Office and Social Insurance
Institute, but the client's consent
must be given for information gathering.
Table 4.1: Claiming social assistance, verification and fraud control - ( contd.)
..
Italy Social workers play at large part in the No information No inforntalion
claiming process. receiving and dealing
with the application and also providing
counselling.
Payments of the social pension are made
directly into post office or hank accounts
every two months.
Payment systems for local social assistance
vary according to the municipality.
Japan To make a claim a person must apply to the
welfare office in the relevant town, village
or city. Payments are made monthly, in
cash at welfare offices or by credit transfer
to bank accounts.
I.,uxemhourg A claim for the RMG must be trade to the No infortrtation
local municipal social welfare office. but
there is no specific application form. After
three 'months of claiming, administration
should pass to an office of the national
Fonds A lumsrta/ tic Solidrtr•ite, though the
initial period can last longer.
Initial payments are made at 80'% of the
full rate, usually weekly in cash. ENS
payments are made monthly by credit
transfer.
Country
Ireland
Making a claim
Unemployment Assistance is claimed at the
local welthrc office. Supplementary
Welfare Allowance and Disabled Person's
Allowance are paid by the local health
board. All other benefits are applied for by
post, centrally All payments are made
weekly. Each scheme has a method of
payment associated with it: tot example.
cash for the unemployed, order hooks for
most other social assistance recipients and
cheques rot health hoard payments.
Procedures for verification of identity
In order to claim social assistance people
must quote their revenue and social
insurance numbers. They may also be
required to show other proof of identity
(for example a birth certificate is required
for Unemployment Assistance and most
pensions).
There is a home visiting service which can
lae used to verify circumstances and to
review elig ibility
Review of eligibility
A joint Revenne.Soetal Welfare
Interdepartmental Unit employs special
f'rand investigators. Order hr have
been redesigned to prevent ■•'gery.
art_ .e
No information
Fraud control
Departmental records and computer
systems are used to detect any faulty
payments. Certain employers have to
notify the Department of Social Welfare
about new employees and sub-
contractors.
There is no system of identity cards for
receipt of assistance
The renewal of a claim is not necessary if
circumstances do not change. Case workers
visit claimants regularly to cheek their
eircumstances and offer guidance=.
No formal requirements for review .. of as
claim, however case workers can make
house visits
The Ministry provides guidance for local
authorities in detecting and controlling
fraud, which is punishable by a
maximum of 3 years imprisonment or a
fine of up to 50.000 Yen
et_
The enquiries made when assessing a
claim are seen to be sufficient by the
offleetIs to detect fraud
ruble 4.1: Claiming social assistance, verification and fraud control (contd j
Country Making a claim
Netherlands Payments are usually paid directly to the
person's bank account through a credit
transfer on a monthly basis. In special
circumstances such as hotuelessness
payments can be made more regularly. It is
possible for the payments to be made to
another party on behalf of the claimant hut
only with the permission of the claimant.
New Zealand Applications are usually made by Claimants have to show proof of identity
completing an application form and a face when they apply, and they are then
to face interview. All benefits are paid allocated a DSW number
fortnightly, except the unemployment-
related benefits which are paid weekly. All
payments are by credit transfer.
Norway People can either send in an application If necessary people will have to prove Review procedures vary considerably both
form or go to the local office to get help their identity to make a claim by local authority and claimant category
with completing the form. There is no
obligatory home visiting service.
Methods of payment vary by municipality.
but generally, shorter-term claimants such
as the young unemployed have to re-apply
each month and are paid by cheque,
whereas longer-term recipients receive
monthly payments by credit transfer.
Review of eligibility
et_
People are required to sign on once a month
if they are available to work and their case
is reviewed every eight months
Fraud control
Two national commissions in the early
1990s suggested that fraud in social
assistance was extensive and focal
authorities have been encouraged to
tighten up procedures, Social service
computer files are now linked to those of
tax and national insurance offices.
Procedures for verification of identity
National identity card is required for
initial claim
Entitlements are renewed annually for
invalids. Widows, Domestic Purposes and
Transitional Retirement Benefits, as well as
for Superannuation. Renewals of Sickness.
Training and Ilaaemployment benefits vary
according to circumstances_
There are a number of strategies to detect
fraud: internal controls and audits, the
use of investigation units and officers.
and extensive electronic matching of data
from different agencies
In order to control fraud, social services
have access to information on their
clients from other authorities. Fraud is
not a major issue, however.
Portugal
Spain
Benefits are usually claimed in person at Claimants are given an identification
the local social security offices. Payments card and number when they first claim
are made monthly, by postal order. assistance
For the minimum income benefits.
claimants are required to make a personal
and detailed application at the district
council within each Autonomous
Community. Payments are made monthly
and credit transfer is the most popular
means of a m lint.
There are no formal arrangements for the
reviewing of a claim. However, a person's
circumstances can periodically be re-
-ad.
To detect fraud, data is cross checked
between the National Institute of
Employment, the National Institute of
Social Security and regional social
welfare departments
substantially between regions
Claims must be supported by proof such as Procedures for reviewing claims vary
an identity card or passport
Regional social security centres have
inspection teams for controlling fraud,
but there is little debate on the subject
Sweden Apphcuttt~ €a .an be made through the post,
but usually they are made in person at the
local social security offices. Benefit is paid
monthly by money order or credit transfer.
It is possible to have more frequent
payments in difficult circumstances.
If the person is not known then identity
must be confirmed by a passport or
identity card
Claims for social assistance have to be
renewed in writing once a month
There is little debate on fraud, but checks
can be made with information from the
social insurance office or unemployment
benefit fond, the national register office,
the motor vehicle register. and employers
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Country.
Switzerland
Turkey
Making a claim
Applications for benefit are normally made
over a public counter (and thus can lack
privacy). The majority of payments are
made in cash. but the frequency varies
according to the commune. In some.
payments have to be collected daily.
Claims are made by post or in person.
Payments are made every month or three-
monthly, by whatever method the claimant
prefers.
Fraud control
No information on specific
arrangements, but the assessment process
for a istans t is Generally very detailed
and ti. n.' and social workers have
the authority to interview as wide range of
people about the client's circumstances
No information
..._
Procedures for verification of identity Revierv of eligibility
No information Procedures vary from commune for
commune
Applicants must provide proof of' deaatity No information
UK
USA
Income Support is claimed by post. The
claimant fills in an extensive form and
sends it to the local Benefits Agency office.
Income Support can be paid by order book,
giro or credit transfer. Payments are made
usually fortnightly.
For AFDC, applications are made in person
at the public assistance office. Food Stamp
applications are made at the same office
and monthly payments are often combined
with AFDC.
An identity card is not required, but a
national insurance number is needed to
access the claimant's records.
In cases of disputed identity or
immigration status. passports or other
forms of identification may be required
Identificmnni Mr SSE AFDC and FS is
made by social security numbers issued
by the Social Security Administration
A claim for Income Support is reviewed
after the first 13 weeks of claiming.
Claimants must report any changes of
circumstances which might affect their
benefit award
Eligibility for the SST is reviewed
periodically, but this varies from between
1--3 years depending on the profile of the
claimant. Eligibility for the AFDC is
reviewed every 6 months, with a face to
face interview every 12 months.
The government places groat emphasis
on preventing, detecting and deterring
fraud. The DSS has improved
technology to detect. fraud and made
delivery and payment systems more
secure (such as by putting bar codes on
order books). The number of
prosecutions has also been increased.
at_
AFDC and SST fraud is controlled by
extensive manual and computer data-
matching, and field investigations
Applicants for SSI can apply in person, by
post or by telephone. Payment can be made
either by cheque or credit transfer. For (TA,
payments are usually made by cheque or by
voucher.
4.4 Procedures for verification of ide
The extent of documentation which is required in order to make a claim varies
considerably both between, and to some extent within, countries (see Table 4.1). In
Denmark and Austria_ for example, there are no specific legal requirements as to
evidence of identity. and practice varies considerably in different areas. Australia,
Canada and the UK have among the most stringent conditions, with requirements
to produce proof of assets, proof of identity (such as birth certificates) and social
insurance numbers. In countries with local administration of benefits, such as
Sweden. identity documents are not checked on each claim if the person is already
known to the office. A number of countries. including Canada and New Zealand,
have considered the imposition of a national, compulsory system of identity cards
for claiming social assistance, but have, up to now, rejected the idea on civil
liberties grounds.
4.5 Computerisation of benefit delivery
Computerisation may be adopted for a number of reasons. Administrative
efficiency tends to be enhanced where the majority of claims are processed by
computer. as in the UK. However, this is a feasible strategy only where schemes of
social assistance are reasonably simple and not subject to a large degree of
administrative discretion, In Sweden, benefit authorities have access to motor
vehicle tax records. which are used to check ownership. as a car is regarded as a
saleable asset. While helping to contain administrative costs and limit the extent of
fraud, the introduction of computerised systems has also brought advantages for
claimants. For example, in Australia and New Zealand, social security authorities
argue that the introduction of computerised systems has led to fuller take-up of
entitlements. Portable computers are also used for home visits in Australia, with
the result that the service received is comparable to that available in an office
interview.
4.6 Fraud prevention and control
Computerisation also plays a major role in fraud control in a number of countries.
There is considerable disparity in the extent to which countries regard fraud as an
issue, and in the measures which are adopted in an attempt to minimise it (see
Table 4.1). In those countries with recently developed systems of social assistance,
such as Turkey and Portugal. there is little discussion of fraud. Fraud is also not
perceived as a particular problem in Sweden or Finland, though local authorities
have extensive access to tax records, motor vehicle license information and other
databases. In New Zealand, also, there is considerable use of computers to detect
fraud, as authority exists for the Department of Social Welfare to check databases
including those for income tax, customs and excise, and college records. Other
methods used include home visits, as in Japan and France: in the latter lone
parents in particular appear to be subject to special scrutiny when claiming.
Metropolitan areas are typically perceived as difficult to monitor and therefore
more likely to experience fraudulent claiming. The UK appears to rely more on
information supplied by members of the public than other countries. In Germany
information such as anonymous letters tends to be ignored, unless there is existing
knowledge or suspicion of fraud.
Amongst countries with a pro-active approach to fraud prevention, Ireland has
targeted particular types of employers in order to prevent 'off the record' working.
These are now required to notify the benefit authorities when new employees are
taken on. Australia has developed sophisticated data-matching technologies which
include probability estimates of the likelihood of fraud among particular client
groups. Deterrence is also an important component of anti-fraud strategies, and
countries such as Japan and the U.K use prosecution ('pour encourager leis autr-es')
in addition to computer technology and traditional methods of detection. During
the 1980s. Japan experienced some well-publicised cases of social assistance fraud
by organised crime syndicates_ and introduced more careful scrutiny of claims in
order to ensure public confidence in the system.
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Complex, routine and regular reviews are conducted in a number of countries (see
Table 4.1): among the most systematic is Australia where continued eligibility is
monitored on an ongoing basis, with the frequency of checks varying according to
the benefit received. In the USA review requirements also vary across benefits. with
claimants of AFDC being required to attend a review interview at least once a
year, with an interim six-monthly report. In some cases monthly reviews of
circumstances may be undertaken.
In Canada, requirements vary between the provinces. but several demand regular
re-application for benefit (every month for young, single 'employables'), and in
some cases claimants are required to return a cheque stub from their benefit
payment as part of a routine verification process.
In the USA, reviews take place at intervals between one and three years for
different claimant groups. Failure to complete the required report on circumstances
may lead to a reduction in benefit. In the UK. Income Support claims by
unemployed people are subject to weekly, fortnightly. or monthly checks on job
seeking activity, but otherwise are not specifically reviewed on a regular basis. In
Finland, the review period varies from once a month in rural areas to six-monthly
in cities. In Denmark. Spain and Norway there appears to be a high degree of
geographical variation in the frequency with which claims are reviewed, since this is
a matter of local policy. There are no formal requirements for benefit to be
reviewed in Portugal or Turkey.
There is a general duty on the claimant to report any relevant changes in
circumstances in virtually all countries, though they vary in the extent to which
there are active procedures for discovering whether individuals' circumstances have
altered. In Japan. for example. claimants are visited regularly at home in order to
check their current circumstances, whereas the more common pattern appears to be
to rely largely on self-reporting of changes.
Table 4.2 summarises procedures for recovery of overpayments, appeals against
administrative decisions and wider scrutiny of the quality of administration.
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Table 4.2: Procedures for recovery of overpayments, appeals and see ny of administration
Country Recovery of overpayments Appeal systems and scrutiny of administration
Australia Overpayments from misrepresentation or failure to
comply can be recovered from a DSS payment.
Not all overpayments arisin g from administrative
error are to be repaid.
Australia has a well-established system of reviews
and appeal involving several tiers. These include
internal reviews, appeals to the independent
Social Security Appeal Tribunal and to the federal
courts on a point of law. Administration and
delivery of benefits are scrutinised by a
Commonwealth Ombudsman, to whom a
dissatisfied client can also complain. The DSS
does not have to implement the recommendations
but the Ombudsman can inform the Prime
Minister and Cabinet about non-implementation.
Austria Overpayments are recovered by 'reasonable
repayments'. though repayments may defeat the
object of help if it does not stimulate people to be
self-sufficient. The debts can only he recovered
from a liable spouse or relative, a divorced spouse
can only be liable if there was an obligation for
support in the settlement of the divorce,
Local decisions are subject to appeal and are
heard by a tribunal with provincial authority: the
decision will normally take up to six months to go
through, Complaints can he heard by the
National Ombudsman. The administration of
social assistance is subject to scrutiny by
provincial governments and the provincial and
federal courts of auditors.
Belgium No information about recovery mechanisms The jurisdiction for appeals against decisions on
social assistance lies with the labour courts.
Appeals to the courts are stow and cumbersome.
but they are regarded as providing good access to
social justice.
Canada Every province has procedures to recover any
assistance payments made which people are not
entitled to. Overpayments are deducted front future
benefits according to provincial formulae. Most
provinces reduce or defer repayments if they might
cause real hardship.
Under the Canada Assistance Plan every
province must have an appeal procedure relating
to refusal, suspension and termination of benefit.
There is considerable variation. Some have limits
on issues that can be appealed upon, others allow
people to question any decision. There are also
provincial ombudsmen. The Federal Department
is subject to scrutiny and review by the federal auditor.
Denmark Arrangements for repayment are dependent on the
circumstances that led to the overpayment. The
local municipality can decide how the payment
should be repaid. Only the person who was
overpaid is liable but it is possible to recover
monies from an estate in the case of death.
There is a right of appeal first to the local Social
Board, then to the County Board. Final appeal to
central Social Appeals Committee. The
Ombudsman can scrutinize any social assistance
appeals.
Finland Overpaid benefit is recovered from other social
security benefits. or by attachment of wages. It can
only be recovered from another person in the
household if s/he is obliged to support the claimant.
Overpayments can be recovered from cash from an
estate but not from the home and household items.
Appeals go first to the local Social Welfare Board
and then to the Count Board. No further appeal
beyond this level. Process can take up to a year.
A parliamentary Ombudsman reviews the
administration of the appeals.
France Overpayments are deducted on a percentage basis
from future payments. subject to individual
arrangements where other debts are involved
Appeals on the RMI and other social minima can
be made to local Commissions, and for some
benefits to a Social Security Tribunal.
Administration is subject to scrutiny by mediators
appointed by the CNAF and by a national
Ombudsman concerned with all public services.
C"sermaanv Claimants must repay any claim that arises from
misrepresentation. Overpayments can be recovered
from the estate of a dead client if necessary.
Decisions on social assistance are subject to
appeal, including discretionary decisions. First
tier is review, by local or Lander welfare office.
Further appeal to administrative court, where free
le g al aid is available.
Greece No information Internal rights of appeal for most benefits
Iceland Payments made on basis of false information are
recoverable. Overpayments as result of
administrative error are non-recoverable.
Adjudication process and benefit awards are both
open to appeal at the national Social Services
Appeal Committee, but only where decision at
issue is subject to regulation
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able 4.2: Procedures for recovery of overpayments, appeals and scrutiny of administration - (contd.)
Country Recovery of overpayments Appeal systems and scrutiny of administration
Ireland Overpayments are recovered from future payments
of benefits and income. They are only repaid by the
claimant or their partner. In general repayments are
not recovered from the estate of a dead client.
However, if it is proven that the client had greater
resources than stated in their claim, then money
can be recovered.
Decisions are subject to appeal at local Social
Welfare Appeals Offices or Health 'Board Appeals
Offices, depending on benefit. Further appeal to
the High Court on point of law.
All Departments are subject to scrutiny by the
parliamentary Ombudsman. The Ombudsman
can investigate decisions made, administration
and failure to take action. As well as this. the
Comptroller and Auditor General scrutinise
departments.
Italy No information Ri g ht of appeal on social and disability pension
decisions, but said to be 'slow and cumbersome'.
Appeals on local assistance depend on locality.
Japan Any overpayments are recovered by deducting
money from succeeding payments or by ordering
repayment. All members of a household are liable
for repayment.
Claimants dissatisfied with decision of local
social welfare office can ask for local review and
can also appeal directly to Prefectural Governor
within 50 days of the original decision. The
Governor will issue jud gement within 50 days.
Further appeal right to Minister for Health and
Welfare or through courts.
Luxembourg Benefits can he reclaimed in a number of
circumstances. If during a period of claim a client
disposes of resources which could be taken into
account in the claim, the excess can be reclaimed
from them or anyone liable to them. If a client has
given false information that may affect the claim,
repayment is obligatory. Any benefit that is
wrongly paid can be reclaimed. It can be reclaimed
from future benefit or any arrears. Benefit can be
reclaimed from an estate or a will, and from the
claimant if their situation improves.
There are common procedures for appeal on all
social security benefits and free representation by
a lawyer is possible
Netherlands Payments can be recovered from claimants or other
parties in a number of circumstances.
Overpayments made in error can be claimed from
the person themselves. Assistance can be also
reclaimed from an estate.
Claimants have the right to administrative review
(sometimes carried out by a special committee),
and to further appeal at the Regional Court.
which has a special social security appeal
`chamber'. Appeals can be made on exercise of
discretion as well as on regulations.
New Zealand Overpayments may be recovered. If repayment is
unreasonable then the debt will be written off. If a
person is still on benefit then a reduced repayment
schedule is used. such as S5 per week. Repayment
can only be from the claimant or his:`her estate and
not from an ex-spouse.
Several sta ges of appeal include internal review
review by local Benefits Review Committee
Social Security Appeal Tribunal. Appeal Court,
and High Court on a point of law.
Departmental operations are also subject to
scrutiny by Ombudsman. Audit Department and
parliamentary Select Committee.
Norway if overpayments are not paid back voluntarily legal
steps can be taken to recover them, Overpayments
can only be recovered from the claimant or their
spouse.
There is provision in the law in Norway for
people to appeal against any decisions made.
Applicants can ask for a re-assessment of their
case. The case is first heard by a committee of lay
people from the local municipality. If they do not
support the appeal, it goes to the County level
where the final decision is made.
The municipal social services are reviewed by the
County Governor.
Portugal Overpayments are recovered from future benefit or
other income, depending on whether the mistake is
the fault of the claimant or the institution. Benefit
can only be recovered from claimants themselves.
Claimants may challenge decisions if they think
that they have had their rights infringed. Appeals
a
gainst decisions are lodged first with the relevant
administrative institution and then with the
administrative courts. The Ombudsman can also
receive complaints, but cannot issue binding
recommendations.
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Table 4.2: Procedures for recovery of overpayments, appeals and scrutiny of a inistration - (c°ontd )
Country Recovery of overpayments Appeal systems and scrutiny of administration
Spain Overpayments can only be reclaimed from the
claimant and are not recoverable from an estate
Claimants may appeal to district authorities
must benefit decisions within one month of
receiving the decision
Sweden Any small overpayment received in good faith is
not reclaimed. It can only be reclaimed if it is paid
out as an advance against another benefit or if it
has been paid to someone involved in a labour
dispute. In these cases the social welfare board
must be certain that a person is not left without
resources because of the repayment. Payment can
only be recovered from the person who received it.
Appeals on social assistance can be made to the
County Administrative Court if submitted within
three weeks of the decision. The County Court ' s
decision can be appealed by both the claimant
and the social welfare board. at the
Administrative Court of Appeal. The Supreme
Administrative Court is the final place of appeal
and sets le gal precedent. but only hears test cases
given leave to appeal.
The county administrative board and the National
Board of Health and Welfare are mainly
responsible for supervising social services.
Complaints may also be lodged with the
Parliamentary Ombudsman.
Switzerland Payments are theoretically recoverable if a
claimant ' s circumstances improve
Right of appeal exists but procedures vary
between Cantons. Legal aid may be available. in
practice appeals are rare.
Turkey Overpayments are recoverable from future benefit.
Legal heirs can be responsible.
There is a process of appeal written into the
constitution and claimants have a ri ght to legal
representation.
UK Overpayments in general are recoverable. but only
where there has been a misrepresentation or failure
to disclose a material fact. Repayments can be in
the form of deductions from future benefit,
instalments or lump sums.
Most decisions are subject to appeal. Appeals on
Income Support must be lodged within three
months of original decision. Officers review
cases internally Fu r st and if the decision is not
changed it goes to the independent Social
Security Appeal Tribunal. Further appeal, on
points of law only. can go to the Social Security
Commissioners. whose decisions are binding on
tribunals, and then to the Court of Appeal.
The Benefits A g ency is subject to scrutiny by the
National Audit office on behalf of Parliament and
by the House of Commons Social Security
Advisory Committee. Complaints about
maladministration can be heard by the
Parliamentary Ombudsman.
US No information Well established national appeal procedures exist
for 55I. in four tiers. AFDC has only one tier of
appeal.....a 'fair hearing ' before the state a gency or
`evidential hearing' at local level. Procedures for
GA depend on the state.
4.7 Recovery of overpayments
Again there is a broadly similar pattern of procedures for recovering overpayments
of benefit across the countries. Generally overpayments resulting from some
mistake or misrepresentation on the claimant's part are liable for recovery, either
by deductions from future benefit, by separate debt recovery or through
attachment of earnings. Mistakes made as result of official errors are less likely to
be recoverable. In countries where there is greater discretion in decision making in
general, this discretion is likely to apply to overpayment recovery too. It is also
noticeable that recovery of overpaid benefit from the estate of deceased claimants
is commonly permitted, although it is not known how often this actually happens.
4.8 Provision for payment of benefit to third parties
Several countries make provision for deductions to be made from benefit to meet
debts, such as for fuel and housing costs. These include Australia. Finland.
Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK. Direct payments are made in
between a quarter and a third of all cases in the Netherlands. In the UK, by
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contrast (if deductions for repayment of Social Fund loans are excluded). the
proportion of claimants who have payments made directly from their benefit to
third parties is consistently below five per cent. However, the total number of
direct payments trebled between 1991 and 1993, from 486,000 to 1.€28.000
( Man.nion et al.. 1994). Rules governing the situations where such deductions may
be made appear to be most developed in the UK. In Australia. rent arrears are
specifically excluded. In Norway. such assistance may be conditional on the
acceptance of considerable social work intervention. In Finland, occasional lump-
sum payments are sometimes used to prevent the need for deductions from benefit.
Deductions from benefit to meet debts cannot be made in Denmark or France.
There is little information on the use of direct deductions from benefit in the other
countries, although it appears that lump-sum payments which are available in
Belgium, Denmark.. Portugal and Ireland may lessen the necessity to incur debts
for essential items. Discretionary awards of weekly benefit (for the higher heating
bills of disabled people, for example) are also made in some countries.
4.9 The role of social workers
In a number of countries social workers play an important role in the assessment
and delivery of social assistance benefits. The potential for payment of benefits to
be explicitly linked to behavioural change (especially job search activity) appears to
be most highly developed in Japan and Switzerland where detailed and personal
interviews with social workers are common. In the Scandinavian countries, where
social workers have traditionally had a dual role as counsellors and benefit
administrators, there is evidence that they are experiencing increasing difficulty in
reconciling the contradictions which arise. In Italy, where they also have this dual
function, there appears to be less concern about potential conflicts of interest. In
the Netherlands, the teams of benefit administrators include a legal expert, in
addition to trained social work staff, in order to facilitate decision making. The
social worker as benefit administrator is associated with local funding and
administration of benefit. and is thus not found in those countries with a national
system of benefit. In countries where social workers have no involvement in the
administration of benefits. they may nevertheless play an important role in
providing advice and information, as in France and the UK.
4.10 The role of non-governmental organisations
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have a number of potential roles in
relation to schemes of social assistance. One role is to act as campaigning bodies,
monitoring policy and administration of benefits and providing representation for
claimants. This `poverty lobby' or `welfare rights' function is well-developed in a
number of countries and is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. They may
also be involved in the provision of benefits and services, although typically these
are in kind, rather than cash. In certain countries, such as Germany and Portugal,
some NGO are 'incorporated' into the system of social assistance. In Germany this
takes the form of provision of services such as residential care. The contractual
relationship between these voluntary agencies and the social assistance authorities
is regulated by law. In Japan, there are a number of NGOs which are involved in
service provision, such as training schemes. accommodation for homeless people
and care for elderly or disabled people. Switzerland has an extensive network of
NGOs which, in some of the smaller communes at least, functions as an alternative
system of assistance for people who are unable or unwilling to make use of the
rather stigmatised formal social assistance scheme. In other countries such as Italy,
where social assistance provision for some groups is very limited, religious and
voluntary bodies also play an important role in providing substitute assistance. The
growth of such organisations as food banks in Canada and New Zealand is also
indicative of increasing levels of need. It is said that claimants in New Zealand are
often referred to such organisations by the benefit authorities, as much for their
role in providing advocacy as for the practical aid which they offer. In
Luxembourg and Austria. some NGOs can make cash payments, sometimes in
emergencies, for which they are later reimbursed through social assistance. The
importance of NGOs appears to be increasing at present, and even in those
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countries where they have traditionally played a very limited role, such as
Denmark and Finland, they are becoming more significant. Their relevance to
schemes of social assistance is still regarded as marginal, however, in the Nordic
countries. Organisations which play a role comparable to that of the voluntary
sector in the UK are few, and marginal to the administration of social assistance.
In the UK, NGOs have tended to be wary of policy changes which could involve
their substituting for statutory provision, on the grounds that this might undermine
their independent role.
4.1.1 Quality and scrutiny of administration
The term 'quality` is highly contested and despite a growing interest in its meaning
and application in the general field of management and administration, there is
little evidence that it has been subject to systematic evaluation in the context of
social security. The general correlates of quality include accessibility, acceptability,
equity, efficiency, effectiveness and, more recently. customer service. The
established portfolio of social security research has focused primarily on inputs (the
volume of resource), outputs (numbers in receipt of benefit) or outcomes
(distributional impact or standard of living) rather than on process of benefit
delivery. The UK appears to be one of the countries where claimants' views on
service delivery are sought using regular attitudinal surveys (see, for example,
Russell and Whitworth. 1991: Smith and Wright, 1993).
This chapter has described the structures and processes by which claims are
initiated, benefits received and redress of grievance provided. No firm conclusions
can be drawn on the basis of available evidence. But to ignore or avoid the issue of
quality in relation to benefit adjudication and delivery would be to disregard a
commitment which is at the heart of policy agendas in most social security systems.
It is evident. certainly in the British context and exemplified by the establishment
of 'Next Steps' executive agencies responsible for the implementation of social
security policy (Ibbs Report. 1989; Department of Social Security, 1995), that there
is growing interest in quality processes of benefit delivery: whether claimants have
easy access, are treated courteously, are well informed, are paid promptly (Ditch,
1994). This is not to detract from the significance of either benefit levels or
outcomes, but is a recognition that how systems are organised to provide a service
is important for policy maker and claimant alike.
For a number of the countries there is very little evidence about the quality of
administrative decision making. In the Netherlands, there is a strong perception
that speed is prioritised to an extent which seriously prejudices the quality of
decisions on claims (Commission van der Zwan, 1993). The administration of the
social assistance scheme in Finland has been criticised as deteriorating rapidly
under the weight of increasing numbers of claims (Lauronen and Lehto, 1991:
Lehto and Laminipaa, 1992; Mantysaari, 1993). Administrative efficiency is also
regarded as problematic in Norway (Terum, 1994).
There is considerable variation in the rights of appeal which are available to
dissatisfied claimants (Table 4.2). These rights may include local or internal
reviews, appeals to specialist courts, and hearings in general courts. The appeals
system in Turkey is described as straightforward and equitable though no
information is available about its actual usage in assistance cases. In Canada. rights
of appeal vary across provinces, and there have been recent moves to limit the
range of decisions which carry appeal rights. Nonetheless, there has been a marked
increase in the number of appeals in the early I 990s - a period of benefit cuts. By
contrast, the appeals system in Switzerland is apparently hardly used. while in
Finland too there appears to be Iittle confidence in the appeals structure, resulting
in low rates of use (Tanninen and Julkenen, 1993: Huhtanen. 1994). In Italy, the
appeals process is described as 'complex and slow' (Saporiti, 1994) and this can
also be the case in Japan if the general courts are used (although special social
assistance hearings are faster). Some countries have recently expanded
opportunities for claimants to make use of appeals through the general legal
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system: this has happened in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands_ In Belgium
this was in explicit recognition of the superior quality of administrative justice
available in the Labour courts, which had been demonstrated by a number of
studies (van HuffeI, 1990; Bodart and Dijon. 1990; Huyse (a al., 1991). In the USA
the degree of administrative discretion and the appeal rights of claimants appear to
vary with the benefit received. with General Assistance offering the least rights and
Supplemental Security Income the greatest. Claimants of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children have the right to only one hearing. which is at the state agency
level.
Although appeals to specialist tribunals or courts are free of charge in most
countries. there are usually some costs associated with use of the mainstream
courts. It is also often the case that claimants' success at appeals may be increased
by legal or para-legal representation, and a number of countries provide legal aid
for social assistance tribunals.
4.12 Conclusion
Social assistance schemes are a product of the overall structure of social protection
within each country and of the prevailing constitutional and political arrangements.
Of necessity, all social assistance schemes are complex, as they seek to adjust to the
diverse and changing needs of claimants on the one hand and the interests of tax
payers and employers on the other. Certain aspects of the administrative process,
such as methods of application and payment, reporting requirements on claimants
and recovery of overpayments. seem. at least in principle, broadly similar in most
countries. Mechanisms for fraud control and detection. and procedures for appeal
and redress, seem more variable and reflect to a greater extent the differences in
context and scale between the various systems. However, more research needs to be
undertaken looking in detail at the practicalities of administration 'on the ground'
in the different countries if we are to understand better the role of administration
and benefit delivery in the translation of policy objectives into outcomes.
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Chapter 5 Benefit Rates, Adequacy and
Take-up: National Debates
5.1 Introduction
So far this report has discussed the growing importance of the different forms of
social assistance in the OECD countries and examined the structure and
administration of different schemes. Clearly one of the key features of assistance
schemes is the level of support available and the next chapter compares the
financial value of benefits fora range of model family types. First, in this chapter.
we examine how benefit rates are set and uprated. We then briefly survey debates
in the different countries on poverty and the role of social assistance in preventing
or alleviating it. In some countries, non-governmental organisations and `poverty
lobbies' play an important part in these debates and their role is considered here
too. One of the key question is whether assistance benefit levels in the different
countries are generally viewed as sufficient, given the role social assistance plays in
wider social security systems. Although to do justice to the range of debate on
these topics requires a full study in itself, some information was provided by the
national informants which helps to contextualise the empirical findings. Means-
tested benefits, however, can only play their intended role if people with
insufficient resources take up their entitlements. The final section of the chapter
briefly reviews the limited evidence on take-up of assistance.
5.2 The construction of social assistance scales
As we have seen in earlier chapters. social assistance schemes in a number of the
countries in the OECD are administered by local, regional or provincial tiers of
government rather than by national-level departments. Despite this, however,
benefit rates are set nationally in more than half the countries, whether or not
assistance is locally administered. and do not vary (except for the discretionary
elements) at a local level. In several others there is regional variation within national
guidelines or limits, and in only a few countries are re gional or municipal authorities
entirely free to set their own rates. Even in these Iatter countries there is often a
distinction between means- or income-tested benefits which are supplements or
replacements for insurance benefits (including unemployment assistance and
supplementary pensions), and general or categorical basic assistance payments: the
former are usually administered by insurance institutes and have national rates.
Countries with locally administered assistance schemes, but national guidelines for
benefit rates, include Germany, where rates vary only marginally between the
Lander: Finland, which has recommended national rates at two levels related to
local variation in the cost of living; Japan, which has six geographical cost-of-living
bands; Iceland, where minimum rates are set nationally: Switzerland, where there
are national guidelines but wide local variation in actual payments; and Sweden.
Sweden has national recommended rates. but the courts have ruled that if a local
municipality refuses to give a claimant the minimum recommended rates of social
assistance recommended by the government s/he is entitled to call on bailiffs,
supported by the police, to seize from the municipality up to the value of the
minimum entitlement. According to the Swedish National Board of Health and
Welfare, however, this has only happened once. Austria, Canada, Norway, Spain
and Italy (for the local Minimo Vitale) seem to be the only countries where both
administration and the setting of rates are entirely the responsibility of the provinces
or municipalities. In all other countries there are national social assistance scales.
Every country for which we have information, except Norway, has a general
understanding that assistance benefits will be uprated regularly. The minimum
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benefits which exist in Greece are not indexed and where they are uprated this is
only by Ministerial, or in some cases Presidential, decision. In most countries
uprating takes place annually, though it is not clear for all countries whether this is
a statutory obligation. Australia, Italy. Germany, France and the Netherlands
uprate twice yearly, and Turkey. which has experienced high levels of inflation,
uprates benefits quarterly. The most common uprating formula is to change
benefits in line with movements in the consumer prices index. In Belgium the index
was recently altered to exclude cigarettes, alcohol and petrol. and in the UK it
excludes housing costs, where rent is fully covered by housing benefit in most cases.
The countries which use formulae other than prices are Austria, Denmark and
Finland. where benefits are linked to an earnings index or to another benefit which
itself is linked to an earnings index - thus Denmark links social assistance to
unemployment benefit_ which is in turn uprated in line with earnings. In Japan
social assistance has been maintained since the early 1980s at 69 per cent of the
consumption level of the general household, while Germany uses an index of the
expenditure of' the lower third of the income distribution.
The formula used for uprating benefit is not necessarily related to that used to set
benefit levels in the first place. The information provided on the original rationale
for the level of benefits was not always very detailed, perhaps because in a number
of countries if such a rationale had existed, it had been superseded by subsequent
incremental changes. In the U.K.. for example. the original national assistance scale
rates have their origins in the recommendations of the Beveridge Report
(Beveridge. 1942), which in turn drew on the minimum subsistence budget derived
from Rowntree's 1936 study of poverty in York (Rowntree. 1937). In the post-war
period. the scales were initially •uprated rather haphazardly, but had more or less
doubled in real terms by 1979, maintaining their value relative to earnings. Since
1980, they have been uprated mainly in line with movements in the Retail Price
Index (with some exceptions --- particularly for pensioners) and their value in
comparison with earnings has fallen as earnings have moved ahead of prices. They
have never been fundamentally reviewed or re-based during that whole period (see
Bradshaw and Lynes. 1995. for a full review of this topic). Similar changes in the
way benefits are uprated have taken place in a number of other countries.
In Australia. there is currently considerable official interest in benefit levels: the
Minister of Social Security has established a working group to review the levels of
social security benefits and to determine how a bench-mark might be established to
monitor adequacy. At present the Australian Department of Social Security
monitors quarterly changes in the relative position of social security payments
against the Henderson Poverty Line (HPL). The Henderson Poverty Line has its
roots in the US Bureau of Labor Statistics Family Budget Standard. and although
it is not formally endorsed by the Government it is widely used in Australia as a
poverty measure. In fact, the level of benefit rates are currently related to average
weekly earnings (AWE) of male employees. Thus, since 1990, the Government has
agreed to pay pensions at 25 per cent of AWE (and in November 1993 it reached
25.5 per cent of AWE). Benefits for the unemployed are not covered by this
agreement and in November 1993 they were 23.1 per cent of AWE. Benchmarks
for child payments as a proportion of AWE were also set in 1987. Since these
benchmarks were achieved in 1989. those payments have been uprated by the
consumer price index. As average weekly earnings have been falling in real terms.
the incomes of beneficiaries have been improving relative to earnings. This factor,
as well as a number of small adjustments in benefit rates at different times, has led
to improvements well above the rate of inflation. The Australian DSS has
estimated that between. 1983 and 1992 the basic rate of pension increased by nearly
14 per cent in real terms, while support for a lone parent with one child aged 13
increased by 30 per cent.
Table 5.1 shows how benefit rates are set and uprated in the countries of the study.
The sources of information are primarily the responses to the questionnaire sent to
the official and academic informants for this study. More information is available
in the individual country chapter of Volume Two.
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Toile Mechanisms for setting and upratmg social assistance benefits
Country Tier of government
respmnsible for setting
rates
Method and period of
uprating
Rate-setting mechanism and comparison
with other standards
Pension benchmarks were set nsing an
average weekly earnings index. In 1990,
25.5'1di of male average earnin gs was set
as the level for the standard pension rate.
3obsearchiNewstart rates are set at 23.P>6
of AWE. Child benefits have been
indexed since 1989 and are 16. 2°%« of the
married pension rate for children under 13
and 21.2°:1 for children 13-15.
National except in the
remote area allowance
Australia Twice per year fol. basic
payments. Anmialiy for
most additional payments.
indexed by changes in the
consumer price index.
Austria Provinces set benefit
g uidelines, but district
authorities have discretion
to vary payments
according to their
assessment of individual
needs. National rates for
asylum seekers from ex-
Yugoslavia.
Annually
Increased usually in line
with chan ges in pensions
which are linked to
earnings. However, in
recent years the pension
has increased faster than
earnings and social
assistance has fallen
behind pensions.
The standard rates for single people vary
between 45 and fir's of the lowest net
earnings and 60 to of the minimum
pensions
National framework for all
the minimum benefits
Belgium Annually
Automatically in line with
the retail price index, but
as a result of special
increases Minintex rates
have increased in real
terms since 1980, and
the gap between assistance
and insurance benefits has
narrowed.
IV9inimex rates (from 1975) were taken
from the already existing guaranteed
income for older people. Until 1988. lone
parents were paid at the same level as
single people: from 1992. they received am
supplement- Now lone parents are treated
as couples (and thus receive about 1
-
33
times tlae single person rate).
In 1994 the minimum Unemployment
Benefit rate was 105"1,6 of Niinimex.
In 1994 there was a new
index that excluded
cigarettes, alcohol and
petrol. This 'health index`
produces lower levels of
uprating but in May 1994
compensation was
included in the Rlinimex
uprating for sin gle people
and heads of households.
Canada Provinces and Territories.
are responsible for their
own benefit rates
Annually
Generally cost of living
increases (by CPI or in
Quebec related to pension
indexation). but act hoc.
Since the recession several
provinces have frozen
benefits.
Two provinces relate their upratings to a
benchmark standard. Though Statistics
Canada publish various low income
standards they do not directly influence
assistance rates.
Denmark National rates. Social
workers at municipal level
have discretion over one-
off items.
Annually
Since 1994, cash
assistance has been linked
to the level of
Unemployment Benefit,
which is related to average
earnings
For parents, assistance rate is 80 ` kii of
nmaximum. Unemployment Benefit. For
others it was of maximum
Unemployment Benefit in1994.. rising t0
60`Y:, in 1995.
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Table 5.1: Mechanisms for setting and upra g social assistance benefits .. ( count
Country Tier of government
responsible for setting
rates
Method and period of
uprating
Rate-setting mechanism and comparison
with other standards
There are two rates, depending on the cost
of living in the municipality. The basic
rate is set in relation to minimum flat-rate
old age pension. In the 1980s. this was
SQ°iii for a single person.
The recent recession has meant that
pensions have not been fully indexed to
cost of living
Nationally-set scale rates
(in two geographical
bands), phased in between
1989 and 1994.
Supplementary Benefit
fixed by the municipality.
Finland Annually
In line with flat-rate
pension which is linked to
the consumption patterns
of the lowest quintile
France Social minima such as
RMI set nationally, along
with most housing benefits
and family allowances.
Aide Socials is local or
departmental responsibility
RMI can be uprated twice
yearly in line with prices,
but not automatic
No information available
Lander set benefit rates,
within a lower and upper
national limit
Germany. Generally every six
months
Social assistance is uprated
in line with price inflation,
but varies according to
political judgement
Originally set in relation to a basket of
goods. Now set usin g data on the
expenditure patterns of households in the
lower third of income distribution.
Variations between Lander are in practice
small
Greece Minimum benefits set
nationally
Ministerial or Presidential
decision. No statutory
period or basis.
No information available
Iceland National government sets
minimum rates for
Financial Assistance, but
actual payment levels are
at discretion of
municipalities.
Pension supplements set
nationally.
Uprating within six
months of a change in
reference insurance benefit
Minimum rates set in line with those of
disability insurance, which are indexed to
wages
In recent years wages have not increased.
so neither have benefit rates
Ireland National Uprated annually ; at least
in line with prices, but by
decision of -Parliament
By 1994 benefit rates had reached 90'; of
the level recommended by the
Commission on Social Welfare in 1986
Italy Uprated every 6 months
In line with the cost of
living index
Social pensions and
disability pensions are set
nationally, but local
Llurinzo Vitale has no
national guidelines
Social pension levels are about half of the
Italian poverty threshold and a quarter of
the minimum salary. Local assistance
benefits levels vary gr eatly by re gion and
commune.
Local authority areas are grouped into six
bands according to variation in the costs
of living.
Rates were improved in real terms during
the 1980s, reaching about 69 of
average household consumption levels in
the early 1980s. Since then they have
been indexed.
Rates are set nationally,
but within six geographical
bands
Uprated annually. Indexed
to national average
consumption.
Japan
Luxembourg Rates for both the .Revenu
illinimwn Garand and
categorical minima set
nationally
Annually. by decision of
Parliament, in line with the
cost of living, according to
an index used for the
wages of civil servants,
Indexation can be varied
within 25% each way by
statutory order.
Rates for RMG originally set in relation to
the structure of existin g social security
benefits and minimum wages
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Table Al: Mechanisms for setting and upra g social assistance benefits contd.
Country Tier of government
responsible for setting
rates
Method and period of
uprating
Rate-setting mechanism and comparison
with other standards
The basic rate of benefit is set according
to the social minimum, which is a ;, of
the net minimum wage. The rules
establishing standard rates were set in
1974 and since 1980 they have been
linked to the minimum wage. Benefit
rates as a proportion of the social
minimum vary between 60% for single
people sharing dwellings and IOO`S, for
couples.
The minimum wage was originally
determined in relation to household
expenditure surveys and the costs of a
prescribed basket of g oods, and then
uprated by improvements in the national
price index. However since 1984 the
minimum wage has periodically been
frozen.
Uprating takes place twice
a year. in line with chan ges
in the minimum wa ge.
However, benefits were
frozen between 1984 and
1990 and a g ain in 1993.
Netherlands All minimum benefit rates
set nationally
Nett. Zealand Set nationally Annually, by Parliament,
on the basis of income
requirements, prevailing
wa
g
es and fiscal
affordability.
Since 1991, indexed to
movements in prices subject
to a floor of of the
average r:. and a ceiling
of 72 the average wage.
From 1972 to 1991, benefits were largely
based on the indexed value of 80 of a
prevailing 1972 low wage
In 1991, the Government cut most
benefits in real terms by an average of
12 14~;;i
Norway No national rates.
Local variation and
discretion.
No uprating formula
Uprated locally by social
workers
Local scale rates interpreted by social
workers
No data on link with wages/prices
Portugal Set nationally Annually. by movement in
prices index
No information available about how rates
originally determined
Spain Determined by each
autonomous region
No information No information
Sweden Nationally recommended
standard rates
Local variation
Standards uprated
annually_ in line with
prices and consumer
patterns
Since 1985. monetary standard was based
on items included in the household budget
drawn up by the National Board for
Consumer Policies
Index used for assistance produces lower
uprating than that for insurance benefits
Switzerland Guideline norms set by
national institute (CSIAP),
but actual rates paid can
vary both below and above
norms according to Canton
and commune
Supplementary pension
rates set nationally
CSIAP guidelines are based on a budget
standard. 1988 norms were similar to
minimum, income-related pension level
and below full guaranteed insurance
pension level.
Norms uprated annually
Turkey Rates set nationally Every three months Based on a formula which is used to
determine wa ges for civil servants
Considered to be very low even in relation
to earnings
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Table 5.1: Median's s for setting and uprating social assistance benefits 'contd.)
Countrv Tier of government
responsible for setting
rates
Method and period of
uprating
Rate-setting mechanism and comparison
with other standards
UK Set nationally Annually in November for
April payments, by
decision of Parliament
Largely linked to prices
since 1980, and since
1982 based on the Rossi
index (retail price index
minus housing Costs)
Historically based on the former
Supplementary Benefit rates, which in
turn were linked to the National
Assistance rates recommended by
Beveridge on the basis of a budget
standard. Rates have not been
fundamentally re-based since 1948,
though the structure of payments was
changed substantially in 1988.
USA For SS.i, the 1993 individual rase s
:
. as set
at 75% of poverty threshold t.. when
Food Stamps are included and 10:f: fat a
couple). Food Stam p s based on thrifty
food budgets.
Supplemental Security
Income determined
federally and
supplemented by some
states.
Food Stamps set federally.
Aid to Families with
Dependent Children set by
states within federal
guidelines.
General Assistance is
optional scheme with rates
set by state.
SS" adjusted annually
using costs of living
standards produced by
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Food Stamps adjusted
annually according to
changes in the costs of a
'thrifty' food plan.
AFDC and GA uprated at
the discretion of states.
5.3 Debates about poverty and the level of benefits
It is not the intention here to discuss. in detail. research on the relative levels of
poverty in OECD countries. Some of the main. recent work in this area was
referred to in Chapter One. along with the difficulties involved in such a
comparison. The aim is rather to illustrate the range of issues which are or have
recently been on the policy agenda concerning the effectiveness of minimum
income schemes and social assistance in dealing with poverty. The level of
consistent information available was limited_ however, and this section is
necessarily brief. We begin by discussing the terms of the debate.
How much poverty is debated as an issue varies. not surprisingly, between
countries in the OECD. Factors which seem to influence the level of debate include
the extent to which recent economic problems have resulted in noticeable increases
in deprivation, and the effectiveness of political parties or lobby groups at drawing
public attention to the issues. There is not necessarily a correlation. however,
between intensity of debates on poverty and actual levels of either absolute poverty
or inequality, in so far as these can be determined. There are, nevertheless, some
common themes or concerns.
First, in many countries, widespread concern about poverty appears to have been a
relatively recent development. Informants in several countries. including Canada.
Germany and Ireland_ referred to the 'rediscovery' of poverty in the 1970s. and to
the influence of British and other English-language research in suggesting the
persistence of poverty amongst increasing affluence in developed countries. Within
the European Union countries. in particular, the concept of 'new' poverty has
grown out of comparative analyses of the effects of the European-wide recession of
the late 1980s, and the combination of social and demographic change and labour
market restructuring which has been a common feature across both the Union and
the OECD area as a whole (see Chapter One).
This poverty is regarded as new partly because of the changed conditions which
have given rise to it and partly because of the identification of certain population
groups amongst whom poverty has become more prevalent, including young
people, lone parents, older women, and families with children where the main
earner is unemployed or in insecure work with low pay. Hotyever. emphasis on
economic `poverty ' as a concept is often regarded as too narrow an approach and
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the alternative term 'social exclusion' is widely regarded_ in European debate. as
capturing more accurately the broader sense of deprivation which may be
experienced as a result of inability to participate in the mainstream life of the
citizen. The concept of 'social exclusion' also implies that action to counter the
problem should be seen as encompassing more than simply cash income
maintenance -- a view which accords with the more social work-oriented and
rehabilitative approaches to social assistance of the Nordic and some northern
European states. Exclusion is, however, a concept which is even harder to measure
than poverty, and the importance of a level of cash income security as a basis for
combating it has been acknowledged in the European Commission's Draft
Recommendation on guaranteeing sufficient resources (Commission of the
European Communities. 1991).
Discussions within the Union about ensuring minimum incomes in the context of
the Single Market have stimulated debate in a number of countries not only
those of the EU itself. In the countries of southern Europe in particular Portugal
and Spain -- where problems of poverty have long been recognised, debate has
focused, to varying degrees, on developing guaranteed minimum incomes in line
with those of the European partners. Discussions have tended to founder, however.
even where there has been widespread agreement on the nature of the problem, on
the economic practicalities of greater provision (Bruto da Costa, 1994a) or on
broader difficulties of social modernisation (Petmesidou. 1991). In spite of the
considerable poverty which has existed in Greece (Karagiorgas et al., 1990; Deleeck
et a(.. 1991) however, there has been relatively little public debate about the
possibility of creating a guaranteed minimum income, or about poverty as such
(Tsakoglou, 1993). although the particular problems facing older people have been
highlighted in a number of reports. In Italy too, while the austerity measures of the
Berlusconi Government. which included reductions in pension rights, provoked
strong public opposition, there is little sign of any debate on minimum incomes.
Indeed debate on social policy as a whole tends, in recent years. to have been
submer ged in the political and juridical crises of the Italian state.
The particular domestic histories and politics of some countries have also tended to
inhibit the institution of uniform national assistance schemes. Spain, for example.
has reacted against the over-centralised state of the Franco era by increasingly
devolving powers to the autonomous regions and localities, including responsibility
for income maintenance. As a result, some researchers argue, there is a lack of
adequate national data on poverty. and the legislative autonomy of the regions is
producing territorial inequalities in minimum income protection (Ayala. 1994).
There is evidence that other non-EU members have also been influenced in recent
years by debate within the Union. particularly countries, like Austria. which were
candidates for membership. There was little official recognition that poverty might
exist in Austria until recently. Now, however, there is growing debate about both
the levels of assistance, which tend to fall below EU 'poverty lines', and about the
possible shortcomings of the localised and discretionary allocation of benefits.
although Pfeil (1994) has noted that the sub-text for this debate is often the
distribution of power and resources between central government and the provinces.
In Switzerland too. which is generally thought of as having only minimal poverty,
there has been some debate about the effectiveness of their comparatively generous,
but highly individualised, assistance scheme in preventing the development of `new ,
forms of poverty.
The terms of debate have been somewhat different in the Scandinavian countries.
There. poverty began to be talked about again in the late 1980s. mainly as a result
of growing unemployment, but concern has been largely about inequality rather
than poverty as such. Although there have been disputes in Denmark and Sweden
about the extent of poverty, concern has focused particularly on the small groups
of very poor people, or those experiencing forms of multiple deprivation or
complex social problems which require social intervention other than simply
through cash benefits. However, in Finland and Norway especially, but in other
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social work-oriented regimes too. expanding caseloads have been leading to conflict
between the traditional caseworker role of social welfare officers and the demands
of cash benefit delivery. If claimant numbers continue to grow, this question is
likely to become more acute and may lead these countries to a greater
standardisation of benefit levels and regulations. In general, debate on social
assistance in the Nordic countries has tended to focus less on poverty relief as such
and more on aspects of delivery of benefits. Thus in both Norway and Sweden.
arguments have centred on the advantages of uniform national rates and regulation
versus local and individualised discretion, and on problems of administration, as
well as on the division of financial responsibility between the local and central
state.
A further theme which has been particularly salient in the USA. and to a lesser
extent in the UK, has been that of benefit dependency and work incentives. While
concern about the consequences of' long-term dependency on social assistance. both
to individuals and to the economy, are common to most countries in the OECD.
this debate seems especially potent in the LISA and has been growing in the UK.
As Chapter Two showed, both are countries where assistance benefits are central to
their systems of social protection. In the USA particularly, anxieties about the
social consequences of the emergence of a deprived 'underclass' of welfare
recipients has in recent years fuelled much of the policy debate on social assistance.
This debate has had some resonance in the UK too, although questions concerning
the generosity and costs of means-tested benefits have perhaps been more
prominent. The extent to which receipt of social assistance can be seen as
synonymous with poverty in the UK is a matter of continuing debate.
While the underclass debate also has some resonance in the other English-speaking
countries, and the work incentive debate has been a central element of the
Canadian government's recent review of income maintenance policy, the key issues
are currently rather different in Australia and New Zealand. The Labor
government in Australia has been engaged for some years in a high profile 'Social
Justice Strategy'. of which income support benefits are a key element. This has
involved concentrating resources on lower income families in particular, in order to
combat child poverty, through a combination of increased payments and tighter
eligibility criteria. This was also one of the key aims of the UK benefit reforms in
1988, which established Family Credit as an important assistance-linked earnings
supplement intended to reinforce the work incentive elements of the benefit
structure. One way in which Australian Government. strategy has differed from
that of the UK, however, has been in the establishment of an official working party
to research benchmarks of adequacy for benefit payments. These targeting
strategies in all three countries have not been without their critics, but there is
general agreement that the social and economic policies delivered under the
Government-trade union Accord in Australia have had some substantial success in
reducing family poverty. By contrast, debate on poverty in New Zealand has been
revived as a result of policies of economic liberalisation, involving higher
unemployment, direct and substantial reductions in some benefits, and an
expansion of charges for services.
We have said that the extent of public debate about poverty and benefits is not
necessarily correlated with the level of poverty itself. Turkey, for example, has the
lowest per capita income among the OECD countries, but, as far as we have been
able to ascertain there is relatively little debate specifically about social security
provision. Japan. on the other hand, is one of the wealthiest countries, but also has
little public debate on social assistance. The existence and achievements of
voluntary organisations and campaign groups clearly represent one factor in this
equation, and the next section looks at the evidence obtained on their role in the
countries of the study.
The role o/' non-governmental organisations and `poverty lobbies'
Although the information available to the research team is neither detailed nor
consistent across countries, it does appear to suggest that the existence of organised
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campaigns and lobby groups working around poverty generally, or representing
particular population groups or claimants, is an important element in whether
poverty and social assistance are matters of public debate. This is not surprising in
itself, though it is noticeable that such poverty lobbies are judged by our national
informants in a number of countries to have had only limited influence on actual
policy decisions. However_ such influence is not always easy to determine. To some
extent the existence of organisations active around issues of social security depends
on different national policies towards the voluntary sector. In the U.K and Canada.
for example, which have some of the most developed networks of organisations
working in service provision, welfare rights and campaigning around social security
issues. many agencies are reliant on public funding to support their activities. Both
the UK and the US experience tends to suggests that welfare rights activity is to
some extent symbiotic with the structures of social security. In both countries
welfare rights groups have used tactics of exploiting the opportunities available in
highly regulated systems to advance the interests of their clients. There were fears,
for example, that the simplification of benefits introduced in the UK in 1988, and
the re-introduction of officer discretion into decisions on exceptional needs would
spell the end of meaningful welfare rights activity. In practice this has not
happened. but the scope and focus of welfare rights has had to change. Similar
processes have also been observed in the USA.
The churches and denominational charities are also active in this field in the UK
and other northern European countries, including Belgium. through the Quart
Manila and Welzijns_org organisations, and the Netherlands through De Arnie
Kant_ but their role in service provision is limited. In the Catholic south of Europe,
however, the church, through the international Caritas organisation and other
national equivalents. is often the key non-governmental body, playing a role both
in the provision of services and support and in policy debates. In some countries,
including Spain, the line between public and private provision is less distinct than
in other countries, with Caritas and other or ganisations receiving public funding to
support the distribution of help in both cash and kind, and discretionary
assessments of need being carried out. jointly by local social workers and the
charity. Churches are also playing a key role in New Zealand. They have formed
the core of a growing opposition to the liberal economic policies of the current
government, producing a series of reports on poverty and establishing food banks
for people facing hardship as a result of unemployment or benefit reductions.
It is noticeable that campaigning and lobbying around poverty and social
assistance appears. generally, to be less organised both in countries with lower
levels of provision and those with localised and discretionary schemes. It may be
that the nature of provision in such countries, being more personalised and
individual, is more difficult to organise campaigns around than in those with more
visible, national schemes. On the other hand. locally-run assistance schemes may be
more amenable to individual advocacy and casework. It is also likely that
voluntary activity in these countries is more localised and thus less accessible to
researchers.
Debates about adequacy of assistance payments
Having surveyed the debates on poverty and social assistance, and the role of
poverty lobbies, we now turn to specific views on the adequacy of benefit levels.
Clearly adequacy is to a considerable extent a subjective question and the extent of
research both on measures of adequacy and on views and attitudes varies
considerably across countries. All we are able to do here is to reflect very briefly
the key points coming through from national informants' summaries of debates in
their respective countries. These points are summarised in Table 5.2 and further
discussion can be found in the individual country chapters in Volume Two.
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Table 5.2: Views on the adequacy of social assistance
Country- Views on the adequacy of social assistance
Australia Australian income support programmes are intended to promote equity in the way =
economic resources are distributed and equality of social and economic rights, will
adequacy a key objective. The DSS is currently researching and developing a
framework for a benchmark of adequacy for basic payments. Although increased
tar geting has been criticised. it is generally accepted that benefit levels have been
i mproved for most categories of client.
Austria In Austria social assistance only plays a minor role in combating poverty and only
absorbs 0 3'%; of social security expenditure. Standard rates for assistance for single
people are substantially below both minimum pension Levels and the lowest net
ages. The discretionary powers exercised by the provinces have led to questions
about whether social assistance is adequate to promote a minimum standard of
Belgium In spite of the relative increase in benefit levels compared to insurance belle s.
commentators ar gue that the Minimex is still insufficient to raise all people out of
poverty. It is not viewed by social welfare campaigners as adequate to promote a
minimum standard of living.
Canada Social assistance rates iu most provinces appear to be below a number of poverty
standards, including 'baskets of goods' measures and the semi-official low Income
Cut-Off measures produced by Statistics Canada. This is particularly the case for
single `employables'. The Government argues that the rates alone cannot be
compared with the LICOs because they are not comprehensive and do not include
all possible benefit payments from provinces and municipalities.
Denmark Whether or not benefit levels are adequate has been a matter for debate: a person
may he fed. clothed, housed on social assistance. but there is little left over for any
other expenses
F and The Consumer Research Unit has compared benefit rates to a basket of goods and
judged them adequate. Surveys suggest the majority of' the public also believe them
to be sufficient. as opposed to recipients (and many officials) who do not.
Assistance rates have been found in comparative studies to be lower in Finland
than in the other Nordic countries.
France There has been little or no research into the adequacy of assistance payments
Germany The Federal government believes assistance levels to be adequate and that problem
only arise for tho'.:: a ho do not take it up, but this view is disputed by many social
researchers in ( _ ;i ..tv
Greece Social assistance in Greece is very limited and benefits are widely re g arded as
inadequate. In 1992 payments for an elderly person without insurance cover
represented only 11 per cent of the national minimum wage.
Iceland Surveys su g gest that the majority of the public does not consider assistance rate
sufficient to live on. but there is no broad support for increases. Rather. public
pressure is on Government to reform pay policies and combat unemployment.
Ireland The Combat Poverty Agency (a statutory body) holds the view that social
assistance rates are inadequate and in spite of improvements do not meet the
minimal adequacy standards set by the Commission on Social Welfare
Italy Hard to gauge evidence on adequacy due to local variation, regional divides in the
levels between North and South, and high levels of discretion. Little systematic
evidence on public opinion.
Japan Benefits increased in real terms in the 1980s and the official view is that benefits
are adequate. There is little evidence of debate on the subject.
Luxembourg Benefits are relatively high, leading to some incentive problems. Generally regarded
as adequate. though some restrictions apply to the availability of the RAG.
Netherlands Social assistance is generally regarded as sufficient to bye on for a short period,
though longer periods can result in the incurring of debts
New Zealand Until the 1991 reductions, benefits were broadly viewed as adequate for most
family types. The changes since 1991 have been criticised for leading to substantial
hardship. Some evidence comes from the growth in food banks. Reductions in
housing support are also said to have led to a growth in homelessness and
inadequate housing.
Norway Local variation and individualised assessments mean that there is little evidence on
adequacy
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Country= V iews on the adequacy of social assistance
Portugal Social assistance is very low in Portugal compared to earnings. This means that
poverty and work traps are unlikely to develop, but benefits are not widely
regarded as sufficient to live on by themselves.
Spain A major issue for Spain is territorial inequality produced through establishment of
local minimum income schemes in 1988. Such information as is available on the
re
gional schemes suggest average payments are well below estimates of a poverty
line.
Sweden Local variation i t rates makes it hard to assess benefit adequacy n relation tc
wa
g
es, benefits are relatively low.
Switzerland The absence of national rates leads to geographical inequality in treatment. The
individual nature of assessments also makes adequacy hard to gauge. Benefit
norms, however, are relatively high.
"Turkey The system in Turkey is still being developed. so there is no evidence concerning
adequacy, but assistance benefits are considered to be low even in relation to per
capita income
UK The question of the adequacy of Income Support rates is a matter of ongoing
debate in the UK. Apart from the level of benefit itself, the adequacy question has
also been raised in connection with the (relatively few) people with multiple
deductions from Income Support (such as for debts, fines and repayments of social
fund loans). Concerns about the discretionary role of the Social Fund have also
been linked to the issue of the adequacy of Income Support rates_
'USA When measured against the official poverty line most assistance benefits in the
USA leave people below this level. In 1993 the maximum benefit for a single
person was 86% of the poverty line.
In Australia. as we have seen, the issue of adequacy is one with which the
Government is currently preoccupied. It has established a working party to review
the adequacy of benefits and set benchmarks for them. In the UK too. although
Governments have not felt it practicable to establish an official poverty line, there
has nevertheless been continuing concern amon g welfare rights organisations.
academic researchers and people working with low-income families about the
adequacy of the levels of Income Support. In other countries. the degree of debate
about adequacy reflects to some extent the salience of social assistance in the social
security system. In those countries where social assistance is more important. it
appears that there is more debate about adequacy and more information on the
subject. These countries include, as well as Australia and the UK, Ireland. New
Zealand and the USA. In those countries where social assistance levels are highly
variable or locally determined, there is naturally more difficulty in examining the
issue of adequacy.
5.4 Take-up of means-tested benefits
Whether or not benefit rates are considered to be sufficient to live on. means-tested
benefits are only likely to be effective against poverty or other problems if people
who are entitled to claim them do so. As was pointed out in Chapter One, it has
long been a criticism of means-tested benefits that take-up is often low compared
to that for other types of benefit. van Oorschot, who has carried out perhaps the
most extensive studies to date of take-up in a comparative context (1991 and 1995:
van Oorschot and Schell, 1991). has suggested that, with the exception of Britain,
the non take-up of social security benefits has been a particularly neglected topic in
the welfare state literature.. This observation was supported in the information
provided by national informants for this study. Less than a quarter of the countries
were able to provide any recent estimates of take-up and the basis of these was not
always clear.
Official estimates of take-up in Australia suggest a relatively high level of take-up
for most benefits, ranging from 71 per cent for the Sole Parent Pension, to 100 per
cent for Family Payments (though only 29 per cent for the Service Disability
Pension). However, most of the estimates provided are of coverage of the known
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population group and take no account of those who might be ineli gible because of
excess resources. In this light, the Australian estimates look even higher a fact
which may be partly explained by virtually all benefits being resource-tested in
some way.
In Germany, it was suggested that take-up was controversial. Studies in the mid-
1980s pointed to an increase for Sonioihilfe from an estimated 50 per cent in the
1970s to around 70 per cent. It is not clear why such an increase should have taken
place, but one possibility is that growth in claiming by lone parents and younger
people may have led to better understanding of ri ghts and less reluctance to claim.
Japan appears to have had a low take-up rate, at least in the early 1980s (Sohara,
1985), but there are no more recent estimates and the present situation is unknown.
An official estimate from Luxembourg put take-up for the Rerenit Minimum
(iciranti at only around 50 per cent surprising perhaps given the relatively high
level of benefits. However. the RMG is generally received as a supplement to some
other source of income and it may be that small entitlements are less commonly
taken up. This is a feature of take-up which has been observed in the extensive
research carried out in the UK. both by Government and by independent
researchers (see. for example. Kerr. 1983; Fry and Stark. 1987: Craig, 1991; Marsh
and McKay. 1993; Department of Social Security, 1994; Corden. 1995). Official
estimates put take-up of Income Support in 1992 at 77-87 per cent of expenditure,
depending on household type, and most of the amounts not claimed are estimated
to be fairly small. Family Credit performs somewhat less well in this respect, partly
perhaps because it again acts as a top-up for earnings rather than as a subsistence
benefit. The best estimate for 1992 was a take-up rate of around 73 per cent
(expenditure) and the rate appears to have improved since the benefit was
introduced in 1988.
Informants from a number of other countries, including Austria, Belgium. France.
the Netherlands and the Nordic countries all suggested that there were likely to be
some take-up problems with the minimum benefits in their countries, but that the
question had not been extensively researched. Some studies did, however. point to
various specific problems such as non-receipt of children's additions by families
receiving the Minimex in Belgium, and low take-up of benefits for disabled
children in France. y
The Nordic social assistance schemes present particular difficulties in discussing
take-up, partly because of local variations in benefit levels in some of the countries,
but also because of certain specific features of the conditions of entitlement. In
Sweden, for example, it is estimated that there are a large number of working
families with one wage earner who are in theory eligible for social assistance to
supplement their earnings. Many do not claim, however, because if they did the
availability for work test would require the unemployed spouse to seek work.
Take-up is also particularly difficult to assess in other countries with highly
discretionary systems. such as Austria and Switzerland.
van Oorschot (1995) has concluded that non-take-up is influenced by factors at
three levels: first the way benefits are designed, secondly the way benefits are
administered: and thirdly the way potential claimants respond. Non-take-up is
more likely to be a problem in means-tested benefit systems, in schemes that have a
density of complex rules, have vague criteria for entitlement, are aimed at social
groups which are the subject of prejudice, supplement other sources of income and
leave the initiative in taking up benefits to the claimant. These characteristics exist
in many of the social assistance schemes in this study.
Many of the national informants also suggested that claiming social assistance
continued to be stigmatised to some degree, even where the existence of the benefits
had wide levels of support and legitimacy. Stigma, of course, is hard to measure
and the information available is impressionistic. but examples were given
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particularly from countries where local and discretionary systems combine with
small numbers of claimants. In these circumstances it is possible for individuals or
particular groups to be singled out as welfare recipients_ and for them to become
the subject of prejudicial public attitudes. By contrast. receipt of benefits in
countries like Australia and New Zealand seems relatively lacking in stigma,
although even in these countries being able bodied and unemployed can attract
residual prejudice.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has brought together information on how benefit rates are set and
uprated, debates about poverty and the adequacy of assistance benefits, and take-
up of means-tested benefits in the OECD countries. While in general there has been
increasing concern about poverty in many of the countries in the study. the terms
of these debates have often been very specific to the particular circumstances of
individual countries. Where assistance schemes are minor elements of much more
developed social security systems, debates have often focused on elements other
than assistance. In a few countries, levels of assistance benefits seem fairly widely
agreed to be adequate. at least in the short term. Even where they are not seen as
sufficient, there is often no consensus for raising them, either because of concerns
about expenditure or work incentives or because extra money is not necessarily
seen as the answer to social exclusion. There also seems to be relatively little
serious concern in most countries about whether assistance schemes are taken up
by all those entitled. The limited evidence available suggests that take-up tends to
be lower in places where benefits are aimed at small and marginalised groups in
society. and generally higher where the use of assistance is more mainstream.
The next chapter focuses on the empirical data collected to compare the relative
values of benefits across countries by using model family ty-pes.
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Chapter 6 The Level and Structure of Social
Assistance Payments
6.1 Introduction
This chapter compares the level and structure of social assistance payments in the
countries in the study. The analysis is based on the data provided by the national
informants on the impact of different benefit `packages' on a series of model
families in specified. near-identical circumstances. The chapter starts by explaining
the methods and assumptions used. It then compares the levels of the different
social assistance packages and shows how they vary with the characteristics of the
claimant unit (the implied equivalence scale). An overall ranking of the level of
social assistance is presented and comparisons are made of the level of net
disposable incomes of some of the same families if they were receiving insurance
benefits or average earnings, along with any in-work benefits available. These data
are used further in Chapter Seven to compare benefit replacement ratios and
investigate incentive structures.
Even in the few earlier comparative studies of social assistance referred to in the
introduction to this volume, there has never been an attempt to compare the level
of income provided through social assistance. This may be because social assistance
benefits are not very salient in many countries. The problems of defining the scope
of social assistance, which have been discussed elsewhere in this volume, also make
such comparisons difficult. Perhaps the main reason why such a comparison has
not previously been attempted on this scale is the difficulty of comparing like with
like. The limitations of the analysis which stern from this difficulty are spelled out
below.
6.2 Methods
In the study of child benefit packages in 15 countries carried out at the University
of York by Bradshaw et a/. (1993a), data were collected on the social assistance
benefits paid to model families in a `worst case° situation. invariably long-term
unemployed families no longer entitled to social insurance benefits. Information on
three other countries was subsequently added and preliminary evidence on the level
of social assistance in 18 countries was compared in Bradshaw (1995).
It was found in the previous research that. by using national informants to
simulate the impact of social policies on a selection of model families, comparable
and reliable data on the level and structure of benefit packages could be obtained.
These techniques have been used again in this research and indeed we have been
able to use some of the data collected in the previous studies. However, there were
a number of changes.
First. this study covers more countries than the original 15 (subsequently 18). In
this study, data were collected on 23 OECD countries (unfortunately it was not
possible to obtain data for Turkey, and those on Iceland and Italy are incomplete).
Also, because of the degree of variation within the USA, four separate States have
been covered. Secondly, because the focus of the previous study was families with
children, claimants over retirement age were not covered. However, as retirement
pensioners are, in some countries, an important group receiving social assistance,
they have been included in this study. The earlier study was not directly concerned
with contributory insurance benefits, but in order to compare levels of insurance
benefits with those of assistance, insurance data were collected for this study. These
additions to the coverage had. however, to be achieved at the costs of reducing the
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variety of family types on which data were collected. The comparison was therefore
limited to the following family types:
1. A single person aged 17
2. A single person aged 35
3. A single retired person aged 68
4. A couple both aged 35 (couples were assumed to be married)
5. A retired couple both aged 68
6. A couple aged 35 with one child under three (two years and eleven months
ie. pre-school age in all countries)
7. A couple aged 35 with one school aged child (seven years)
8. A couple with two children, aged seven and 14
9. A lone parent {female. separated or divorced, not widowed) with one
pre-school child
10. A lone parent (female, separated or divorced. not widowed) with one
school age child (aged seven).
This selection of family types is inevitably somewhat arbitrary. They were chosen
to illustrate the range of types of families that might be dependent on social
assistance benefits. They were also chosen to allow comparison of the level of
benefits paid to different types of claimant, including single unemployed people of
different ages, couples - of working age and retired - and families of different types
with different numbers and ages of children. Ideally, other family types receiving
social assistance would have been included, such as larger families. or people with
disabilities and other special needs, but a line had to be drawn somewhere. It also
has to be recognised that some of these family types are more or less common in
different countries, and that the likelihood of different family types being in receipt
of assistance also varies between countries. In Chapter Two, the characteristics of
social assistance recipients in different countries were compared. However, the data
available for many countries are limited and often not easily comparable.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the modal or typical social assistance recipient varies
between countries. In the Nordic countries, for example, about two-thirds of social
assistance recipients are young and single. In the UK. they are much more evenly
spread across family types, including unemployed families with children, lone
parents and older people.
The chosen examples are also all 'nuclear" families. The complexity of attempting
to model the policy framework for the presence of other adults in the household,
or for other wider family and household obli gations, arguably outweighs the
possible advantages. Specifying that all couples are married also means that
differences in the treatment of cohabiting couples cannot be analysed. Finally, the
assumption has to be that resources are shared within families in a similar way
across the countries compared. There is sufficient data on inequalities in within-
household resource distribution in certain countries to make this assumption highly
questionable, but since the purpose of the analysis is to examine the structural
effect of benefit policies. it can be argued that the distribution of' resource
consumption within families is a separate issue. It should be noted, however, that
different countries' policy approaches to this question are reflected in areas such as
individual taxation. individualisation or splitting of benefits and choices about to
whom benefits for children are paid.
Simulating the impact of national polices on the model families requires a series of
detailed specifications, and a number of choices have to be made which are not
always entirely satisfactory. The following sections outline the choices made for
this exercise, starting with the specification of the income and benefit packages
which were assumed to accrue to the model families. There were three income
packages. as follows:
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1. Social Assistance
This was the package of benefits that would be received by the model families on
social assistance, and was the main focus of the research. For the families of
working age, the adults were assumed to have been unemployed for long enough
not to be entitled to any contributory unemployment benefits for, in the case of the
17 year old, not to have a contributory record). In the case of the 68 year olds. it
was assumed that they were out of the workforce and did not have contributory
records sufficient for any insurance-based pension. Even where minimum. income-
tested pensions were available they were not counted if they required a record of
insurance contribution. It was assumed that none of the social assistance families
had any income from earnings - they were either retired. receiving the assistance
paid to the long-term unemployed, or the assistance paid to lone parents. This
latter assumption means that the analysis cannot fully represent the experience of
those countries where social assistance, or other means-tested benefits. are
commonly paid as a supplement to low or part-time earnings.
2. Social Insurance
This was the package of benefits paid to some of the same families if they were
receiving contributory or insurance benefits. It was assumed that none of the social
insurance families had any income from earnings. The pensioners were assumed to
be receiving the state pension payable to someone who had worked since the age of
21, with a full record of contributions based on national average earnings
throughout their working lives. Obviously this is a simplification of real experience
in many countries where pension entitlements have changed in the last 40 or so
years. and does not reflect the real earnings trajectory of most workers.
Occupational pensions were not included unless they were compulsory and
underwritten by the state. Again, this assumption leads to the under-estimation of
pensioners incomes in those countries (such as the UK) where occupational
pensions are commonly payable on top of the state schemes. In the ease of couples.
it was assumed that the female partner had not been employed (again an unlikely
assumption in some countries). The adults of working age, includin g the lone
parent, were assumed to have been unemployed for three months_ and receiving the
full unemployment benefit payable on the basis of maximum contributions to
someone who had previously been continuously employed at national average
earnings. Again. in the case of couples, the female partner was assumed not to have
been in employment.
In order to be able to calculate the value of special support going to lone parents.
compared to couples with children or single people without children, the lone
parents (while specified to be mothers) were assumed to have been receiving
average male earnings. Clearly this would often be unrealistic, but it was necessary
in order to avoid confusing the structural effects of tax/benefit policies with wage
differentials by sex.
3. The working case
This estimated the package of benefits paid. in addition to earnings. to some of the
same households if they were working and receiving average male earnings in each
country. These data were required in order to compare the level of social assistance
with net disposable income in work, and to explore replacement rates and marginal
tax rates. The working families, including the lone parents, were assumed to have
one earner working full-time for national average male earnings.
There are no completely satisfactory and up-to-date data on earnings for all the
countries in the study and it was necessary to use a standard methodology to
develop comparable estimates. For comparability, this replicated the methods used
in Bradshaw et at. ( 993a). OECD estimates in The 1989 Tax-Benefit Position of
Production Workers (1990) were used as the base. These give the average gross
earnings of all full-time production workers in the manufacturing sector in each
country. They were updated to May 1992 using the index of hourly earnings of
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production workers in the manufacturing sector given in the OECD publication
Main Economic Indicators. National informants were asked to check these fi gures
against national sources and in a few cases adjustments were made to the OECD
figures.
The earnings levels derived using this method are summarised in national
currencies and purchasing power parity terms (see discussion of these in Chapter
One) in Table A6.1 in an appendix to this chapter. It should be noted that in
considering the net disposable incomes of working families, we are not starting
from a level playin g field. because average gross male earnings differ between
countries. Earnings in Greece and Portugal were between a third and half of
earnings in the USA and Canada -- after taking account of differences in
purchasing power. Earnings in Spain were also lower than in the other countries.
Among the remaining countries, earnings were remarkably similar, with three
exceptions -- Finland. Sweden and France - which had average earnings of about
1500 (USS795) per month lower than Canada. in purchasing power parity terms.
That these three countries had earnings levels so much lower than the rest calls for
some explanation. It is no doubt partly a function of purchasing power parities,
but we believe that it is mainly related to the level of the `social wage` in those
countries. Thus in France, employers' social security contributions represented 38
per cent of average earnings. Similarly, in Sweden they represented 35 per cent of
average earnings, while in Finland the combination of employers' social security
and compulsory superannuation contributions brought the total to more than 22
per cent of average wages. It is likely that what is happening in these countries is
that workers are effectively foregoing higher earnings for the benefits - often in the
future - of a generous social wage. These high social security contributions can
thus be seen as a form of deferred wa ge. By contrast, earnings are higher in
Canada and the USA, for example, partly because employers are not required to
contribute so much to a social wage. If this is the explanation for these differences.
then as Whiteford (1995) has argued, when comparing the earnings levels of
workers between countries it might be more appropriate to include employers'
social security contributions as part of earnings. This, however. has not been done
in the present analysis.
The calculation of cash benefits received and tax and social security contributions
payable were relatively straightforward, given the model families' income and
household circumstances. However, the calculation of other elements of the
package called for the establishment of a common context and framework for the
analysis. One of the most problematic areas is that of housing costs.
I-Iousing costs
Housing costs are especially difficult to take into account in comparative research.
Costs vary within countries and between countries according to tenure and the size,
age and location of the dwellings. In some countries rents may be controlled for
those persons occupying dwellings before a certain date. For owner-occupiers, loan
structures and interest rates vary between countries, often according to the stage in
the economic cycle. while the level of mortgage interest is also affected by the stage
of a purchaser's life cycle. There are also significant differences between countries
in tenure distribution at different income levels. Nevertheless, housing costs cannot
be ignored. In many countries, help with housing costs is a critical element in the
benefit package, and even where such support does not exist. variations in housing
costs mean that real income levels differ substantially before and after taking
account of housing. For this exercise. the families were assumed to be living in
rented dwellings rented from a public authority, housing co-operative or housing
association, if they were common forms of tenure in the country, or from a private
landlord if that was the most common tenure pattern. In those countries with high
levels of owner-occupation, this assumption is less representative. However, leaving
aside the difficulties of making assumptions about owner-occupiers' costs, families
receiving social assistance are more likely than others in most countries to be living
in rented dwellings.
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National informants were asked to fix typical or representative rent levels for such
dwellings in a given town in their country. There is an argument for using national
average rents rather than local estimates, but previous experience has suggested
that up-to-date information on average rents is often not available. Locating the
families in a given commune, town or city, helps to structure the comparisons
where benefits vary locally, but it can be difficult in some countries to nominate a
typical or `average' location. The size of the dwellings was specified and varied with
the model families, so that single people were assumed to be living in one-bedroom
dwellings, couples without children and lone parents and couples with one child in
two-bedroom dwellings, and lone parents and couples with two children in three-
bedroom dwellings. Again, this is an artificial assumption. as families on
constrained incomes will in practice make different choices in response to local
housing markets. The national informants were left to determine whether the
dwelling was a house or a flat/apartment on the basis of what was the most likely
accommodation type in their country.
Informants were also asked to provide the gross rent. One defect of this method is
that it does not take account of the value of any bricks-and-mortar subsidy on the
dwelling - the difference between the market rent and the gross rent. If certain
families are benefiting more than other households from living in houses with
bricks-and-mortar subsidy, and therefore have lower rents for the same dwelling,
the support package for such families will be under-estimated. It is also anomalous
that the rents assumed in some countries are those subject to rent control. In these
cases the rent is being subsidised by the landlord.
Table 6.l. shows that the designated rents varied substantially between the
nominated locations, even for the same size dwelling: for a two-bedroom dwelling
they ranged, in purchasing power parities, from a controlled rent of £55 (S87) per
month in Barcelona, to £386 6614) in Sydney. The ratio of rents for dwellings of
different sizes also varied between countries. Thus, for example, in Austria, Greece
and Portugal. the rents for three-bedroom dwellings were about twice that of a
one-bedroom dwelling, but in France a three-bedroom dwelling cost only one-third
more than a one-bedroom dwelling. In Barcelona, the controlled rents meant that
costs did not vary according to the size of the dwelling. These variations, along
with the assumptions inevitably underlying the nomination of the rent figures.
illustrate the very considerable problems involved in taking account of housing
costs in this kind of analysis.
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(able 6.1: Gross rents nominated by the national f on ants in purchasing power pa Y. sterling
and USS, per month.. 1992
One bedroom
dwelling
Two bedroom
dwelling
'three bedroom
dwelling
£ S £ S £ S
Australia 285 453 386 614 499 793
Parramatta, Sydney
Austria 242 385 ?5 ? 560 484 769
Salzburg
Belgium 131 208 163 259 183 291
Antwerp
Canada 305 485 376 598 452 719
Toronto, Ontario
Denmark 201 320 244 388 316 502
Copenhagen
Finland 198 315 246 391 272 432
Helsinki
France 62 98 79 125 90 143
Bar-le-d tuc. Meuse
Germany 194 122 239 380 299 475
Bremen
Greece 108 171 163 259 217 345
Peristeri. Athens
Iceland 220 350 256 407 294 467
Reykjavik
Ireland 146 232 214 340 243 386
Dublin
Italy 87 138 111 176 127 201
Turin
Japan 205 326 275 437 384 610
Osaka
Luxembourg 107 171 153 243 183 290
Luxembourg City
Netherlands 101 160 115 182 145 230
N j imegeri
New Zealand 185 294 235 374 258 410
Wellington
Norway 239 380 286 455 375 596
Oslo
Portugal 80 127 134 213 161 256
Lisbon
Spain 55 87 55 87 55 87
Barcelona
Sweden 199 316 253 402 310 493
Stockholm
Switzerland 299 475 385 612 470 747
Fribour g , Canton de
Fribour g
United Kingdom 95 151 117 186 131 208
York
USA New York 290 732 352 559 414 658
USA Pennsylvania 234 372 327 520 425 675
USA Texas 205 326 270 429 371 590
USA Florida 246 391 253 402 340 540
SIUS = £0.629 PPP in 1992
National informants were then asked to give the net rent - that is the rent actually
payable by a family of the specified type and earnings level. The difference between
the gross rent and the net rent was then treated as part of the package of support.
There is no denying that these assumptions are both arbitrary and unsatisfactory in
many respects. However to have ignored altogether the impact of housing costs
and housing subsidies would have been misleading.
Housing costs are not only a problem at the design stage of comparative projects,
they are also difficult to handle at the analysis stage - particularly in a study
comparing the level of social assistance payments. The problem arises because, in
some countries, housing costs. or a proportion of them, are paid together with
social assistance. Thus the basic benefit takes account of some or all housing costs.
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In other countries, housing costs are subsidised either by a reduction in rent
payable, or by a housing benefit or allowance scheme which is administered
separately from social assistance. If comparisons are made of the level of social
assistance before housing costs_ then the first group of countries - those that pay
the housing subsidy in with social assistance -- will appear to have higher levels
than the others. The answer to this is to avoid making comparisons of social
assistance before housing costs and to concentrate on comparisons after housing
costs, when income net of housing represents the income people have left to spend
on living costs other than their housing. However_ there are three objections to this
approach:
• Housing is a consumer good, of which people are more or less free to
make choices about the quality and quantity they consume. It is not in the
same category as income tax or social security deductions. People in
countries where standard housing allowances are paid in with social
assistance could choose to consume less housing and use the element of
their benefit provided for housing for general consumption. A possible
solution would be to identify the element in social assistance that
represents housing costs and deduct it from benefits. But to do that would
be to misrepresent the actual resources that the family has command over,
and for some countries it is not possible to identify the housing element
separately.
• Similarly, families in those countries with housing benefit schemes could
theoretically move to more expensive housing and pay higher rent, without
it affecting their net disposable resources (except if the rent is considered
unreasonable in the housing benefit scheme).
® As we have seen, the rents of the dwellings in each country vary
considerably. The quality of the housing will also vary, though not
necessarily with the level of the rent. Therefore, if social assistance is
compared only after housing costs. the families would not necessarily be
starting from the same standard of living.
There is no simple solution to these problems. It would be wrong to compare social
assistance only before housing. yet it would also be misleadin g in certain
circumstances to compare social assistance incomes only after housing. The answer
we believe is to present the results in most circumstances both before and after
housing costs, but also to bear in mind that results after housing costs are strongly
affected by the assumptions made.
Local taxes
National informants were also asked to take account of any local taxes payable in
a given location and the impact of any subsidies. If the tax was a local income tax,
contributin g to national revenues. it was included with income tax.
Health costs
In order to take account of the value of health care in the countries, it was again
necessary to establish a standard package. The base line assumptions were that
health care at the point of demand was free of charge, available to all regardless of
means and of similar quality in every country. Account was then taken of any
variations from these assumptions. In taking account of variations, a standard
package of health was costed in each country. This included any charges for three
prescriptions per person per year for a standard antibiotic; one week in hospital per
person per year (this is an unlikely assumption, but in practice in no country did it
actually make a difference. because where there were in-patient charges it was
assumed that insurance premiums covered the whole family); three visits to a
general practitioner per person per year: and one visit to a dentist for a check-up
and filling per person per year. The costs were estimated for both adults and
children, where they existed, then annualised and turned into a monthly charge.
The major problem with these assumptions is that for those countries - including
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Greece. Portugal, Spain and to some extent Italy . where in theory there is access
to public health services but in practice the quality may be poor or the waiting lists
long, families often tend to use private treatment.
School and child-care costs
In order to take account of the costs or value of free or subsidised pre-school
provision, a standard package was again established for each country. National
informants were asked to follow the most prevalent pattern of formal, full-time,
pre-school provision in their country and to take account of the costs of this
provision. This resulted in different types of care being costed in each country, and
no account was taken of any variations in the quality of that care. In this study.
pre-school costs were only taken into account in the case of the working lone
parent with a pre-school age child.
It was assumed as a base line that school education of an equivalent standard.
including basic books, was available free of charge to all children of school age. It
was assumed that parents would have to pay for a midday meal, and that children
lived near enough their school not to require school transport. Account was then
taken of any charges that parents were expected to pay for education and any
benefits (including the value of free or subsidised school meals) that they might
receive.
6.3 Limitations of the model family approach
The assumptions described above are essential to the task of simulating policy by
obtaining comparable information on an up-to-date basis. However, there are
several disadvantages, in addition to the problems discussed earlier. First, this
method inevitably produces a description of the way the system should work rather
than how it necessarily does. For example, the study implicitly assumes that all
those eligible for means-tested benefits are claiming them, despite the fact that
take-up of these benefits is known to be far from complete in some countries. It is
possible to address this difficulty at the analysis stage by excluding such benefits,
or even by building in some assumptions on take-up, but because of the complexity
of the interactions within the different systems this is not always a safe or easy
solution. The data on which to ground these assumptions are also often missing.
Other behavioural effects of policy are also inevitable missing from the analysis.
For example, the high cost of formal child care in some countries means that in
practice many working lone parents find other informal solutions. In modelling
their net incomes, it may, therefore, be unrealistic to take child-care costs into
account. These are limitations which make it necessary always to emphasise that it
is the structural features of tax/benefit systems which are being compared. not the
outcomes for actual families. Concentrating on the formal arrangements and the
intended impact of the policies one is seeking to evaluate can, however, be as valid
as looking at the actual impact.
Secondly. looking at families at one point in time obscures the more complex life-
cycle effects of taxlbenefit systems. In particular, while employees' social security
contributions are taken into account as reducing disposable income, there is no
way of modelling the future benefits which accrue from them. In so far as higher
contributions may bring better benefits (which is not always the case). this may
distort the picture for some countries from a longer-term perspective, especially in
relation to retirement pensions. However, by counting benefits received at the time,
some account is taken of the distributive effect of contributions previously paid by
the family in question and by other contributors.
Thirdly, the more assumptions that are made about the circumstances of the model
families, the less representative those families are of actual populations. This
problem is the inevitable cost of achieving comparability. It has to be accepted that
the model families in the study are most unlikely to exist in all their characteristics
in any country. They are not representative but illustrative. They illustrate a range
of experience, and being comparable they enable us to demonstrate and compare
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the tax/benefit 'environment' implicitly created for families in a variety of
circumstances in a number of countries. Ideally other families and other aspects of
the benefit systems would have been included. However. with three categories of
benefit. nine family types, two adult ages, three children's ages and a variety of
different benefit systems in each country, the matrix was al ready large and
complex.
Finally, it needs to be emphasised that the matrix figures for countries with local
assistance schemes often have to be viewed differently from those where there are
national scale rates, such as Australia and the UK. or where regional variations are
slight, such as Germany. In countries like Switzerland, Norway and Italy. in
particular, but others too. the amount of benefit paid to particular families depends
not only on their individual circumstances, but also on the discretion of local social
workers operating within local guidelines. For these countries, the figures given are
the best estimates of the national experts, but they apply only to the specified
municipality and cannot necessarily he seen as representative of the country as a
whole. The tables need to be read, therefore, not only with any relevant footnotes.
but also alongside the descriptive material in earlier chapters and in Volume Two.
The first set of tables specifies the location along with the country. From then on.
for ease of presentation, only the countries are given, but the locations should
always he borne in mind when looking at the data from countries without national
systems.
Purchasing power parities
Comparisons of the levels on benefits payable in this study use purchasing power
parities (PPPs). As was explained in Chapter One, PPPs are a method of
comparing the actual value of a currency in terms of purchasing power. They have
their limitations, but it can be argued that they are the best available way of
comparing the value of benefit packages across countries. Table A6.2 at the end of
this chapter compares PPPs with exchange rates for May 1992.
6.4 The results of the income matrix analysis
The structure of ,social assistance
The assumptions outlined above indicate that the social assistance package is made
up of a variety of elements a combination of benefits and costs. This can be
illustrated by examining the structure of the social assistance package for three
different family types - a childless couple, a pensioner couple and a couple with
two school age children.
Tables 6.2a and 6.2b show the structure of social assistance for a childless couple.
Before housing costs. the social assistance package in seven countries. including the
UK, was entirely made up of the cash benefit itself: in these countries the:re were
no deductions of tax or social security, or expenses for health or education. to be
paid out of the benefit. and no other sources of income. Only New Zealand
charged income tax on social assistance and only Luxembourg required recipients
of social assistance to make a social security contribution. About half the countries
had some health charges which had to be paid out of social assistance benefits.
These were for most countries small amounts, but in France and Switzerland they
consumed over ten per cent of the social assistance paid. Four countries had other
types of payment in addition to the social assistance scales. In the case of Canada
this was a refundable tax credit. in the USA it was Food Stamps, in Italy it was the
Household Allowance, and in Ireland it was the Electricity Supplement. Of these.
Food Stamps were by far the most valuable, accounting for over a quarter of the
total social assistance package in the USA. Table 6.2b shows the (substantial)
impact of the nominated housing costs. In Austria. Finland and Germany, there
were no housing costs for couples receiving social assistance and in the UK they
were relatively small - 20 per cent of the Community Charge (poll tax) in 1992 (the
requirement to make this payment while on Income Support has since been
abolished for the current form of local taxation). In the other countries, housing
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costs were very i mportant thus in Greece they cancelled out the value of the
limited social assistance available. In New York (USA) they consumed most of
social assistance. while in Florida they resulted in a notional negative figure. In
Switzerland (Fribourg). they took up nearly half of the cash payment. The Nordic
countries, apart from Finland. also had housing costs which consumed over a
quarter of social assistance paid.
Table 6.2a: Structure of the social assistance package. Couple aged 35. Amounts per month in E. and $
PPPs (before housing costs), 1992
Social
assistance
S
Income
tax
Employee
contribution
Health
costs
Other
£ S
Total
£ S £ $ £ S £ S
Australia 519 825 0 0 0 515 818
Parramatta.
Sydney
Austria 247 393 0 0 0 0 247 393
Salzburg
Bel gium 407 647 0 0 7 -11 0 400 636
Antwerp
Canada 432 687 0 0 -3 . 4 36 465 740
Toronto, Ontario
Denmark 559 889 0 0 0 557 885
Copenhagen
Finland 338 537 0 0 -20 -...3? 0 318 505
Helsinki
hrance 264 420 0 0 -30 -48 4 235 372
Bar-le-due, Meuse
(3er€many 258 410 0 0 0 0 258 410
Bremen
Greece' 30 48 0 0 0 0 30 48
Peristeri, Athens
Iceland 632 1.005 0 0 --12 -19 0 620 986
Reykjavik
Ireland 349 555 0 0 0 10 16 360 571
Dublin
Italy = 415 660 0 0 0 30 444 706
Turin
Japan 397 631 0 0 0 0 397 631
Osaka
Luxembourg 560 890 0 -13 ---21 -5 0 542 862
Luxembourg City.
Netherlands 523 831 0 0 -16 25 0 507 806
Njimegen
New Zealand 449 714 -67 107 0 -- 11 -17 0 371 591
Wellington
Norway 626 995 0 0 -. 11 0 619 984
Oslo
Portugal 158 251 0 0 0 0 158 251
Lisbon
Spain 231 367 0 0 -5 -9 0 225 358
Barcelona
Sweden 577 917 0 0 -12 .-..1 9 0 565 898
Stockholm
Switzerland 906 1,440 0 0 -105 -167 0 801 1.273
Fribour g , Canton
de Fribourg
UK 289 460 0 0 0 0 289 460
York
USA Nev York 296 471 0 0 0 0 403 641
USA Pennsylvania 199 316 0 0 10 -16 52 83 241 383
USA Texas 0 0 0 6 -10 128 203 122 193
USA Florida 0 0 0 0 128 203 128 203
1992 USS 63 pence PPP rate
Since Greece has no general social assistance this figure and those in other tables are based on an
assumption that people receive the full yearly amount of lump sum Special Assistance available
For non-pensioner households, the Italian figures should be regarded with particular caution. They
represent optimistic assumptions about the likelihood and the level of awards to these households
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Table 6.26: Structure of the social assistance package. Couple 35. Amounts per month in r and S PPPs (after housing costs), 1992
Social
assistance
income tax Employee
contribution
Housing Health
costs
Other Total
 S £ S £ S £ S £ S £ S £ S
Australia 519 825 0 €1 -104 --165 -5 -8 0 411 652
Parrametta. Sydney
Austria 247 393 0 0 0 0 0 247 393
Salzburg
Belgium 407 647 0 0 -163 -259 -7 --11 0 237 377
Antwerp
Canada 432 687 0 0
-165 -2 62 -3 -5 36 57 300 420
Toronto. Ontario
Denmark 559 889 0 0 ..207 330 --2 -3 0 350 556
Copenhagen
Finland X 38 537 0 0 0 -2 0 -32 0 318 525
Helsinki
France 264 420 0 0 10 -30 --48 0 244 372
Bar-le-due, Meuse
Germany 258 411 0 0 0 0 0 258 411
Bremen
Greece 30 48 0 0 9b -156 0 0 --68 108
Peristeri. Athens
Iceland 632 1.005 0 0 167 -12 -19 0 453 720
Reykjavik
Ireland 349 555 0 0 -58 -92 0 10 16 301 478
Dublin
Italy' 415 660 0 0 32 -51 0 30 48 413 657
Turin
Japan 397 631 0 0 94 --149 0 0 303 482
Osaka
Luxembourg 560 890 0 --13 21 153 -243 5 -8 0 389 618
Luxembourg City
Netherlands 523 831 0 0
-71 -113 -16 --24 0 435 691
Njimegen
New Zealand 449 714 -67 -106 0
-152 -242 -I.1 -17 0 219 348
Wellin g ton
Norway 626 995 0 0 ...286 456 --7 -11 0 332 528
Oslo
Portugal 158 251 0 0 --134 -213 0 0 24 38
Lisbon
Spain 231 367 0 0 -60 -95 --9 0 165 262
Barcelona
Sweden 577 917 0 O -217 -345 -12 -19 0 348 553
Stockholm
Switzerland 906 1,440 0 0 -385 -612 -105 -167 0 416 661
Fribourg, Canton
de Fribourg
UK 289 459 {l 0 -8 -13 0 0 281 446
York
USA New York 296 471 0 0 -352 -559 0 107 170 50 79
USA Pennsylvania 199 316 0 0 0 -10 --16 52 83 241 383
USA Texas 0 0 0 16 25 -6 -9 128 203 138 219
USA Florida 0 0 0 -253 402 0 128 203 ._ 125 ..-198
1992 USSI = 63 pence
For non-pensioner households, the Italian figures should be regarded with particular caution. They represent optimistic assumptions about
the likelihood and the level of awards to these households
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Table 6. 3 provides the results for a pensioner couple - this time only after housing
costs. Income tax was payable in Denmark and New Zealand (this is not. in fact.
social assistance in Denmark but, as with Finland,the minimum non-contributory
retirement pension). Social security contributions were again payable in
Luxembourg. Fewer countries had health costs for pensioners on social assistance
and where they did, they were fairly small, with the exception of Switzerland.
Canada had a refundable tax credit. Finland the minimum pension. Ireland the
electricity allowance and the USA Food Stamps. In most countries, pensioners'
housing costs were identical to those of the childless couple, but in Canada, Greece
and the Netherlands. pensioners paid more than childless couples, while in
Denmark and New Zealand they paid less, In most cases these differences were
offset by adjustments to the social assistance payable.
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7 blc 6.3: Structure of social assistance package. Couple aged 68. Amounts per month in C and $ PPPs tarter housing costs), 1992
Social assistance income tax Employee contribution Housing Health costs Other Total
£ S £ $ £ `.6 £ S £ $ £ S £ S
Australia 519 825 0 0 04 165 --5 8 0 411 653
Austria 288 458 0 0 0 0 0 288 457
Belgium 407 647 0 0 _
. 163 259 -3 -5 0 241 383
Canada 748 1,188 0 0 -305 485 --3 -5 46 73 486 773
Denmark 653 1.038 -13 --21 0 -92 -146 --2 3 0 546 868
Finland 49 124 0 0 0 . 20 -32 397 631 426 677
France 523 831 0 0 10 16 --3€1 -47 0 503 800
Germany 309 491 0 0 0 0 0 309 491
Greece 76 121 0 0 ---ILO --175 0 0 -34 54
Iceland 632 '1,005 0 0 167 -266 -12 19 0 453 720
Ireland 370 588 0 0 . 58 -92 0 33 52 345 548
-Italy' 415 660 0 0 -32 --51 0 0 383 609
japan 373 593 0 0 --94 149 0 0 279 443
Luxembourg 560 890 0 --10 16 153 243 -5 -8 0 392 623
Netherlands 523 831 0 0 -92 146 -16 -25 0 415 660
New Zealand 592 941 -89 _141 0 72 273 -11
.47 0 321 510
Norway 544 865 0 0 ..205 326 --7 -11 t.) 332 528
Portugal 156 248 0 0 34 -213 0 0 23 36
Spain 228 36 2 0 0 --60 -95 -5 ---8 0 163 259
Sweden 465 739 0 0 -- 25 -40 1
2 19 0 427 679
Switzerland 906 1,440 0 0 .385 612 105 -167 0 416 661
UK. 385 612 0 0 -4 12 0 0 377 593
USA NY 463 736 0 0 -352 -560 0 50 79 161 260
USA Pen 429 682 0 0 0 10 l6 61 97 480 763
USA. Texas 398 633 0 0 07 -170 -1 --15 70 111 360 572
USA Florida 398 633 0 0 -253 402 0 70 111 215 342
'For non-pensioner households, the Italian figures should be regarded with particular caution. They represent optimistic assumptions about the likelihood and the level of awards to these households
Table 6.4 presents the results for a couple with two school-aged children, after
housing costs. For people with children, the social assistance package is more
complex than for those without children. With the exception of Switzerland
(remembering that this applies specifically to Fribourg), all countries paid either an
income-related or non-income-related cash payment in respect of children, in
addition to the social assistance figure in the first column. In Australia, Austria and
Belgium this represented over a quarter of the total package. Only in New Zealand
did families on social assistance pay income tax and in Luxembourg social security
contributions. There were health charges to be paid in about half of the countries,
though they only exceeded ten per cent of the social assistance payments in France
and Switzerland. There were costs associated with education in six countries and
school meals subsidies in four countries. including the UK. In five countries there
were other types of additional payments -- in Canada the tax credit. in Germany a
child tax credit, in Ireland the electricity allowance, in Italy the household
allowance and in the USA the Supplementary Food Programme for Women,
Infants and Children (WIC) and Food Stamps.
In all but three countries (Austria, Germany and Finland). people had to pay
housing costs out of their social assistance. though the amounts varied from £8
($13) per month in the UK (for the Community Charge which has since been
abolished') to £470 ($747) per month in Switzerland. In Belgium, Luxembourg,
Spain, Portugal, Switzerland and two of the four US States, recipients of social
assistance paid the full gross rent. The value of the rent subsidy in the other
countries depended to some extent on the level of the gross rent, but it was worth
over £200 ($318) per month in Austria, Finland, Germany. Australia, Japan,
Canada and Ireland and over £100 ($160) a month in the UK, Sweden. Iceland and
Denmark.
In the UK, Income Support rates were increased at the time of the introduction of the Community
Charge to provide some compensation. but this increase was not clawed back when the tax was
abolished.
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Table 6.4: Structure of the social assistance package. Couple aged 35 +- two children (7, 14), Amounts per month in 1: and $ PPPs (after housing costs). 1992
Social Child Means Income tax Employee Housing Health costs Education Other Total
assistance benefit tested child
benefit
contribution
£ $ $ £ $£ $ £ $ £ $ £ $ £ £ $ £ S £ S
Australia 519 825 67 123 196 0 0 0 0 -- 137 --218 -5 --8 0 0 0 0 543 863
Austria 333 529 143 227 18 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 494 785
Belgium 407 647 0 0 182 289 0 0 0 0 -183 291 --11 -17 --23 -37 0 0 372 591
Canada 539 857 35 55 50 79 0 CI 0 0 . -245 390 --3 -5 8 13 47 75 432 687
Denmark 602 957 65 103 0 0 0 0 0 0 177 281 --2 3 0 0 0 0 488 775
Finland 542 861 75 119 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37 .. 59 0 0 0 0 580 922
France 319 507 60 95 6 10 0 0 0 0 21 33 59 --94 52 83 0 0 398 633
Germany 379 602 42 67 18 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39 42 477 758
Greece 30 48 0 0 11 17 (.l 0 0 0 145 --231 0 0 0 0 0 0 1(13 164
Iceland 717 1,140 22 35 104 165 0 0 0 0 . 179 -285 -21 --33 0 0 0 0 644 1,024
Ireland 450 715 31 49 0 (1 0 0 0 0 -49 -78 0 0 -10 -16 10 16 433 688
Italy' 476 757 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 --32 ---51 0 0 (1 0 59 94 503 800
Japan 663 1,054 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 0 -203 323 0 0 0 0 0 0 460 731
Luxembourg 637 1,013 162 257 0 0 0 0 --17 -27 183 291 --11 -17 -12 --19 0 0 577 917
Netherlands 523 831 106 168 0 0 0 0 0 0 ---98 156 --23 -37
. 12 ... 19 0 0 496 789
New Zealand 477 758 0 0 112 178 ---72 114 0 0 183 291 --14 --22 --7 -
. 11 0 0 313 498
Norway 735 1,169 119 189 0 0 0 0 0 0 299 475 9
..44 0 0 0 0 546 868
Portugal 158 251 0 0 24 38 0 0 0 0 -161 -256 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 33
Spain 280 445 0 0 32 51 0 0 0 0 -60 ---95 --11 -17 -8 --13 0 0 233 370
Sweden 673 1,070 94 149 0 0 O 0 0 (1 141 --224 --20 -32 0 0 0 0 607 965
Switzerland 1.208 1,921 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -470 -747 140 --223 (1 0 0 0 598 950
UK. 409 650 76 121 0 0 0 0 0 0 -8 ---13 0 0 31 49 0 0 508 808
USA 'NY 433 688 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -414 -658 0 0 59 94 145 231 222 353
USA 'Pen 253 402 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 --14 -22 61 97 108 172 408 649
USA Texas 71 113 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 22 -1 -- 2 49 78 233 370 367 583
USA Florida 157 250 0 0 0 (1 0 0 0 0 . 340 .541 0 0 67 107 224 356 108 172
For nonpensioner households. the Italian figures should be regarded with particular caution. They represent optimistic assumptions about the likelihood and the level of awards to these households
Social assistance levels
Tables 6.5a and 6.5b provide a comparison of disposable income at the social
assistance level, for all the family types, before and after housing costs. In a few
countries. including Canada and the Nordic states, older people would not receive
social assistance even if they had no contributory pension entitlement. Instead they
received minimum. non-contributory - citizen's pensions', and these are included in
the tables in place of social assistance.
The first thing to note about these tables is that there were only five countries
(Australia. Finland. Iceland, Japan and New Zealand) paying an independent
social assistance benefit to an unemployed 17 year old single person. France and
Luxembourg show negative amounts- because, despite having no income, such
young people would be expected to pay some health costs in those countries.
Japan had the highest benefit level for a 17 year old, but in practice it would be
rare in Japan for young people of this age to be unemployed, out of education or
training and not supported by their families.
The second point to note is the variation in the level of social assistance paid in
the diffferent countries. Thus. for example for a couple with two children, before
housing costs, it varied from an estimated £1.068 per month in Switzerland
(Fribourg) to £182 per month in Portugal (and £41 per month in Greece which
effectively has no social assistance scheme). For the same family after housing
costs. the variation between countries was not as great, with Iceland providing the
highest income (£644 per month). compared with Portugal's £21 per month. Any
social assistance payable was effectively cancelled out by housing costs for all
families in Greece. for the single pensioner in Portugal, for the single 35 year old
in Pennsylvania (USA), and for the single person and couple in Florida (USA) -
hence the negative amounts shown.
On this basis, for the couple with two children, the UK came fifteenth in the
ranking of social assistance before housing costs and eighth after housing costs.
This difference in rank order is a function of the fact that families on Income
Support in the UK had almost all their housing costs covered by benefits.
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7'a66' 6.5a: Families on social assistance: net disposable income (£ sterling purchasing power parity) per month (before housing costs), 1992
Single Single Single Couple Couple Couple (35) Couple (35) Couple (35) Lone parent (35) Lone parent
(17) (35) (68) (35) (68) + 1 child (3) + 1 child (7) + 2 eh (7,14) + I child (3) (35) + l child
(7)
S £ S £ S £ S £ `b £ S £ S £ S £ $ £ S
Australia 128 203 285 453 309 491 515 818 515 818 598 951 598 951 680 1,081 426 677 426 677
Austria 0 0 182 289 212 337 247 393 288 45S 360 572 36O 572 494 785 262 417 262 417
Belgium 0 0 302 480 304 483 400 636 404 642 458 728 465 739 554 881 461 733 468 744
Canada 0 0 203 323 485 771 465 739 791 1,258 572 909 566 900 676 1,075 507 806 501 797
Denmark 0 0 368 585 319 507 557 886 639 1,016 612 973 602 957 665 1.057 502 798 491 781
Finland 159 253 187 297 187 297 31S 506 426 677 501 797 438 696 580 887 566 900 362 576
Prance -.. 15 -24 170 270 277 440 235 374 493 784 271 170 296 471 377 599 343 545 2 60 413
Germany 0 0 141 224 170 270 258 410 309 491 336 534 350 556 477 758 307 488 233 370
Greece 0 0 30 48 38 60 30 48 76 121 33 52 33 52 4i 65 38 60 38 60
Iceland 44 70 461 733 494 785 62O 986 620 986 711 1,130 711 1,130 823 1,308 590 938 590 938
Ireland 0 0 221 351 281 446 360 572 403 641 426 677 421 669 482 766 316 502 311 494
Italy' 0 0 244 388 244 388 444 705 415 659 524 833 524 833 535 850 419 666 419 666
Japan 281 447 258 410 246 391 397 631 373 593 497 790 512 814 663 1,054 430 684 446 709
Luxembourg
.3 S 405 644 405 644 542 862 545 866 646 1,027 646 1.027 76O 1,208 509 809 509 809
Netherlands 0 0 357 568 358 569 507 806 507 8O6 531 844 542 862 594 944 487 774 498 792
New Zealand 149 237 723 355 322 512 371 590 493 784 467 742 465 739 496 789 395 628 392 623
Norway 0 0 451 717 373 593 619 984 536 852 622 989 596 948 845 1,343 594 944 568 903
Portugal 0 158 251 78 124 158 251 156 248 169 269 170 270 182 289 169 269 170 270
Spain 0 196 312 131 208 225 358 223 356 266 423 262 417 292 464 241 383 237 377
Sweden 0 374 595 259 412 565 898 452 719 561 892 590 938 748 1,189 417 663 445 707
Switzerland 0 556 884 556 884 801 1,273 801 1,273 876 1,392 876 1,393 1,068 1.698 758 1 205 897 1,426
UK 0 184 293 248 394 289 459 385 612 402 639 407 647 516 820 318 5O6 323 514
USA NY 0 289 459 355 564 403 641 513 816 508 808 537 854 636 1,011 403 641 432 687
USA Pen 0 155 246 327 520 241 383 480 763 347 552 377 599 408 649 257 409 287 456
USA Texas 0 67 107 317 504 122 194 467 742 246 391 202 321 352 560 227 360 251 399
USA Florida 0 70 III 318 5O6 128 203 468 744 341 542 374 595 448 712 285 453 318 506
1 For non-pensioner households, the Italian figures should be regarded with particular caution. They represent optimistic aissnmptiuns about the likelihood and the level of awards to these households
Tble 6.56: Families on social assistance: net disposable income (i sterling purchasing power parity) per month (after housing costs). 1992
Single Single Single Couple Couple Couple (35) Couple (35) Couple (35) Lone parent (35) Lone parent
(17) (35) (68) (35) (68) + I child (3) + child (7) + 2 eh (7,14) + 1 child (3) (35) + 1 child
£ S £ $ £ $ £ S £ $ £ $ £ $ £ $ £ S
( 7)
£ $
Australia 102 162 227 361 246 391 411 653 411 653 477 758 477 758 543 863 342 544 342 544
Austria 0 82 289 212 337 247 393 288 458 360 572 360 572 494 785 262 416 262 416
Belgium 0 171 272 173 275 237 377 241 383 295 469 301 479 372 591 298 474 305 485
Canada 0 38 60 180 286 300 476 486 773 368 585 362 576 432 687 303 481 297 472
Denmark 0 198 315 265 421 350 556 546 868 468 744 458 728 488 776 372 591 361 574
Finland 159 252 87 297 187 297 318 506 426 677 501 796 438 696 580 922 .566 900 362 576
France ---1 5
-24 80 286 286 455 244 388 5(1.3 800 286 455 311 494 398 633 347 552 275 437
Germany 0 141 224 170 270 258 410 309 491 336 534 350 556 477 758 307 488 233 370
Greece 0
-31 -49 31 49 -- 68
--108 -34 -54 64 102 ---64 -102 -103 -_164 60 ._95 ..60 ...95
Iceland 44 70 . 294 467 313 500 452 719 452 719 543 863 543 863 644 L024 418 665 410 652
Ireland 0 174 277 234 372 301 479 345 548 372 591 367 583 433 688 277 440 272 4.32
Italy' 0 199 316 139 221 267 424 139 221 326 518 326 518 355 564 275 437 275 437
japan 281 447 192 305 180 2 86 303 482 279 444 403 641 418 665 460 731 336 534 352 560
Luxembourg . 3 5 298 474 298 474 389 618 392 623 493 784 493 784 577 917 356 566 356 566
Netherlands 0 268 426 269 428 435 692 415 660 460 731 471 749 496 788 396 659 407 657
New Zealand 149 237 115 183 197 313 219 348 321 510 297 472 294 467 313 498 239 380 236 375
Norway 0 212 337 212 337 332 528 332 528 463 736 437 695 546 868 435 692 409 650
Portugal 0 78 124 2 3 24 38 23 36 35 55 9 14 21 33 35 56 :3 6 57
Spain 0 136 216 131 208 165 262 163 259 206 327 202 321 233 370 181 288 177 281
Sweden 0 203 322 238 378 348 543 427 679 442 703 471 748 607 965 298 474 326 518
Switzerland 0 256 407 256 407 416 661 416 661 492 782 492 782 598 951 373 593 513 815
UK. 0 180 286 244 389 281 447 377 599 394 626 399 634 508 808 314 499 319 507
USA NY 0 1 --16 65 103 50 79 161 256 155 246 185 294 222 352 50 79 80 127
USA Pen 0 155 246 327 520 241 383 480 763 347 552 377 599 408 649 257 409 287 456
USA Texas 0 83 132 206 328 138 219 36(1 572 252 401 219 348 367 583 222 353 246 391
USA Florida 0 -176 280 72 114 -125 199 215 342 88 140 121 192 108 171 32 51 65 103
For non-pensioner households, the Italian figures should be regarded with particular caution, They represent optimistic assumptions about the likelihood and the level of awards to these households
The implied equivalence scale in social assistance
So far, the analysis has concentrated on the relative level of social assistance paid
to couples with two children. Scrutiny of the tables, however, reveals that each
country's relative position changes with the type of family considered. Thus the
UK. for example, comes eighth after housing costs for a couple with two children,
but twelfth for a childless couple. This variation occurs because countries treat
different types of families differently that is, the implied equivalence scales in
their benefit systems vary. Tables 6.6a and 6.6b provide a representation of the
implied equivalence scales in each country's social assistance system, before and
after housing costs. In these tables, the assistance paid to a couple without children
is set at 100 for each country: thus it is possible to compare the relative treatment
of other family types compared with a childless couple.
First, it is interesting to compare the treatment of childless single people and
couples above and below pension age. Most countries provided relatively larger
assistance benefits to people over retirement age - Canada, France, Greece and the
USA were notably more generous to people above pension age than to childless
couples below pension age. Other countries did not vary their social assistance
payments between those below and above pension age - including Belgium, Italy
and Finland (for single people). Luxembourg, Netherlands and Switzerland. There
were a few countries that appeared to pay higher benefits to working-age singles
and couples than to pensioners. These included Denmark and Spain (for singles),
Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal and Sweden, though in Japan higher benefits are
paid to people over 70. On the face of it. these differences in payments to younger
and older people without children do not appear to follow any obvious pattern,
though they may be related to the level of benefits available from old-age insurance
pensions. Certainly they appear to represent a valuation by each country of the
relative needs or deserts of younger and older childless people dependent on social
assistance.
There was considerable variation in the level of benefit paid to an unemployed
single person compared with an unemployed couple. Before housing costs, a single
person in Canada. for example. received 44 per cent of the benefit paid to a couple.
and in Australia, Germany, Italy and two of the US States, 55 per cent of that of a
couple. There was no difference in the treatment of single people and couples in
Greece and Portugal. and in Spain the single person received 87 per cent of the
amount paid to a couple.
Turning to couples with children, we again see considerable variations in the
treatment of children. Thus before housing costs Austria (Salzburg) paid an extra
46 per cent for a three year old. in Finland the extra amount was 58 per cent, and
in two of the US states benefit increased by more than 100 per cent (but in their
case the amounts paid for a childless couple were very low). By contrast, before
housing costs. Sweden paid less for a couple with a three year old and Norway
nearly the same amount. For two children, the extra amount paid varied from 251
per cent in Florida (from a very low base), 100 per cent in Austria, 85 per cent in
Germany and 79 per cent in the U.K, to only 17 per cent in the Netherlands. 19 per
cent in Denmark and 15 per cent in Portugal. Comparing the ratios for a couple
with a three year old and a seven year old enables us to examine whether the
amounts paid in social assistance vary with those ages. Again practices differed. A
number of countries did pay higher benefits for children of different ages, but of
those that did, about half paid more for a three year old and half more for a seven
year old. These variations were not always the result of differences in the benefit
scales: they could also be the consequence of school costs assumed for the seven
year old, or exemption from health charges for the three year old.
Moving to the treatment of lone parents with children, the general pattern was for
lone parents on social assistance to receive higher amounts than childless couples.
but lower amounts than couples with the same number of children. However there
were some exceptions to this pattern. Thus, in a number of countries, including, for
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example, Australia, Denmark, Ireland. Iceland. Italy and Sweden, lone parents
received less than childless couples (before housing costs). In Finland. France and
Greece. on the other hand, the lone parent with a three year old received more in
social assistance than a couple with a child of the same age.
T /d 6.6o: Implied equivalence scale of social assistance (before housing costs), couple(35) = 100.
1992
Single
(17)
Single
(35)
Single
(68)
Couple Couple Couple Couple Couple Lone
parent
Lone
parent(35) (68) (35) + (35) (35) +
I child I child 2 ch (35) + (35) +
(3) (7) (7.14) l child 1 child
(3) (7)
Australia 25 55 60 100 100 116 116 137 83 83
Austria 0 74 86 I00 117 146 146 200 106 106
Belgium 0 75 76 100 101 115 116 1 39 115 117
Canada 0 44 104 100 170 123 122 145 109 108
Denmark 0 66 57 100 115 110 108 119 90 88
Finland 50 59 59 100 134 150 138 143 178 114
France
-6 72 118 100 210 115 126 161 146 111
Germany 0 55 66 100 120 130 136 185 119 91
Greece 0 100 127 100 253 111 III 138 126 126
Iceland 74 SO 100 100 115 115 133 95 95
Ireland 0 61 78 100 112 118 117 134 88 87
Italy' 0 55 55 100 93 118 118 120 94 94
Japan 71 65 62 100 94 125 129 167 108 112
Luxembourg
-1 75 75 100 101 119 119 140 94 94
Netherlands 0 70 71 100 100 105 107 117 96 98
New Zealand 40 60 87 100 133 126 125 134 106 106
Norway 0 73 60 100 87 101 96 137 96 92
Portugal 0 100 50 100 99 107 107 115 107 107
Spain 0 87 58 100 99 118 116 130 107 105
Sweden 0 66 46 100 80 99 104 132 74 79
Switzerland 0 69 69 100 100 109 109 133 95 112
UK. 0 64 86 100 133 139 141 179 110 112
USA NY 0 72 88 100 120 126 133 158 100 107
USA Pen 0 64 136 100 200 144 157 169 107 119
USA Texas 0 55 261 100 384 202 166 289 186 206
USA Florida 0 55 249 100 367 267 293 361 223 249
1 For non-pensioner households, the Italian fi gures should be regarded with particular caution. They
represent optimistic assumptions about the likelihood and the level of awards to these households
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Table 6.66: I mplied equivalence scale of social assistance (after housing costs), couple(35) -= 100. 1992.
Single Single Single
(68)
Couple Couple Couple Couple Couple Lone
(35) + (35) + (35) + parent
Lone
parent(17) (35) (35) (68)
I child 1 child 2 eh (35) + (35) +
( 3 ) (7) (7,14) I child I child
(3) (7)
Australia 75 55 60 100 100 116 116 132 83 83
Austria 0 74 86 100 117 146 146 200 106 106
Belgium 0 72 73 100 102 125 127 157 136 129
Canada 0 13 60 100 162 123 121 144 101 99
Denmark 0 56 76 100 156 134 131 139 106 103
Finland 50 59 59 100 134 158 138 183 178 114
France -6 73 117 100 206 117 127 163 142 113
Germany 0 55 66 100 120 130 136 185 119 91
Greece 0 47 46 100 51 95 95 15$ 88 88
Iceland t0 65 69 100 100 121) 120 142 92 91
Ireland 0 58 78 100 114 123 122 144 92 90
Italy' 0 51 51 100 93 119 119 122 94 94
Japan 9.3 64 60 100 92 133 138 152 111 116
Luxembour g 1 77 77 100 101 127 127 148 92 9 2
Netherlands 0 62 62 100 95 106 108 114 91 93
New Zealand 68 52 90 .100 147 136 135 143 109 108
Norway 0 64 64 1OO 100 139 131 164 131 136
Portugal 0 323 -9 100 94 145 38 87 145 149
Spain 0 82 79 100 98 125 122 141 110 107
Sweden 0 58 68 100 123 '127 135 174 85 94
Switzerland 0 62 62 100 100 118 118 144 90 123
UK 0 64 87 100 134 140 142 181 112 114
USA NY 0 - I 130 100 320 309 367 441 100 159
USA Pen 0 64 136 100 200 144 157 169 107 119
USA Texas 0 60 150 100 262 183 159 267 161 179
USA Florida 0 141 -57 100 -172 -70 -97 -86 26 . 52
For non-pensioner households, the Italian figures should be regarded with particular caution. They
represent optimistic assumptions about the likelihood and the level of awards to these households
Given all this variation in the level of social assistance paid to families of different
types, it is not easy to draw conclusions about the overall comparative income
levels of recipients of social assistance in different countries. However, an attempt
is made at an overall ranking in Tables 6.7a and 6.7b. These rankings are derived
by taking the total amounts, in purchasing power parity £sterling, paid to all the
family types except the single 17 year old. This total is then expressed as a
proportion of the mean for all countries. The advantage of this method is that it
not only gives a ranking of countries, but also provides an indication of dispersion.
Clearly a composite figure for all the family types takes no account of the
prevalence of different types of family among social assistance recipients in
different countries - a prevalence which may in some cases be influenced by
behavioural responses to the policy structures under examination. Nor can it
represent the variation for different family types. It is subject to all the caveats
already mentioned, including housing cost assumptions_ discretionary benefit levels
in some countries, and the limitations of purchasing power parities. Nevertheless,
the composite figure does provide a useful indicator of the overall effect of policy.
The average for each country is presented as a percentage distance from the mean
for all the family types. before and after housing costs. Those with negative figures
were thus below the mean.
Before housing costs. Switzerland (Fribourg) was clearly an outlier. with the level
of social assistance paid to these nine families being close to double the mean. This
is possibly an artefact of the estimation necessary to judge what families might
receive in a discretionary system. The U.K. social assistance level came out as 19 per
cent below the mean. However, probably a more reliable comparison is the ranking
after housing costs. On this scale, Iceland had the highest level of social assistance,
at around 50 per cent above the mean, and headed a leading group containing the
Nordic countries. Luxembourg. the Netherlands and Australia, all with levels more
than 20 per cent above the mean. Italy too appears in this group, but, as has been
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emphasised, the figures for non-pensioner households in particular may be less
accurate for Italy than for other countries. Next comes a group of countries led by
the UK and including the USA (New York), Japan, France, Canada and
Germany. Finally there is a third group, all with social assistance levels more than
ten per cent below the mean. including Belgium. New Zealand, the three other US
states and the other southern European countries. Greece, which as we have seen
has no general or major categorical social assistance programmes, stands out at the
bottom of the ranking.
There are a considerable number of changes in ranking before and after housing
costs: after housing costs, Canada. Belgium and New Zealand move down the
ranking and Finland. Germany, Austria, France and the UK improve their
positions.
Table 6.7a, Social assistance: percentage ctifi'erence from the mean - all cases before housing costs
St
Switzerland
Fribour g . Canton de Fribourg
Iceland
W
Reykjavik
Norway
Oslo
Luxembourg
Luxembourg City
Canada
Toronto, Ontario
Denmark
Copenhagen
Sweden
Stockholm
Netherlands
Njimegen
Australia
Parrametta. Sydney
USA
New York
Japan
Osaka
Belgium
Antwerp
Italy
Turin
New Zealand
Wellington
Finland
Helsinki
Ireland
Dublin
UK
York
USA
Pennsylvania
USA
Florida
France
Bar--le-due. Meuse
Austria
Salzburg
Germany
Bremen
USA
Texas
Spain
Barcelona
Portugal
Lisbon
Greece
Peristeri. Athens
91
49
38
32
26
26
17
16
15
8
0
--a
..15
-19
27
8
-32
-40
-45
-63
-91
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Table 6.7b: Social assistance: 'rcentage difference from the mean -- all cases after housing costs
%
Iceland
Reykjavik
Switzerland
Fribourg. Canton de Fribourg
Luxembourg
Luxembourg City
Netherlands
Njimegen
Finland
Helsinki
Denmark
Copenhagen
Italy
Turin
Australia
Ptarramatta. Sydney
Norway
Oslo
Sweden
Stockholm
UK
York
Japan
Osaka
USA
New York
France
Bar-le-due, Meuse
Ireland
Dublin
Canada
Toronto. Ontario
Austria
Salzbur g
Germany
Bremen
Belgium
Antwerp
New Zealand
Wellington
USA
Pennsylvania
Spain
Barcelona
USA
Florida
USA
Texas
Portugal
Lisbon
Greece
Peristeri. Athens
These comparisons of the level of social assistance have been based on purchasing
power parities. In Table A6.3. at the end of the chapter. social assistance is also
expressed as a proportion of average gross earnings, before housing costs and for
two families only - the pensioner couple and the couple with two children. The
results of these comparisons are, as would be expected given the discussion earlier
about earnings data, to improve the relative levels of France. Sweden and Finland.
Thus for the couple aged 68, Sweden moved from being below the average on the
purchasing power parity ranking to among the top countries on the proportion of
average earnings rankings, and for the couple with two children it moved from
fourth to first place. However, apart from these three countries the relative level of
the countries remained reasonably stable. whichever comparison was used.
50
41
35
33
31
28
28
is
24
it
8
6
4
2
i
-a
1 8
.23
41
-64
-85
-9o
-319
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Another method of comparing the level of social assistance is to compare it with
the net disposable incomes of similar families in work. This is investigated for
working age families in Chapter Seven as part of the exploration of incentives and
unemployment traps. The analysis here is restricted to the single and couple
pensioners. Tables 6.8a and 6.8b provide data on the pensioner replacement ratios
for each country, before and after housing costs -- that is. the ratio of the net
disposable income of the pensioner receiving social assistance to the net disposable
income of a single working person, or one earner couple, on average earnings. The
ratio is therefore a relative measure of the level of living of pensioners on social
assistance. The higher the ratio, the closer the incomes of pensioners on social
assistance are to those of similar people in work.
Before housing costs. the ratios vary for a single pensioner from 62 per cent in
Switzerland (Fribourg) to seven per cent in Greece. and. for a couple, from 89 per
cent in Switzerland to 12 per cent in Greece. The UK, at 28 per cent for a single
person and 42 per cent for a couple, comes well down in the ranking. After housing
costs, in most countries. pensioners" replacement ratios improve because housing
benefits are of more help to social assistance recipients - the UK, for example,
moves up the league table for this reason.
Table 6.8a: Pensioners replacement ratio (net disposable income on social assistance as percentage of
net disposable income on average earnings) (before housing costs)
Single person Couple
Australia 34 54
Austria 30 40
Belgium 39 47
Canada 45 69
Denmark 47 81
Finland 23 54
France 42 71
Germany 21 34
Greece 7 12
Ireland 37 47
Italy 42 52
Japan 24 33
Luxembour g 43 52
Netherlands 58 77
New Zealand 39 61
Norway 45 62
Portugal 22 43
Spain
.17 28
Sweden 40 71)
Switzerland 62 89
UK 28 42
USA N Y 33 50
USA Pen 32 49
USA Texas 29 47
USA Florida 32 53
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Table 6.156: Pensioners replacement ratio (net disposable income on social assistance as percentage
net disposable income on average earnings) (alter housing costs)
Single person ° E> Couple Ni
Australia 36 57
Austria 46 80
Belgium 35
Canada 23 57
Denmark 55 100
Finland 109
]ranee 48 8
Germany 28 46
Greece 8
Ireland 38 53
]tale 43 54
Japan 23 34
Luxembourg 36 44
Netherlands 53 78
New Zealand 32 58
Norway 34 54
Portugal -l 10
Spain 19 22
Sweden 55 110
Switzerland 51 91
U.K 31 49
USA NY 10 26
USA Pen 49
USA Texas ?5 50
USA Florida 9 34
One final way of examining the level of social assistance is to compare the
relationship between the net disposable resources of families receiving social
assistance and those receiving social insurance benefits. The analysis is presented in
Tables 6.9a and 6.96. with the relationship between the disposable income of
families in the two situations expressed as a percentage ratio. These ratios could be
described as a representation of the 'contributions trap' in each country.
Beneficiaries in those countries with high ratios were receiving little more in
exchange for their contributions than they would if they had not -made
contributions and were therefore not entitled to insurance benefits. The tables also
show what would be the impact to the incomes of families when entitlement to
insurance benefits cease (for example, as a result of being unemployed for a long
period of time). and people have to fall back on social assistance.
Looking at the situation before housing costs (Table 6.9a). we see that in Australia
and New Zealand the ratio was 100 per cent. because there are no social insurance
benefits. The ratio for the other countries varied considerably. both between
countries and within and between countries by the type of family. The results for
the US states were heavily affected by the assumptions about health and housing
costs. Payments for health care and insurance, for example. can be so large that
many people on low incomes cannot afford them. The specified package,
nevertheless. includes them. resulting in somewhat artificial negative incomes.
Among the other countries, the members of the Nordic group had particularly high
ratios -- indeed for the couple with two children in Denmark, Norway and Sweden,
the social assistance levels exceeded the social insurance Ievels. The UK and Ireland
also had high ratios.
The countries with the biggest gaps between the level of their social insurance
payments and their social assistance payments were the continental European
countries. There were interesting differences in the ratios for people below and
above retirement age. In the majority of countries, social assistance levels were
closer to social insurance levels for non-pensioners than pensioners - this is true of
all the Nordic countries. Netherlands. Japan and Switzerland. In these countries,
retirement insurance pensions are likely to be at a higher level than unemployment
insurance, and in some cases older people without full insurance-based entitlements
would be entitled to supplements which are income-tested less strictly than social
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assistance. In Canada. France and Portugal, on the other hand, social assistance
levels appeared closer to social insurance levels for pensioner couples than non-
pensioner couples. In general. the ratios after housing costs were higher than before
housing costs because housing benefits w3-ere more generous to families on social
assistance than social insurance. Indeed, only in Belgium. Luxembourg. Portugal
and Spain were they lower (for a couple plus two children) and in many more
countries the net disposable income on social assistance was more than or only a
little less than net disposable income on social insurance.
Table 6.9a: Ratio of net disposable income on social assistance to net disposable income on social
insurance (before housing costs)
Single
(35)
Single
(68)
Couple
(35)
Couple
(68)
Couple (35)
+ 2 children
Lone parent
(35) + 1
(7.14) child (7)
Australia 100 100 100 100 100 100
Austria 42 36 54 49 76 51
Belgium 59 53 79 54 88 84
Canada 30 83 62 97 75 65
Denmark 83 94 101 92 108 90
Finland 38 35 66 60 93 57
France 35 49 47 84 65 46
Germany 45 28 45 53 67 54
Greece 15 7 14 13 16 17
Iceland n./a Ma nia Ma nia nia
Ireland 78 88 81 81 89 96
Italy n/a Ma nra n a nia n/a
Japan 43 35 62 49 104 61
Luxembourg 51 48 64 58 62 51
Netherlands 78 57 102 57 102 94
New Zealand 100 100 100 100 100 .100
Norway 83 77 107 79 114 73
Portugal 45 45 45 83 49 69
Spain 33 16 38 26 39 47
Sweden 67 59 102 71 117 65
Switzerland 84 81 120 92 100 102
UK 99 75 96 82 94 96
USA NY 84 78 183 75 165 173
USA Pen 45 62 62 59 98 63
USA Texas 21 76 26 77 56 50
USA Florida 30 69 260 68 -103 -104
Note: It was not possible to obtain the social insurance data for Iceland and Italy
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Table 6.91: Ratio of net disposable income on social assistance to net disposable income on social
insurance (after housing costs)
Single
(35)
Single
(68)
Couple
(35)
Couple
(68)
Couple (35)
+ 2 children
Lone parent
(35) + 1
(7,14) child (7)
Australia 100 100 100 100 100 100
Austria 97 61 236 121 305 158
Belgium 45 39 69 42 83 78
Canada 10 64 68 95 97 74
Denmark 72 92 102 91 1 12 88
Finland 78 67 123 95 118 76
France 41 58 54 95 70 51
Germany 114 41 76 89 96 122
Greece -23 6 -63 6
-89 _..49
Iceland n/a n'a n/a nia n/a n/a
Ireland 81 85 80 79 94 102
Italy n a n'a n;`<t n a ma n/a
Japan 49 36 82 58 173 76
Luxembourg 43 41 56 50 55 42
Netherlands 78 52 118 55 114 101
New Zealand 106 100 103 100 102 103
Norway 64 72 103 73 134 73
Portugal 29 2 11 41 10 32
Spain 25 18 31 20 34 40
Sweden 57 78 116 97 143 66
Switzerland 95 74 187 95 108 120
UK 101 90 99 94 100 100
USA NY l 39 -38 48 -772 --78
USA Pen 45 62 62 59 98 63
USA Texas 44 72 39 87 70 64
USA Florida -1.600 34 61 50
-14 -- 23
Note: It was not possible to obtain the social insurance data for Iceland and Italy
All the data discussed so far is based on the situation in 1992. In some countries
there have been changes in social assistance arrangements since this date, quite
apart from any uprating of benefits. It is not possible at this point to estimate the
i mpact of any such changes on the relative value of benefits or benefit packages,
but it is worth noting the key changes which have taken place. Table 6.10
summarises recent and prospective changes, based on information provided by our
national informants.
Table 6.10: Changes in social assistance which might have affected the level of payments between 1992
and 1995
Country Changes
Australia Since July 1992 it has been compulsory for employers to make superannuation
contributions for virtually all their employees. From March 1993 a new
structure of increased rates and variable rent thresholds has tar geted rent
assistance to private renters with housing affordability problems.The family
payment system was rationalised and integrated in January 1993. Family
allowance became Basic Family Payment, while FAS and additional
pension/allowance/benefit became Additional Family Payment. All family
payments are now paid to the primary carer, usually the mother.
From March 1993 the jobs Education and Training (JET) scheme was
extended to widow pensioners and carer pensioners.
From September 1994 a Home Care Allowance of S60 per fortnight is paid
direct to full-time carers of children in the home.
From 1995 the income support test for couples will be partly individualised
and earnings disregards changed, plus a package of other work incentive
measures.
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Table 6.f{i: Changes in social assistance which might have affected the level of payments between 1992
and 1995 eontd)
Country Changes
Austria The Federal Nursing Benefits Act 1993 has raised insurance based benefits for
persons requiring nursing care thus easing the burden on social assistance paid
by the provinces_
In 1994 the limited powers of central government over social assistance were
removed and it became almost entirely a responsibility of the provinces.
Belgium 1992 Abolition of previous residence condition.
199.3 Abolition of the permanent residence condition affecting the homeless.
Canada The 1992 federal budget put a cap on the Canada Assistance Plan at 5t until
19945 and this will have put pressure on provinces to reduce expenditures.
Also many provinces have made their social assistance two tiered. Frozen
benefits and enforced more rigid job search activities by ` employables'.
From 1996197 the Canada Assistance Plan will he replaced by a broader
Canadian Health and Social Transfer_ under which provinces will have greater
authority on social assistance but have federal funding. Some hav=e already
reduced benefits.
Denmark Radical changes in payment structure from January° 1994. Benefits became
subject to tax and insurance contributions, but were substantially increased.
Benefit linked to unemployment benefit, extra housing and children's
allowance no longer payable, but assistance recipients have access to the
normal rent subsidies and child care subsidies. Simpler, but disadvantages
those with high housing costs.
Finland National scales of benefit have been phased in, and from 1994 all
municipalities are required to pay only the higher "gross norm" at
standardised national rates. From 1994 child allowance is treated as income
and will he deducted from social assistance. Child over 18 living with parents
granted a reduced allowance.
France No changes directly affectin g social assistance
Germany Process of unification still going on - increase in dependency of one parents in
the new Lander on social assistance.
Changes introduced at the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1994. Age for
older persons supplement raised from 60-64 ; increased powers to recover
benefit from liable relatives. Reductions in future levels of unemployment
benefit and assistance announced in Jan 1994. Asylum seekers excluded from
social assistance since November 1993: now only entitled to benefits in kind or
minimal cash payments. Long-term care insurance introduced in 1994.
Proposals to reform Susialhill'c in 1995.
Greece Benefit for the non-insured elderly has increased
Iceland Since 1993, income-testing introduced into the pension system and incomes
related supplements expanded. Separate general housing benefit introduced in
January 1995.
Ireland Back-to-work allowances introduced to increase work incentives
Italy In 1993 the means test for the supplementary pension was changed from an
individual to a couple basis.
The reform of the health system launched in 1993 requires increased charges
for drugs and treatment, with some increase in means testing as a result. The
policy. of the new Government on social assistance is not yet known, but
attempts to curb pension levels may lead to increases in assistance claims.
japan No specific changes affecting social assistance
Luxembourg In February 1993 Rb4G rates for single adults were increased by 3.8% and the
rate for the second adult in the household by S2:141. The level of maximum
housing allowance was increased_ Insertion contracts, changes in the
availability for work test of mothers with children and other adjustments to
the means-test were introduced.
Netherlands The Government stated that it expected purchasing power for people on the
social minimum to drop by three per cent during 1994.
In 1993 lone parents with no children under 6 years became obliged to be
available for work_ New revised assistance scheme, combining ASW and
RWW, introduced from January 1996. Includes reduction in rates for single
people and lone parents. and more discretion.
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Table 6.10: Changes in social assistance which might have affected the level of payments between 1992
and 1995 - (confer;
Country Changes
New Zealand Accommodation supplement introduced in 1994. replacing income related rents
in the public sector and the flat-rate accommodation benefit for people in the
private housing sector
Norway No spec changes affecting social assistance
Portugal Plans for reform but none implemented in period
Spain No changes reported in regional InSreao Minima. In 1994 condition of
entitlement to Unemployment Assistance restricted.
Sweden Since 1993, unemployment and sickness contribution have been payable
(previously paid for out of taxation). Thus social assistance recipients now not
covered.
Discussions continuing about national social assistance standard rates.
Switzerland None reported
Turkey None reported
United Kin gdom The Child Support Act began operating from April 1993 and is designed to
ensure that absent fathers contribute to the financial support of their children
--
contributions based on a strict formula with no disregard. so does not affect
the incomes of lone parents receiving Income Support.
in 1993 care clement of Income Support for people in residential ca"e
transferred to local authorities.
From October 1994 families claiming in-work benefits were able to benefit
from an offset of formal child-care charges of up to £40 per week.
Packa ge of work incentive schemes introduced commencin
g from 1995. From
1996 will include the 7obseeker`s Allowance, which replaces Unemployment
Benefit and Income Support for the unemployed.
USA Welfare is a high profile issue and the Administration and others have
proposals for reform mainly aimed at work incentives and reducing the welfare
rolls. No national changes implemented so far. but some states have begun to
reduce provision.
With the possible exception of Denmark, which has restructured its scales in 1994,
there do not appear to have been fundamental reforms that would. by 199.5. have
altered the general picture of the level of social assistance presented in this chapter.
although changes to the RMG equivalence scale in Luxembourg and the
introduction of new housing benefit schemes in New Zealand and Iceland may
have had some impact on housing costs. From 1996/97, however, a major
restructuring of social welfare in Canada will take place, which is likely to result in
substantially less federal support for provincial assistance schemes (see Volume
Two, Chapter Five). Already some provinces have reduced benefit levels.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to compare the level and structure of social assistance in
the OECD countries usin g techniques of policy simulation and model families.
These methods have their limitations and the conclusions have to he regarded with
some caution. Nevertheless. the analysis has shown that the income levels of
families dependent on social assistance in 1992 varied considerably between
countries. They also varied between and within countries, by family type and
according to whether the comparisons are made before or after housing costs.
However. the highest levels of benefit overall appeared to be awarded in
Switzerland (more specifically in Fribourg, since payments vary throughout the
country), Luxembourg, the Netherlands. the Nordic countries and Australia. As we
have seen in the previous chapters. among this group the Nordic countries and
Switzerland have common characteristics - they have relatively high levels of GDP.
traditionally low levels of unemployment, and social assistance schemes which are
residual and locally administered. They also all have strict means tests --- Swiss
assistance arrangements can be seen as basically a loan to the extended family --
while in the Nordic countries there are few capital or earnings disregards and an
emphasis on encouraging claimants to return to the labour market. These common
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features lead one to speculate that countries can have higher levels of social
assistance provision when they are of benefit to only a small number of claimants,
when they have a strict means test and the capacity to organise behavioural
interventions. However, this hypothesis does not explain the position of Australia
and the Netherlands in the leading group. The significance of the differences in
payment levels identified here is explored further in Chapter Eight.
Table A6.1: Gross average male earnings per month, May 1992
National currencies £ sterling, PPPs S US, PPPs
Australia 2,575 1.209 1.922
Austria 23,772 1.046 1.662
Belgium 73,845 1.203 1,912
Canada 2.892 1,446 2.299
Denmark 19.333 1.302 2.070
Finland 10.292 997 1,585
France 9,600 922 1.577
Germany 4,417 1,319 2.097
Greece 186,400 674 1.072
Ireland 1,219 1.184 1,882
Italy 2,583.000 1,091 1.734
Japan 369.290 1,223 1,944
Luxembourg 78.863 1,249 1;989
Netherlands 3,989 1.153 1,883
New Zealand 2,757 1,112 1.768
Norway 17,333 1.182 1.879
Portugal 81.700 438 696
Spain 177,092 952 1,513
Sweden 14,248 896 l ,425
Switzerland 4.643 1,323 2:103
United Kingdom 1,208 1.208 1,920
USA NY 2,245 1,412 2,245
Note: Earnin gs data were not available for bland.
Source: Authors' estimates, based on the 1989 Tax-Benefit Position of Production Workers (OECD.
1990). updated using index of hourly earnings of production workers (OECD. Main Economic
Indicators).
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Table A6.2: Purchasing power parities and exchange rates (UK - 1.00), May 1992
Purchasing power parity 1992 Exchange rates: average daily rate 1992
LA SS USS
Australia 2.13 1.34 2.39 1.36
Austria 22.73 14.30 19.28 10.98
Belgium 6137 38.60 56.40 32.14
Canada 2.00 I 26 2.12 1.20
Denmark 14.85 9.34 10.60 6.04
Finland 10.32 6.49 7.87 4.48
France 10.41 6.55 9.29 5.29
Germany 3.35 2.11 2.74 1.56
Greece 276.63 174.00 334.21 190.49
Iceland 136.25 85.70 101.09 57,62
Ireland 1.03 0.651 I.03 0.58
Italy 2.367. 2 5 1.489.00 2161.40 1.231.99
Japan 302.00 190.00 222.28 126.69
Luxembourg 63.12 39.70 56.40 32.34
Netherlands 3.46 2.18 3.08 1.75
New Zealand 2.48 1.56 3.26 1.85
Norway 14.66 9.22 10.90 6.21
Portugal 186.60 118.00 236.49 134.79
Spain 186.00 117.00 179.65 102.40
Sweden 15.90 10.00 10.22 5.82
Switzerland 3.51 2.21 2.47 1.40
Turkey 5,608,90 3.528.00 12,036.84 6.860.52
UK 1.00 0.629 1.00 0.57
USA 1.59 1.00 1.75 1.00
Source: OECD: Economic Outlook SU. December 1993, Table A33
Table A6.3: Social assistance (before housing costs) as percentage of average gr . ss earnings, 1992
Couple 68 Couple + two children (7, 14)
Australia 43 56
Austria 28 47
Belgium 34 46
Canada 55 47
Denmark 49 51
Finland 45 58
France 53 41
Germany 2 3 36
Greece 11 6
Ireland 34 41
Italy' 38 49
Japan 30 54
Luxembourg 44 61
Netherlands 44 52
New Zealand 44 45
Norway 45 71
Portugal 36 42
Spain 23 31
Sweden 47 83
Switzerland 61 81
United Kingdom 32 43
USA NY 36 45
USA Pen 34 29
USA Texas 33 25
USA Florida 33 32
Assistance data for non-pensioners in Italy needs to he treated with some caution.
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Chapter 7 Social Assistance, Work and
Incentives
7.1 Introduction
This chapter is concerned with the relationship between receipt of social assistance
and participation in the paid labour force. The analysis is primarily descriptive.
This is because information on the actual effects of benefit systems on labour force
behaviour varies greatly in availability and detail. with much more information
being available for a small range of countries, including the USA and the UK. This
chapter therefore seeks to provide an overview of arrangements in OECD countries
that may influence labour supply behaviour, including the extent to which social
assistance recipients may also receive income from earnings, as well as the extent to
which exit from or entry to the labour force is facilitated or impeded.
Before turning to a description of relevant aspects of social assistance
arrangements, it should be noted that the scope of this chapter has deliberately
been limited. Many aspects of benefit rules may potentially affect workforce
participation. For example. in all of the countries in this study the means test for
social assistance is based on joint family income, or may be wider and include all
sources of household income, or even potentially take account of the resources of
other relatives (in Germany. Italy, Japan and Switzerland for example). Under a
joint means test. the labour force behaviour of both partners may be affected by
the substitution effects of the benefit withdrawal rate -- the 'perverse additional
worker effect' (Scherer, 1978: Bradbury, 1993). In contrast. under a social
insurance system. incentive effects will be largely confined to the recipient. `' Thus,
the foreshadowed reforms to the Australian unemployment assistance scheme
include Iiberalisation of the family means test, in order to improve workforce
incentives for second earners in couples.
Moreover. in many social assistance schemes. including those of Denmark.
Finland. Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom, universal child benefits are
deducted from social assistance rates. In the United Kingdom. it has been argued
that this provides a financial incentive to increase income. and may therefore
encourage earlier return to the labour force. In addition, cohabitation rules may
not only affect choices about household formation, but also longer-term decisions
about work. The age at which children cease to qualify as dependent may have a
powerful impact on lone parents' incentives to enter the workforce. The way
benefits are administered and the ease by which claimants are transferred from out-
of-work benefits to in-work benefits may influence the willingness of recipients to
move into work.
Indeed. it could be argued that any measure that makes social assistance either
more restrictive or more widely available will have potential effects on labour force
participation. But it would clearly be impractical to attempt to draw out all of the
implications of the details of benefit administration for labour force participation,
and it would also replicate much of the information contained in other chapters.
Therefore, this chapter follows a number of themes in order to illuminate the
possible range of approaches to encouraging workforce participation.
We concentrate on people of workforce age, mainly the unemployed and lone
parents. After discussing some background data from a variety of OECD sources,
' Assuming that the income effect associated with the provision of' benefits lower than insured earnings
will encourage increased participation.
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we consider the duration conditions for social assistance, as well as the length of
time for which unemployment assistance is available. More limited information is
available on actual duration of receipt of social assistance. This is then followed by
a discussion of work tests and sanctions (sticks'), as well as information on active
` insertion' or 'integration` programmes for social assistance beneficiaries, and other
`carrots' to encourage active labour market involvement. It should be noted,
however, that we have not collected information on labour market programmes
more generally. so this description is limited. Finally, the chapter describes the
structure of the means tests applying in different OECD countries, and presents
calculations of benefit replacement rates and effective marginal tax rates.
7.2 Background data
In setting the context for the discussion that follows, Table 7.1 provides selected
details of labour force statistics for OECD countries in 1992. The unemployment
rate in these countries ranged between 1.5 per cent in Luxembourg (registered
unemployed) i ° and just over 18 per cent in Spain. with the OECD average being
7.4 per cent. It should he noted, however. that different countries were at different
stages in the economic cycle in 1992, so that unemployment has since fallen in the
United States, Canada. the United Kin gdom. Australia and New Zealand, but has
risen in many other countries. particularly Finland, Sweden and Spain, and to a
lesser but still significant extent in Belgium. France, Germany and the Netherlands.
The table also provides estimates of the extent of long-term unemployment, here
defined as 12 months or over. It is likely that the extent of long-term
unemployment is one important influence on claims for social assistance. although
eligibility for unemployment insurance extends past one year in many countries, It
should also be noted that the extent of long-term unemployment will tend to fall in
the early stages of recessions. as many new unemployed people enter the
unemployment stock. It could also be expected that the proportion who are long-
term unemployed will increase in the early stages of' economic recovery.
The table also shows estimates of the long-term unemployed as a percentage of the
total labour force. The proportion was very low .... under half of one per cent - in
Japan. Luxembourg and Sweden, and was under one per cent in Austria and the
United States. Long-term unemployment was between three and live per cent of
the labour force in Australia, Bel g ium. Denmark. France. the Netherlands. New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Long-term unemployment was very high in
Ireland and Spain. at around nine per cent. and also high in Italy, at around six
per cent.
However, participation rates vary substantially across countries, and it is possible
that in those countries with lower participation rates there are more discouraged
workers and more eligible for social assistance. Participation rates were lowest for
men in Belgium. France, Greece and Spain, and highest in Switzerland, Japan,
Denmark, Australia, the USA. the UK and Sweden. The extent of part-time
employment also varied substantiallyi with it tending to be high for men in those
countries with higher participation rates, although the Netherlands stands out with
the highest part-time rate for both men and women. Again, part-time employment
for women tends to be highest in those countries with the highest part-time
employment for men, with the exception of the United States.
Finally, labour force growth rates differ substantially across OECD countries, being
highest in the 1983-91 period in Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Australia - at
three or more times the OECD average. They have been very low in Finland,
Belgium, Ireland, Greece, and Sweden. 1992 was a year of low employment growth
for the OECD, with substantial falls in the Iabour force in Iceland, Finland and
Sweden. and more modest falls in Portugal, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
The bracketed figures are based on registrations, and the other figures are standardised and drawn
from labour force surveys. The OECD average refers to the standard figures only.
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Table 7.1: Selected labour force statistics for OECD countries. 1992
Unemploy- % over LTL as Participation Part-time Labour force growth
ment rate 12
months
% of
labour
rates (h) empt (/,' ) (/, pd).1983-41 1942
force f F V7 F
Australia 10.7 34.5 3.7 85.8 62.5 10.6 43.3 2.4 1.4
Austria (5.2) 17 0.9 80.7 58.0 1.6 20.5 1.1 2.0
Belgium 7.9 59 4.7 72.6 54.1 2.1 28.1 0.2 0.6
Canada 11.2 13.1 1.5 78.9 65.1 9.3 25.9 1.6 0.3
Denmark (11.3) 1 7 3.1 88.5 78.9 10.1 36.7 0.8 0.7
Finland 13.0 9.1 1.2 78.5 70 . 7 5.5 10.4 0.0 -1.3
France 10.4 36.1 3.8 74.7 58.7 3.6 24.5 0.7 0.4
Germany 4.6 33.5 1.5 78.9 58.6 2.2 30.7 0.9 0.9
Greece (4.7) 49.7 2.3 73.9 40.8 2.8 8.4 0.3 2.6
Iceland 1.7 5.1
Ireland I5.5 60.3 9.3 81.9 31.9 3.6 17.8 0.3 1.4
Italy 10.5 5<8.2 6.1 79.1 46.5 2.9 11.5 0.8 0.1
Japan 2.2 15.9 0.3 89.7 62.0 10.6 34.8 1.3 1 _ I
Luxembourg (1.5) 17.6 0.3 '77.7 44.8 1.3 16.5 3.0 2.5
Netherlands 6.7 44 2.9 80.8 55.5 13.4 62.9 2.6 1.7
New Zealand 10.3 31.9 3.3 82.2 63.2 10.3 35.9 0.6 0.5
Norway 5.9 23.6 1.4 82.6 70.9 9.8 47.1 0.7 0.2
Portugal 4.1 30.9 1.3 83.1 61.9 4.2 11.0 1.3 0.7
Spain 18.1 47.4 8.6 74.8 42.0 2.0 13.7 1.3 0.3
Sweden 4.8 8 0.4 83.2 79.1 8.4 41.3 0.4 -1.9
Switzerland (2.5) 93.7 58.5 - 1.1 -0.6
Turkey (4.0) 1.6 1.1
United Kingdom 10.0 35.4 3.5 84.5 64.8 6.3 45.0 0.8
-0.5
United States 7.3 11.2 0.8 84.8 68.9 10.8 2 5.4
y
1.4 1.3
OECD average 7.4 80.9 60.3 _ 0.7 0.1
Source: OECD. Employment Outlook ; July 1994, and Hain Economic Cnslicators, various years.
A major determinant of the extent of concern with work incentive issues will be the
number of people receiving social assistance, particularly the number of people of
work force age who could reasonably be expected to participate in the labour
market. or `emp.ioyables' in the Canadian parlance. Chapter Two provided
information on the overall extent of receipt of social assistance, plus some data on
the level of receipt among different categories of recipients.
In general. as we saw in Chapter Two, the proportion of the population in receipt
of income-related benefits in 1992 was highest in New Zealand and Australia,
where between one-fifth and one-quarter of the population received such
assistance. The next highest proportion in receipt of social assistance was in the
United Kingdom. where one person in six in the population was covered by
Income Support. For some of these people. Income Support is a supplement to
social insurance benefits. In the case of Canada, around ten per cent of the total
population were estimated to be receiving social assistance. The proportion of the
population in receipt of social assistance appeared to be relatively high in Finland,
Ireland and the United States, although it was also significant in Sweden and
Germany.
However, more important for the purposes of this chapter than the salience of
social assistance generally is its importance for those people who would normally
be expected to be active in the labour market, in particular those people of working
age. Unfortunately the data on this are not available for all countries. We have
already seen that the level of unemployment and long-term unemployment varies
considerably between countries. In addition to these factors there is certainly
variation in the coverage and level of social insurance benefits for the unemployed
which will have an impact on the proportion of unemployed people receiving social
assistance. Table 2.8 presented data for some countries on the proportion of the
total population who were lone parent or unemployed social assistance recipients.
From this it is possible to conclude that among the countries for which we have
data this varied from relatively few in Luxembourg and Portugal to about a third
in the UK. half in Canada and Ireland, two thirds in the Netherlands and nearly
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all in Sweden. It is also highly likely that the types of unemployed recipients of
social assistance varies in different countries. Thus for example about two-thirds of
social assistance recipients in the Nordic countries are young single persons who
have not established an entitlement to insurance benefits. By contrast, in the UK,
couples with children are the largest group of unemployed recipients of social
assistance.
7.3 Duration of assistance
Table 7.2 summarises the information collected on duration conditions for receipt
of unemployment insurance and for social assistance. Duration of unemployment
insurance varies widely, and it will also vary within countries depending on the age
of the individual and his or her employment history. It will be recalled from Table
7.1 that the extent of long-term unemployment was greatest in Ireland. Spain and
Italy, followed at some distance by Belgium, France, Australia, the United
Kingdom, New Zealand. Denmark and the Netherlands. Duration of
unemployment insurance appears to be longest in the Netherlands and Belgium,
assuming that individuals have had some recent employment. Duration in Spain is
quite extended. but less so in Ireland. and appears to be limited in Italy.
While Australia and New Zealand do not provide unemployment insurance, it
could be argued that in an informal sense - and until recently - they have provided
the most generous conditions of unemployment coverage, since benefits were
effectively available on an unlimited basis without contribution histories. The
system of Income Support in the UK. also provides similar unlimited benefits,
should an unemployed person move from Unemployment Benefit to Income
Support after 12 months.
In most of these countries_ the duration of social assistance is unlimited while
individuals continue to remain eligible. The exceptions relate to young people in
Portugal and New Zealand. More importantly, administrative discretion, plus the
assumption that social assistance is for limited periods. appear to apply in Austria,
Denmark, Italy, Spain (outside Madrid). Switzerland and Turkey. It can also be
noted that in the USA, AFDC is directed towards those with children, while the
more residual General Assistance varies across jurisdictions. It is also readily
apparent that the most complex set of programmes apply in France, where there is
a wide range of benefits for particular contingencies.
In summary. it is not possible with this data to relate systematically the duration
rules to long-term unemployment rates. Such a relationship has been found in
other studies (for example, OECD, 1994a). From observation. there does appear to
be some broad measure of correlation between countries with more relaxed
duration conditions and longer-term unemployment. However, those countries with
the longest duration of unemployment do not have the most generous duration
rules, suggesting that the general state of the labour market in these countries will
have an important impact.
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Table 7.2: Duration conditions in social it surance and social assistance schemes, 1994
Australia
Duration of unemployment insurance
eii
No insurance. All assistance is available for as long as the claimant qualifies, except
for Job Search Allowance and Sickness Allowance.
Duration of social assistance
People claiming JSA over the age of 18 are eligible for the first 12 months only,
thereafter they may claim the New Start Allowance.
Sickness Allowance for 12 months, renewable for further 12 months in special
circumstances, and in certain circumstances 24 months. This is reviewed every
13 weeks. Other benefits unlimited while eligible.
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Move to Unemployment Assistance after 5- 12 months
Unemployment Benefit for 18 months, up January 1994. Then 15
months, plus 3 months per year of employment. Unlimited for those
who worked 20 years or more, or one-third incapacitated. Others can be suspended if
unemployment more than twice regional average
for their type.
Maximum of 50 weeks. varying by preceding eligible employment and
local unemployment rate. Range changed from 46 .... 50 weeks to 35 .... 5© weeks in 1990.
There is no fixed time limit on claiming. At the discretion of provincial
authorities it earn he given for a limited or unlimited time. It can be unlimited for
older people, those with disabilities, or young children. Permanent recipients
receive higher 7ea;efii lone mothers among them. Other recipients may also
receive higher benefits if there is greater need, its their circumstances may
suggest.
All minimum benefits are unlimited while eligible as long as all the conditions
are met and resources are still low. C'ockx (1992) found a high turnover: 93% of
males and of women sign off of-tea three years. Many who cone off the
Minimex remain in lower-income bands.
There is no limit, provided that each household still satisfies the conditions.
Some provinces require monthly re-applications, such as unemployed adults
who have to reapply every month. This is used as a monitoring system and also
an encouragement to reintegrate into the labour :market.
Denmark Up to 2.5 years
Finland 2 years. Indefinite flat-rate benefit thereafter. but lower than
social assistance.
France Maximum of 60 months
nee. eon_
Germany .lrbeitslosengeld for between 17 and 52 weeks'. up to 104 weeks
for older work.ers. Arlbeitslosenhilje unlimited in principle.
The duration of unemployment insurance varies according to the period of previous
paid employment. Maximum duration of benefits is 12 months for 250 days of previous
employment.
All members of a trade union and all self-employed people (since 1993) are entitled to
180 days during a 12 month period. Entitlement is based on having worked 425 hours
in the previous 12 months. The rate varies according to the number of hours.
Maximum of 15 months claimin g , and the claimant must have paid contributions for
over 39 weeks in the tax year
Essentially social assistance is only short term. Local municipalities reconsider
cases at 3 month intervals to see if other forms of assistance might be more
appropriate. There is an expectation of short term duration.
There are no limits as long as the conditions remain met
AA.II for 5 years renewable. API for 12 month: or once younge s t ..hild r,:rns 3.
Ml unlimited. AV for 3 years. or 5 if over 50 at partner's death. ASS renewable
every 6 months. but unlimited in principc. Al up to 12 months. RMVII `or 3
months, then 3 .. f2 months following insertion contract.
As long as the condi!ii ' ns are met there is no tutu
Unlimited, except First-time Jobseekers
Allow; ,, which lasts only a maximum of five months
There are no limits to the duration of entitlement to linaaacaa] assistance
Assistance available indefinitely as long as all conditions are still met
Greece
Iceland
reland
Table 7.2: Duration conditions social insurance and social assistance schemes. 1994 r corrtd.
Duration of social assistance
a	_a
Duration is unlimited in cases of nationals. but limited with the possibility of
renewal in local cases. M.inimo Vitale can be paid without limits for pensioners
and those with disabiliti.:>, it is always temporary (3 months) for others.
Japan Basic allowance of 60-80% of the previous wage for 90--300 days As long as conditib is are -.till met it is unlimited while eligible
Luxembourg 365 clays in a 24 month period. Further 6 12 months for those aged over 50. As long as conditions are still met it is unlimited while eligible
Duration of unemployment insurance
Italy f redundant, up to 270 days. Other unemployed up to 6 months.
Netherlands 26 weeks if covered for 26 out of previous 52 weeks.
Then up to 4.5 years if employed for 3 out of 5 previous years.
Then 1 extra year or 3.5 years if aged 57.5 years or over.
As long as conditions are still met it is unlimited while eligible
New Zealand Not applicable There arc no time limits on claiming, with one exception. The JSA for 16 , 17
year olds is Limited to 3 months, after which it is expected that claimants will
complete a training scheme or some education.
_ass
Available without limit, as lon g as conditions are met and need continues
The duration of entitlement varies by benefit as follows:
For Young People's integration Benefit the duration is 15 months.
Orphan's Pension- up to the age of 18.
Family Allowance- for children up to the age of 25 if in education.
Supplementary Allowance for handicapped and young people, up to 18.
Duration varies between 6 and 12 months, though it can he longer in certain
circumstances. It varies by region:
6 months- Valencia, Andalucia, Madrid.
12 months- Aragon. Basque, Cantillia, Catolonia, Galicia, Murcia and Navarra.
It is always available as long as the conditions are met
There are no set limits, but the normal expectation is that it is temporary, except
for older people and those with disability .
_sass	
OAA benefits are lifelong, or iii the case of a disability as long as siu;r~ne is
unable to work. Duration of SA benefits is dependent on the fuund .ions that
administer it.
As long as the conditions are still met there is no limit
_tat	
No limits for SSI, AFDC or FS. As regards GA in New York, benefits are
available indefinitely as long as conditions are met.. The same is true in Harris
County. Texas. In Pennsylvania benefits for the needy are available indefinitely,
but for the `"transitionally needy" they are restricted for 3 months in every 12. All
GA benefits in Dade County, Florida last for six months.
ast
Norway Unemployment Benefit is available dependent on wages
Portugal Contributory unemployment benefit is payable for between ten and 30 months,
depending on age
Spain Maximum of 24 months
Sweden 300 days maximum, and tap to 450 days for those 55--65 years
Switzerland Maximum of 250 days if contribution paid for at least 18 months
Turkey There is a 'term a.tion benefit' available for a short time on redundancy
United Kingdom UB is currently payable for 12 months. After this it is possible to requalify
if working for 13 weeks in following 6 months. JSA for 6 months from 1996.
sat_
United States Up to 26 weeks, extended in some states, and depending on unemployment rate. to up
to 1 year. 1992 average of 16 weeks.
Table 7.3 presents a range of information on the duration of receipt of social
assistance benefits which was provided by the national informants for this study.
Particular care should be taken with these comparisons, as it is highly likely that
duration has been measured in different ways in different studies, some being
average current duration of receipt. some covering average completed duration,
and with information coming variously from cross-section and from panel data. In
some cases, the information is based on spells of benefit receipt, while in others it
only applies to particular parts of the country.
it should also be remembered that recipients of social assistance will only be a sub-
set of the long-term unemployed, and that many recipients will actually be outside
the labour market. Nevertheless, with the exception of Finland and Sweden, it
appears that receipt of social assistance appears to be a long-term state for at least
a significant minority of recipients. It should also be noted that many of these
results refer to lone parents, and research tends to su ggest that the main reason for
lone parents ceasing to receive benefits is either the formation of a new relationship
or the ending of responsibility for a dependent child, rather than (re)entry to the
labour force.
Bearing in mind the problems of comparability, it still appears that the proportion
of lone parents receiving benefits for a year or more is rather similar in Australia
and the UK, while the average current duration of receipt by lone parents is similar
in Australia and in Canada. Average receipt of Domestic Purposes Benefit in New
Zealand is less than three years, although it should be remembered that current
duration will be shorter when the number of new recipients is growing rapidly.
However, it is particularly notable that receipt of AFDC by single mothers in the
USA appears to be very long. with 70 per cent of recipients being on benefits for
two or more years. tl
Receipt of benefits by single. unmarried mothers is longer than by separated mothers in the UK and
Australia, and it is not clear from the source whether the US study by Ellwood covered only unmarried
mothers.. or included other lone mothers.
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Table 7.3: Measured duration of receipt of social assistance benefits for selected count r ies
Duration Source
Australia .I SA and NSA: Mean = 66 weeks, Median = 35 Australian DSS
weeks. 70% of sole parent pensioners receive statistics,
pension for 12 months or more. Average current May 1993
duration for female SPPs of 3.4 years.
Austria 60% = 'lon g -term recipients' Steiner, 1994
Belgium Minunex: around I year (men); IS months (women) Cocks. 1992
Canada 50 of recipients in Nova Scotia and Quebec on See Evans, 1994
assistance in each of
3
years (1982--86); average
duration for BC lone mothers of 11 months
(fi rst spell), with 57% returning within 2 years.
Average current duration for single mothers of 3
years and 9 months for unemployed (Ontario).
Finland = 3 months - 4-6 months - 20% Volume 2, p. 238
7--9 months - I1"> 10 months - I I%
Germany Median duratio: of receipt = 23 months (out of 72). 'loges and Robwer,
Median duration of episodes - 12-18 months. 1992. p. I84-185
Netherlands 38'3 of ABW and 29ta: of RWW recipients claiming Volume 2, p. 500
for 5 or more years
New Zealand Average duration of DPB = 2 years, S months. Stephens, 1994.
1988 -- 2 2 % of unemployed for more than 27 weeks. 'NZ Department of
1992 -- 44,r=, Social Welfare
1993 .. 807;
Swede in 1993. 29% of households received benefit for less than I Sociaalstyrelsen,
month. 28 % for 2-3 months. 6 37 for whole of year. 1994
Average duration in 1994 was 5 mouths.
Switzerland Avera g e duration = 1.9 years for divorced and Guillaume- 1994
separated; 1.3 years for unemployed (Tessin]
United Kingdom 6573 claiming for at least I year, and 44% for 2 DSS statistics, 1993
or more years. Just over half of long term aged
over €0. 70% of lone parents on benefit for
over 1 year.
t sited States Mid-1980s: 30°%. of single mothers on AFDC for Ellwood, 1988
under 2 years- 40`1 for 3-7 years, 30% for S or
more years
7.4 Job search requirements
Table 7.4 provides an overall summary of the job search requirements for the main
assistance benefits in the countries in our study. In the great majority of countries,
there is a work test in operation which usually requires that recipients register as
unemployed and establish that they are actively looking for work. The exceptions
to this include Greece, where the only general payments are made on a one-off
basis, and a work test for recurrent eligibility is not relevant. In addition, in Japan,
outside Reykjavik in Iceland, and in Switzerland it appears that the requirement to
seek work is not a formal rule. but that there are very strong expectations that
individuals will make full use of their capacities. Work tests can also be applied
informally through the basic conditions of eligibility. For example, the discourse on
social assistance in Canada appears to make a strong distinction between the
`employable' and the `unemployable', while in several of the United States. General
Assistance is simply not available to able-bodied single people or couples without
children - surely the strongest possible expression of the requirement to be actively
seeking work. At the other extreme, under ten per cent of the already small number
of social assistance recipients of Luxembourg are affected by the work test.
In virtually all countries, work tests are not applied. or are more relaxed. for
people who are ill or experience disabilities. or who are over or approaching
retirement age. The major variations relate to lone parents, in particular to the age
of children who exempt lone parents from the requirement to actively seek work.
The most liberal provisions apply in Ireland. the United Kingdom, Australia and
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New Zealand. where lone parents are not required to seek work until their
youngest child is 16 years (or older). Requirements vary across provinces of
Canada, from the most restrictive (six months) to the more generous (12 years).
Germany is also relatively liberal in this respect, as lone parents must normally
seek part-time work when their youngest child is at school. and full-time work
when the child is 14 or over. In Norway, lone parents receiving the Transitional
Allowance are not required to seek work until the youngest child turns ten years of
age. In Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the qualifying ages are six years and five
years respectively. In Austria and Finland, the qualifying age is three years. while
in Sweden the age is being liberalised from about 1.5 months to three years. In both
Sweden and Denmark, however - the two countries with the strongest expectation
of work or work-seeking ---- municipalities are required to provide child care for lone
parents looking for work. In France, the extent to which lone parents receiving the
RM1 would be expected to engage in ` insertion' activities varies both by
dcpertements and according to individual circumstances. Those with children under
three receiving the Allocation de Parent Isole are not required to seek work.
Table 7.4: ;lob search requirements in social assistance schemes, OECD count s. 1994
Australia
Austria
Work test
Unemployed people must demonstrate that
they have sought work in the last two
weeks, (the "actively seeking work test")
The requirements differ by category of
people. namely oleic) people. lone parents,
short or long-term unemployed people
The activity test is not applicable to those
aged 60 and pension age Those near
retirement age do not have to look for work.
fo qualify for fortnightly payments people
must advise the Commonwealth
Employment Service of their efforts to find
work.
Yes, but not applicable to lone parents,
with child =3; disabled; 60 years and over.
Others register with Labour Markel
Administration,
Sanctions/I ncentirea
The lcr.ment of income support
is linked to satisfying the work
test. Failure to do so may mean
loss of benefit.
Partial or full loss of benefit
Job offers/training schemes
Refusing a a job h offer or trainin
scheme may he seen as failing
the qualification test
Not compulsory. No specific
insertion or integration
agreements.
Hours rules
Unemployed people can do up
to 20 hours voluntary work a
week but there are limits, so tlatit
they spend some of their time
looking for paid work. This
varies by client. For example.
those under 18 can do up to 30
days a year. but those aged 18-
49 can only do this much if
unemployed for more than 6
months.
No limit, but laconic test
implies part-time work
Belgium
Cinada
Finland
Denmark
Yes, not ill and lone parents (discretion)
Distinction between employable and
unemployable across provinces For
employables, must be involuntary and
taking active steps. Tone parents may be
exempted. but age of child for exemption
varies from 6 months to 12 years. More
relaxed with older workers.
Yes eonfirmation friant employment
service that seeking job. If ill, they may be
exempt. With child, exempt if municipality
unable to provide sufficient child care.
Able-bodied must register as job seekers.
Varies across municipalities.
No work test for lone parents with
child'-3 years.
For 25 partial or total
suspension for 1 month for
noncompliance with 'integration
contract'. Up to 3 months for
repeated non-compliance.
Suspension, reduction or
termination, varying across
provinces. Quebec most
systematic in sanctions.
Assistance for travel and care
costs in enhancement
programmes.
Loss of benefit possible
... ......
Not clear.
Help available with child care
costs.
'Programme for More
Solidaristic Society' compulsory
for <25. 'Social employment' by
municipalities
ismployxhility enhancement
measures not compulsory.
"Four-cornered agreements°
f'cac' increased participation by
claimants. General programmes
may have designated places for
recipients.
Yowl' Allowance for 18 24s.
Compul.or_y to undertake
training or other approved
scheme. MonieipitI Activation
Act for people up to 66
Claimants may lose benefits, but
optional for municipalities
No workfare schemes.
Optional schemes, including for
early school leavers.
No liniit, so long as available
for fall-time work
No hours limit, but
earnings reduce benefits
No limit, so limp as not in
full-tine job
No limit, but Cara zings reduce
benefits
Iahle 7.4: Job search requirements in social assistance schemes, OECD cot ies, 1994 (coethf )
Yes, but 91% effectively exempt, due
to age, child<fi years, own invalidity,
caring for sick child or i.ll adult
Work test
France AI and ASS must register for work. Not
others. API available for 12 months, or
until youngest child turns 3.
_ .
Since most people who claim assistance
need the benefits to supplement their
income, people call work any hours, but
earnings are taken into account. In
Reykjavik they must provide proof that they
are actively seeking work.
Compulsory for Unemployment Assistance.
Those claiming Supplementary Welfare
Allowance may be required to seek work if
waiting for decision on claim for fJA_
Must register with training and employment
authority (FAS). All other exempt
Partially disabled must attend employment
agency and accept suitable job. MV for
able-bodied requires job acceptance or
work. on public projects.
Recipients must make full use of
personal capacities. Judgements
discretionary by local authorities.
Benefit can be withdrawn for
tip to 12 months for 3 temporary ,
suspensions due to non-
compliance. Benefit can be
withheld for voluntary job
leavers. Additional payments
over RMG on social
employment.
Job offers/training schemes
Inser tion contracts for RMI. Not stated
30% in employment or training,
Some others involve non-labour
market activities.
Highly developed general
training. Obligations on
municipalities to offer regular
jobs, or special less regulated
schemes. Compulsory to accept
offers on special employment
schemes but limited spaces.
First time job-seekers must accept work
offered by local or central government
agencies or follow vocational training
provided by OAEI)
Refusal to accept a job would
lead to the withdrawal of
benefit
Apart from compulsory FAS
courses, also voluntary partial
job incentive schemes etc to
provide "second chance"
education and training
Public insertion projects,
but very small coverage
Insertion agreements for RMU. No limit
Participation in training low,
but community service options
popular.
Germany Yes, but not physically or mentally
incapable, if affects children, or hinder
return to previous principal activity.
Older unemployed usually exempt. For lone
parents, normally must seek part-time work
when youngest at school, and full-time at 14.
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Sanctions/Incentives
Not stated.
Subsidies for employers, inc.
exemption from social security
contributions.
Not stated.
Small benefit supplements.
First time job seekers must register in special Not stated
lists for young unemployed
Benefit payments rusty be
reduced if' claimants do not
satisfy the work test
Failure to attend training course
can lead to loss of entitlement
for up to 9 weeks.
Back to work allowance gives
partial benefits while working.
Hours rules
No limits
Not stated
Unemployed people can now
enter voluntary work and not
lose benefit
CIA allows up to 3 days work,
but retire rakes Ineligible.
Pre-retirees have earnings limit.
Carers cannot be in full-time
work. SWA not working more
than 30 hours per week_
Not stated
Not stated No limitNot compulsory
Not stated
Table 7.4: Job search requirements in social assistance schemes, OECD countries. 1994 (cont d.)
Work test Sanetionsllncentives Job offers/training schentes Moors rules
RV V required to sign on.
ABW exempt, but from 1994. lone parents
required to seek work if no child under 5.
Netherlands Many potential sanctions under
RWW, from benefit reduction to
suspension.
Small supplements for those
taking up jobs from local
councils,
Municipalities required to create
job pools'. Youth job
Guarantee Scheme pays
minimum wage after 6 . 12
months unemployment.
No unit
New Zealand
Norway
Compulsory for unemployment benefit
and Independent Youth Benefit.
Relaxed for those 55+. Not applicable
to lone parents.
SEA claimants must he available for
work, and accept offers.
Lone parents with child under 10
eligible for Transitional Allowance without
work test. Those aged over 67 and all
disabled exempt.
Sanctions possible, but not
specified
`Benefits may he reduced to
absolute minimum' if
work refused.
Rehabilitation allowances
for those with
.
permanently ,
reduced capacity to work.
Pilot programmes for lone
parents. Training beneficiaries
must attend training. Small-
scale optional special work
schemes. Contracts being
considered.
'Voluntary' agreements between
young people and municipalities
to take on special work. Work
and training schemes available
with pay.
Unemployment beneficiaries
mast be available for full-time
work. Working sickness
beneficiaries unlikely to he
medically qualified. No limits
otherwise, but must satisfy
income test.
No hours limits. so long as
available for full-time work
Portugal Not statedOnly for claimants of Young Persons
Integration Benefit. Must register at
employment centre.
Young people r'u'I undertake Not stated
vocational training or basic
education before registration
at employment centre
Spain
Turkey
Sweden
Switterla rid
Must be. registered at National Institute of
Employment
Strict requirements, except for those 65
years and over, and those with documented
i mpediments to work. Lone parents must
have child care, but obligatory for
municipality to provide for children 18
months and over. Parents allowance for
year after- birth (plus 90 days), and not
required to seek work, home care
allowance from July 1994 with no work
requirement for those with children up to 3
years.
_tee
Apparently not compulsory. Benefits
depend on assessed need.
ei.seu
Expected to seek work Disabled apply
to specialist agencies.
Proposals for those refusing lob
offers to be struck off register
Supreme Administrative Court
ruling that benefits cannot he
denied if work refused.
Small extra assistance for those
in voluntary community service.
Regional `social contracts`, but
details limited
ea_
Municipalities may offer public
relief work and organise
training. New unit in National
Board of Social Welfare.
Successful active labour market
programmes.
Social reinte gr ation and
client rehabilitation are explicit
objectives. Beneficiary status
expected to he temporary.
Provision of equipment for
productive activity possible
No limit, but income dedaacted
No limit. hull-tithe work likely.
to disqualify through income.
Not stated
Not stated
Not stated
No limit if resources
inadequate
Table 7.4: Job search requirements in social assistance schemes, OECD countries, 1994 (ratiti1 )
Work test
es, except lone parents witht child under
16. or 19 and in full-time education; ill and
disabled: 91) years and over maternity
confinements; certain carers. Others must
sign on, but not partners of claimants.
United Sta-.es There Is a work test to all programmes
except S51. AFDC must register foe the
JUBs programme. For FS people must
satisfy the work conditions. For (,OA, people
must satisfy conditions.
SanetionslIncenlites
Failure to seek work can lead to
ineligibility for benefit. but
hardship payment s availtible.
Rcduetion made in case of
voluntary unemployment.
Loss of benefit
Job otters/training schemes
Wide range of trrtining schemes.
not fo rmally compulsory
Refusal to cooperate may affect
pitymettl
I lours rules
24 hours per week up to 1992.
Since then, 16 hours per week
for claimants. but 24 hours per
week for partners of
unemployed, from October
1994.
Not stated
United Kingdom
Most social assistance schemes employ sanctions against those who fail the work
tests. As shown in Table 7.4. these range from full loss of benefits either through
ineligibility or suspension. or loss of part of benefits for defined periods. There is
no indication from the material supplied to us how often these sanctions are
applied, or how effective they are judged to be. There are also schemes offering
incentives to return to work. or to set up as self-employed. Specific incentives were
identified in Australia (from March 1995). Ireland, Luxembourg. the Netherlands.
Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom. and the United States. In most cases. these
appear to be small extra supplements, or lump-sum grants, although a number of
countries also made available loans and grants under their various special
assistance arrangements for people wanting to start up in self-employment. In the
United Kingdom a package of work measures was announced in the 1994 Budget.
These measures are designed to improve the take-home pay of people working full-
time on modest incomes. and to provide incentives for those seeking work, as well
as to boost jobs by reducing costs to employers.
Incentives may also be provided through training and education programmes,
although because of the focus of this research we did not collect information on
general training programmes in OECD countries. In the majority of countries, it
appears that acceptance of job or training offers is compulsory. at least for young
people (for example, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal).
or optional in the case of Finland. Municipalities have obligations to offer
employment schemes in Belgium. Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway,
Spain and Sweden. Such schemes appear to be most limited in countries with more
restrictive assistance arrangements, such as Austria and Italy.
Finally. Table 7.4 provides details of the operation of 'hours rules' in social
assistance schemes. Here it appears that only Ireland and the United Kingdom
have rules formally excluding from benefits those working more than a specified
number of hours per week. Both countries also. however. have separate in-work
benefits which provide help for those working for more hours than the social
assistance limits. In all other cases, there are no formal rules. although the
operation of the income test generally implies that recipients could only be working
part-time. or else recipients are required to be available to take full-time work, if
offered. In Australia, there are a range of limits on hours worked by carers, the
short-term sick and those with disabilities. but these are designed as tests of
primary eligibility.
7.5 Income tests and related arrangements
Table 7.5 summarises key features of the income tests operating in social assistance
schemes. Most countries appear to provide 'free areas' under which benefits are not
reduced, or provide equivalent disregards of income or earnings. The situation is
not entirely clear in the case of Iceland, Italy, Japan, Spain, Sweden. Switzerland
and Turkey. The rules in Denmark and Finland also appear to allow for some
discretion in the provision of disregards, although they are apparently not often
applied. Where levels are stated clearly. disregards appear to be lowest in the
United States (apart from for Food Stamps), followed by Belgium and the United
Kingdom. The disregards seem to be most generous in Ireland. Australia and New
Zealand. as well as in Luxembourg. The disregards are set as percentages of
earnings in Canada, France and the Netherlands. and as a percentage of the
minimum wage in Portugal.
In the majority of countries, social assistance is reduced in relation to net income,
although in Australia. Denmark (from 1994). Luxembourg, New Zealand. Portugal
and the United States (apart from Food Stamps) it is gross income that is taken
into account. Virtually all social assistance schemes operate an income test with a
withdrawal rate of 100 per cent. The exceptions are Australia. New Zealand. and
Ireland for lone parents since July 1994. Portugal for social pensioners. and the
United States, where lower withdrawal rates operate on earnings for SSI and
AFDC, and Food Stamps are reduced by only 30 per cent of net income. Clearly.
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arrangements in Australia and New Zealand are the most liberal, although this
reflects the absence of social insurance benefits. It should also be noted that in
these countries the income taken into account is gross and not net of tax. so that
the effective withdrawal rate will be increased over income ranges where income is
also subject to tax. The income test - or rather the tax surcharge - - is most relaxed
in the ease of recipients of superannuation in New Zealand. It can also be noted
that the change to unemployment assistance arrangements in Australia from 1995
will dramatically reduce the withdrawal rate at higher levels of earnings. although
the disregards will be reduced at the same time.
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Table 7.5: Disregards and income tests itr social assistance schemes, 1994
Australia
Austria
Belgium
('anada
Denmark
Finland
France
(iertna€ny
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
l.uxembourg
Netherlands
Disregards
'Free areas' for pensioners of A$44pax for singles. A$76pw for
couples, plus ASI2pw for each child. Earnings `credit' of
A.$1000 (singles) and A$2000 (couples). For unemployment
payments, basic free area of A$30pw , plus earnings disregard
of A$30pw for singles and A$25pw for each of couples.
Earnings credit of A$500 l'rona 1995, free area. to be reduced
to A$30 .... but see changes to withdrawal rate. Also partial
individualisation of structure.
Income taken into account Withdrawal rate
Gross 50% for older people. those with disabilities, carers, sole
parents. For unemployed, SOY for first $40 per week, and then
100%. From 1995. 50`%, between $30 and $70 per week. and
then 30%.
Net 100`%
Not clear 00%
Not clear 100%
Gross from 1994 1O(]
Net
Not clear 100%
Net 100%
Net One off payments (100`4,)
Gross 100`%f
_tat
Net for VA. Before ta.x and
after social security otherwise.
100.c generally. All UA lost if fourth day worked
parents from July 1994.
St1. for lone
Taxable 100%
Net of tax and social security 1110"/
Gross I1)0%
Net 1007t
Work expenses tnay be deducted
Minimex: general disregard of £:17pm (US$27) for families with
children, £8 (812) for couples without children, £l4pm ($22)
for singles.
Additional earnings disregard of £1O6pm ($168) for first year of
claiming, reducing over time.
Partial exemption of earned income
Not legally defined. Some of up to £136 (5216) per month.
Local and infrequently applied directives .... i:3€) £50 per month
($47 $79)
.R.MI: Earnings disregard of 50% of wage
30 to 50° of household head rate-i:45--75 per month
(871- .... 5119)
Certain types of expense are disregarded when claiming for the
family allowance. These include rent, housing loans and
alimony. The rules are imprecise. Different limits are applied to
the circumstances of different families.
Municipalities have discretion to disregard some types of
income such as the income of a child and training allowances
Daily rate of Unemploymen6 Assistance, plus :t:.15 per day
worked (£UKI5.45, $23.04). £30 per week for lone parents
(£30.90, $46.08).
Not clear
Part of earnings
Up to 20% of household benefit rate £88 per month
for single person (SI39.90)
25% of net earnings up to 15`1 ,1, of benefit rate for Al). Extra
15% for lone parents.
Table 7.5: Disregards and income tests in social assistance schemes, 1994 (contd.
Disregards Income taken into account Withdrawal rate
_
New Zealand Income-tested benefits: 550pw or $6€Ipw with children. Gross Income-tested benefits: 30%0 between disregard and S80pw.
Extra $2Opw for lone parents with childcare costs. then 70°a Superanniutants: 25'4 above $80pw (single) and
$20pw fix earnings for Invalids Benefit. S6Opw for each of couple,
Norway Earnings disregard on Transitional Allowance Net of tax and social 100'6
insurance
Port ugal For an individual the monthly income of the individual must not Gross Ill0'', but 30% for single social pension and 50% for social
exceed 40% of the national minimum wage and the average pension couple
income of a family must not exceed 80ii. For the integration
benefit it must not exceed 60%
Spain Training allowances and one-off payments from chanties arc Net 100%
disregarded
Sweden No earnings disregards Net of tax 100%
Switzerland No formal earnings disregards (though local rules may apply) Assessment of needs l(?tl`;
taaa.
Turkey No earnings disregards Net income l 00`./i
at,ai
United .Kingdom £5pw for singles and each of couple; .f 15pw for lone parents, Net of tax and NI and 1110`;4,
couples under 60 on iS for two or mote years, carers. disability half of pension
premium. Special rules for childminders, and income from contributions
subtenants and lodgers,
United States 5Si: $20pm. $(i5pm of gross earnings, El l U, and other Generally gross. Net SSE: 1 ariiinu , , other 100°/,.
payments. AFDC: $30p n, EPIC, other. FS: $127pm, 20% of for 1-S. AFDC Earn,;; other 1110'/ -
household earnings, E.ITC. FS: 30%x.
7.6 Benefit replacement rates
So far. this chapter has described the rules of social assistance programmes in
different countries. The impact of these rules and their implications for behaviour
can to some extent be given a quantitative value through the calculation of
replacement rates and effective marginal tax rates.
Economic theory distinguishes between two factors that may be relevant to
individual decisions to participate in the labour market the income effect and the
substitution effect. The provision of social assistance will mean that a given level of
income can be maintained without participation in the labour market (the income
effect), while the withdrawal of benefits operates as a tax on earnings and reduces
the cost of not earning (the substitution effect). However, if the level of social
assistance is below the target level of income for an individual, the withdrawal rate
may actually encourage further labour market effort, since the individual will have
to work more hours to reach their income target (the income effect of the
withdrawal rate).
Benefit replacement rates are usually calculated by comparing the levels of
statutory entitlements to some measure of income in work (Balderson and
Mabbett. 1991: Palme. 1990; Esping-Andersen, 1990), thus showing what
percentage of earnings is 'replaced' by benefits. That is:
Replacement rate = Income when receiving benefits x 100iiiiii
Income when employed
Replacement rates can be altered either by changes in the level of benefits or by
changes to the level of disposable income in work. In a number of countries. there
are important schemes to provide in-work benefits, with examples including Family
Credit in the United Kingdom, Additional Family Payment in Australia, Family
Income Supplement in Ireland, the Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States,
Family Support and the Guaranteed Minimum Family Income in New Zealand
and a variety of Federal and provincial supplements in Canada. It is notable that
these in-work benefits are most common in the English-speaking countriesi and are
mainly directed to families with children, although the United Kingdom has
announced the piloting of income-supplementation for persons without children.
However, some other countries tend to provide extensive systems of income-related
housing assistance and more substantial assistance with child-care costs, the effects
of which may be broadly similar.
Such in-work benefits are an important component of the armoury of potential
programmes to encourage workforce participation. However. it has not been
possible to take account of these benefits in the calculation of the replacement rates
that follow. since we were restricted to comparing those on social assistance with
those on average earnings, and these programmes generally do not operate at that
high an income level. For those interested in this issue, relevant figures were
collected as part of the earlier study of support for families with children
(Bradshaw et at.I99;a; Bradshaw, 1995), and these in-work benefits for lone
parents are also described in Whiteford and Bradshaw (1994).
It is also important to note that there are some difficulties involved in comparing
benefit replacement rates across countries. There appear to be grounds to argue
that neither gross nor disposable income are independent of the processes of
redistribution in different countries. This argument is developed in detail in
Whiteford (1995), but in summary there are significant differences in the level of
manufacturing wages in countries with virtually identical levels of real GDP per
head - for example, average wages in France are just under 70 per cent of average
wages in Denmark, even though the levels of national income are about the same.
This appears to be a consequence of differences in the tax structure. with employer
social security contributions being shifted on to wages in France, but being
virtually non-existent in Denmark. This effect is further complicated because
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disposable income actually means different things in different countries. For
example. except for the very poor, health care costs must be paid for out of income
after the deduction of taxes in the United States. but in most other countries in our
study health insurance is provided by the state and paid for out of taxes and/or
social security contributions. Similarly, in the United Kingdom employee
contributions to occupational pensions exceed statutory national insurance
contributions, but are not usually taken into account in calculating disposable
income in replacement rate calculations. In other countries contributions to
earnings-related state pension schemes are analogous to occupational or private
pension contributions, and these employee social security contributions are netted
out of disposable income. In other countries. however. employer social security or
occupational pension contributions are important, but ignored in calculation of
disposable income. These issues are particularly important when using replacement
rates as measures of benefit adequacy. but they may also affect assessments of
potential disincentive effects, as discussed below.
This analysis uses the data from the matrix tables. The methods used to derive
these data have already been described at the start of Chapter Six. Table 7.6a
shows estimates of replacement rates of social assistance (before housing costs) for
a range of family types. These replacement rates are calculated by comparing the
level of disposable income of persons receiving social assistance with the disposable
incomes of the same household type where the head is earning average male
earnings. Thus. they will probably understate the real replacement rates of
individuals in each country who are actually receiving social assistance. since it
could be expected that such individuals would be earning less - perhaps
substantially less -- than average male earnin gs if they gained a job. This would be
even more likely in the case of female lone parents. This abstraction is unavoidable
since it was only possible to collect earnings data for cases at the one income level.
In any case, the dispersion of earnings varies across countries. Bearing these factors
in mind, the results that follow should be considered as a simple measure of
replacement rates that may be useful as an indicator of the scope of differences
between countries. It needs to be emphasised again, however, that in countries with
widely varying local assistance rates. the figures apply only in the specified
location.
For single people and couples (aged 35 years). replacement rates are very low in
Greece and in Texas and Florida in the USA. They are also quite low in
Pennsylvania. Germany. Canada (for single people). and the United Kingdom.
Replacement rates are highest in Switzerland. Sweden. the Netherlands, Norway
and Denmark. They also appear high in Italy, but, as stated in the previous
chapter, these figures have to be regarded with particular caution. For couples with
children the highest replacement rates are in the same countries (followed by
Australia). For other countries - with the exception of Greece - the presence of
children brings quite a large jump in the replacement rate, particularly in Texas
and Florida. In general, replacement rates in the UK are around two-thirds of the
way down the overall `league table'. before taking housing costs into account.
Replacement rates for lone parents are generally lower than for couples with
children if the lone parent does not have to pay for child care when working. The
exceptions are Belgium. Portugal and Switzerland. However. if the working lone
parent has to pay for child-care because of the presence of a child under the age of
three their replacement rates increase compared with a one-earner couple not
requiring child care.
Table 7.6h shows replacement rates after housing costs have been deducted from
benefits and net wages. In general. replacement rates will rise where there is
additional assistance for housing costs for families on social assistance. In the case
of Austria (Salzberg) and Finland this jump in replacement rates is quite
substantial. In other cases, notably New York, Greece and Canada (for single
people), replacement rates plummet. reflecting high housing costs in relation to the
level of social assistance. It is also apparent that replacement rates exceed 100 per
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cent for couples with two children in Austria, Sweden and Switzerland, and for
lone parents with a young child in Finland. while they approach 100 per cent for a
number of other family types in these countries. In the UK. replacement rates rise
somewhat, but its overall position in the ranking does not change much.
The finding that replacement rates calculated after housing costs for some
categories of social assistance recipients are over 100 per cent implies that
beneficiaries are actually better-off than average full-time workers. However, there
is a sense in which these figures may not accurately characterise the relative
advantage of employment compared to benefit receipt. First. as emphasised in the
previous chapter. housing cost calculations are based on a number of assumptions
which may not always emulate the real world. Secondly, as noted above, it appears
that in some countries employer social security contributions may be incident upon
wages, so that gross and net earnings are systematically lower in countries with
high levels of employer social security taxes than in countries with low or no
employer social security contributions. It could be argued that employer
contributions (including compulsory employer contributions to occupational or
private pension schemes) are analogous to employment fringe benefits. That is, an
individual in work is accruing entitlements to more generous pensions in
retirement. while a recipient of social assistance is receiving no such future benefit.
While it is difficult to put a value on such future benefits (Stahlberg, 1986), they
imply that effective replacement rates are lower than those shown in this table. But
it should be remembered that replacement rates are already lower in some
countries which also have high levels of employer social security contributions,
such as Italy.
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Table 7.6a: Replacement ratios: social assistance as percentage of net disposable income at average
earnings, OECD countries 1992 (before housing costs)
Single
(35)
Couple
(35)
Couple
(35) +
Couple (35)
+
Lone
parent (35)
Lone
parent (35)
1 child
(7)
2 children
(7 , 14 )
+
.1 child
{3)
+ I child
(7)
Australia 31 54 60 67 43 44
Austria 26 35 46 58 34 34
Belgium 39 47 52 53 56 57
Canada 19 40 47 53 45 42
Denmark 54 71 73 78 67 61
Finland 23 40 51 65 67 39
France 26 34 41 47 36 34
Germany 17 28 36 44 33 30
Greece 5 5 5 8 7 7
Iceland Ma n/a na n ~a tt/a n`a
Ireland 2 9 41 47 55 44 36
Italy 42 56 65 64 56 53
Japan 2 5 36 46 58 44 42
Luxembourg 43 52 58 62 46 46
Netherlands 58 77 78 81 69 69
New Zealand 27 46 58 63 49 49
Norway 54 72 64 84 58 54
Portugal 44 43 45 =15 68 68
Spain 26 28 32 36 35 29
Sweden 58 88 86 102 60 58
Switzerland 62 89 91 102 77 91
Turkey ma ma Ma Ma Ma
United Kin gdom 21 31 42 51 38 32
USA NY 27 39 52 62 48 42
USA Pen 15 25 40 44 20 29
USA Texas 6 12 23 43 28 26
USA Florida 7 14 48 68 45 36
Table 7.6b: Replacement ratios: social assistance as percentage of net disposable income at average
earnings, OECD countries 1992 (after housing costs)
Single
(35)
Couple
(35)
Couple
{35) +
Couple (35)
+
Lone
parent (35)
Lone
parent (35)
1 child
( 7 )
2 children
( 7, 14 )
+ 1 child
(3)
+ 1 child
(7)
Australia 34 57 64 72 47 47
Austria 40 68 84 125 61 61
Be lgium 28 35 42 44 46 47
Canada 5 35 44 52 40 36
Denmark 41 64 77 80 72 63
Finland 42 81 84 96 107 60
France 30 40 49 56 41 41
Germany 23 39 49 63 46 41
Greece 7 -15 -14 -.31 -16 15
Iceland Ma ni a n/a Ma n!a n.- c
Ireland 28 46 55 68 54 41
Italy 43 58 71 72 60 57
Japan 24 37 51 63 49 47
Luxembourg 36 44 51 55 37 37
Netherlands 53 81 83 86 68 68
New Ze,Lland 18 39 54 61 43 42
_si =L1y 34 54 65 82 57 51
Portugal 28 10 4 9 30 30
Spain 19 22 27 31 29 24
Sweden 45 89 96 118 59 56
Switzerland 51 91 94 113 71 97
Turkey n'a Ilia n . a Ma nie nia
UK 23 37 49 60 45 37
USA NY 8 30 41 12 13
USA Pen 15 25 40 44 20 29
USA Texas 10 19 43 30 22 40
USA Florida -23 -20 23 34 9 10
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Before leaving the subject of replacement rates it is worth discussing the
relationship between the level of insurance benefits paid to unemployed people
compared with the benefits that are available from social assistance. The
relationship between the net disposable resources of unemployed families receiving
social assistance and social insurance has already been shown in Tables 6.6a and
6.6b.
The ratios give us an indication of the consequences for replacement rates of losing
entitlement to social insurance benefits and moving on to social assistance. In those
countries with high ratios, the replacement rates will not change very much.
Indeed, those countries with ratios in excess of 100 per cent after housing costs will
have larger replacement rates when the unemployed person is on social assistance
than when they were receiving social insurance. However. in most countries, the
level of income is substantially higher on social insurance benefits than social
assistance benefits and the replacement rates fall. Thus the rewards of working
increase when families move to social assistance benefits. This is one of the reasons
why. in considering incentive structures in the benefit system, it is important to
cover duration of entitlement as well as the level of benefits.
7.7 Average effective tax rates and the poverty trap
As discussed earlier, the other component of an analysis of work incentives is the
substitution effect associated with the withdrawal of benefits. These are usually
analysed through consideration of `effective marginal tax rates' (EMTRs) applying
to recipients, which are estimated as the sum of the withdrawal rate on benefits
and its interactions with any other form of benefit withdrawal, including tax and
social insurance contributions. These EMTRs are usually estimated for a small
change in labour supply at the margin, looking for example. at what happens if
incomes increase by £1 per week.
I.n this study, we consider average effective tax rates (.AEMTRs), which are
estimated over a wider range of income - the difference between zero earnings and
average male earnings - as this is likely to be a more realistic illustration of the
choices available to individuals, who generally cannot vary their work effort by £1
increments. Averaging the marginal tax rates in this way tends to disguise narrow
income ranges, where marginal tax rates may be particularly high. but where these
ranges are narrow the number of people directly affected by them is likely to be
small. In contrast, our measure provides an indication of the disincentive effects of
moving from not being in paid work to a situation of full-time paid work. That is,
they show the effective tax rate applying to a person who moves from a situation
of complete `dependence" on social assistance to a full-time job at average earnings.
The calculation takes account of all relevant cash benefits available, plus changes
in housing and health costs_ as well as child care costs. where relevant.
An average effective tax rate (AETR) can be defined as follows:
AETR = DI x 100
E
where DI is the change in disposable income and E is the change in earnings.
Table 7.7a shows the average effective tax rates before housing costs and Table
7.7b shows estimates after housing costs. Effective tax rates are lowest where
benefit levels are lowest, since there is less assistance to be withdrawn.
Correspondingly, effective tax rates are highest where benefits are relatively high,
and exceed 100 per cent in those countries where replacement rates also exceeded
100 per cent. Effective tax rates are higher for those without children than for
those with children, although in many cases they are lower for lone parents than
for unemployed couples with children. In a number of countries, child care costs
add to effective tax rates. Housing costs also increase effective tax rates in all
countries apart from Portugal. Spain. and the USA. Again, it should be noted that
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in countries with local assistance schemes the AETRs apply in these areas and not
necessarily nationally.
AETRs are different from replacement ratios, but comparison of Tables 7.6 and
7.7 shows that the relationship between the two is fairly constant, both between
countries and across family types. The tables show that many of the schemes
involve effective marginal tax rates at a level which could act as a disincentive to
return to work. The UK, in this respect. performs relatively well. with marginal tax
rates below the average for most family types.
Table 7_7a: average effective tax rates for assistance recipients movin g into work on average earn g s.
OECD countries 1992 (before housin g costs)
Single Couple Couple Couple (35) Lone Lone
(35) (35) (35) + + parent (35) parent (35)
1 child 2 children + 1 child + I child
(7) (7.14) (3) (7)
Australia 48 63 68 73 54 54
Austria 50 55 60 65 50 50
Belgium 61 62 63 60 70 70
Canada 40 53 56 59 57 52
Denmark 76 82 83 85 81 76
Finland 38 52 58 69 71 43
France 47 50 53 54 35 45
Germany 49 51 54 58 57 52
Greece 21 13 13 25 25 21
Iceland a n'a n?a n/a nra ma
Ireland 54 57 61 67 66 5 2
Italy 69 68 74 73 69 66
Japan 36 41 51 61 55 50
Luxembourg 58 60 63 62 52 52
Netherlands 78 8 7 87 88 81 81
New Zealand 46 61 70 74 63 63
Norway 68 79 72 87 64 59
Portugal 54 53 52 50 72 72
Spain 40 39 42 45 54 40
Sweden 69 91 89 102 69 63
Switzerland 74 92 94 102 83 94
Turkey n:a n:a n a Ma Ma aria
UK 41 47 54 60 57 44
USA NY 44 55 65 72 69 58
USA Pen 38 48 60 63 25 50
USA Texas 28 38 53 66 59 49
USA Florida 34 46 72 85 76 59
Note: These AETRs are calculated over the ran ge of income between zero earnings and average male
earnings.
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Table 7.2b: Average effective tax rates for social assistance recipients Loving into work on avera ge
earnings. OECD countries 1992 (after housing costs)
Single
(35)
Couple
(35)
Couple
(35) +
Couple (35)
+
Lone
parent (35)
Lone
parent (35)
1 child
(7}
2 children
(7.14)
+ 1 child
(3)
+ 1 child
(7)
Australia 63 75 78 82 68 68
Austria 74 89 94 1 1 1 84 84
Belgium 63 63 64 61 7t 72
Canada 49 62 68 73 69 64
Denmark 78 85 90 91 89 84
Finland 74 93 92 97 104 76
France 55 61 65 66 45 57
Germany 64 69 73 82 78 67
Greece 28 23 23 36 35 30
Iceland t -a n/a nia nia n/at n: at
Ireland 63 70 74 83 80 67
Italy 74 ' 82 82 77 72
Japan 51 58 67 78 72 67
Luxembourg 58 60 63 62 52 52
Netherlands 79 91 91 93 84 84
New Zealand 55 70 77 82 71 7t
Norway 66 77 80 90 72 67
Portu gal 5-', 53 52 50 72 72
Spain 40 39 42 45 54 40
Sweden 73 95 98 110 77 72
Switzerland 81 97 98 105 88 99
Turkey n-a€ n. a n/a riia nut t'a
UK 51 60 66 72 68 55
USA NY 52 60 69 77 75 63
USA Pen 38 48 60 63 25 50
USA Texas 48 59 80 40 44 74
USA Florida 34 46 72 85 76 59
Note: These AETRs are calculated over the range of income between zero earnings and average male
earnings,
7.8 Conclusion
This study was not designed to explain differences in the impact of social assistance
schemes on the labour force behaviour of participants. As a result. the chapter has
been primarily descriptive, and has presented some evidence which has a bearing
on the possible impact of benefits on labour force participation. It is readily
apparent from this discussion that social assistance schemes commonly impose a
range of work-seeking requirements on recipients and many offer incentives to
return to work or set up as self employed. Nevertheless. many of the schemes
involve quite high effective marginal tax rates, which may act as a disincentive to
labour force participation. Such potential problems are inherent in any system of
income support. although economic considerations are not the only factors
involved in claimants' labour market decisions.
It is difficult to discern clear evidence of an association between the level of
replacement rates or the stringency of work tests and the level of unemployment. If
anything there is a tendency for the countries paying higher social assistance
benefits to have tougher work tests and lower levels of unemployment. Thus the
Nordic countries tend to have relatively high levels of social assistance, high
replacement rates but quite a severe means test with little or no disregards and
strong arrangements to encourage labour participation - even by lone parents. It is
perhaps also significant that these countries have relatively small-scale and locally-
administered social assistance schemes. It may be difficult to combine strong
labour participation policies when social assistance benefits are relatively low and
also represent substantial elements of the benefit system for the unemployed.
Alternatively. benefits can be perhaps relatively high only when they are not an
important component of the benefit system for the unemployed, and when there
are active insertion policies.
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In order to investigate these issues further. it would be desirable to have more
detailed data on flows on to and off such benefits, but such information is
available in respect of only a limited number of these countries. Further
exploration of different approaches to encouraging labour force participation
requires access to more detailed studies of the range of labour market and training
programmes available in OECD countries.
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Chapter 8 Diverse Systems, Common
Destination?
8.1 Introduction
This concluding chapter attempts to do four things. First, it brings together the key
features of national social assistance systems described in this report in order to
identify certain 'social assistance regimes' with common attributes. It is argued that
the considerable variety found suggests at least seven different patterns. Secondly.
the chapter briefly summarises the evidence from Volume Two about debates and
policy issues salient in the different countries. These. it is argued. tend to differ
according to the social assistance regime in each country. Thirdly, we attempt an
explanation of these findings. in the light of the broad consensus that welfare
systems in modern countries all now face common pressures and constraints. We
try to show how these common pressures can be reconciled with the national
variations which the report has charted. Fourthly. the chapter outlines a
framework for the evaluation of these different national systems. We go no further
at this stage than to discuss the criteria which might be relevant, with some brief
pointers to factors which would need to be taken into account in different
countries. Detailed evaluation of assistance systems in the 24 countries would
require substantial further work.
8.2 Patterns of social assistance
Table 8.1 draws together some of the key features of social assistance arrangements
identified in the previous chapters. The indicators selected are not comprehensive,
but they provide a summary picture of schemes sufficient to allow us to begin to
categorise the countries.
The indicators selected are the following:
• total extent. cost and coverage of social assistance
• the relative level of benefits provided
• the centrallocal dimension in re gulation and administration
• the operation of the means test, in particular:
whether the resource unit extends beyond the nuclear family
the tightness of the assets test
the extent to which earnings are disregarded in calculating entitlement
to benefit
• the degree of officials' discretion in determining awards.
Another important feature. not recalled in this table. is the extent to which the
dominant schemes are general or categorical. Also, as Chapter Seven showed.
systems vary in the extent to which they encourage or enforce job-seeking activity
-- a dimension which is discussed later in this chapter.
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Table 8.1: Selected features of social assistance systems
5
Resource unit
Hat_	
Federal Fit nily
Local Household
Natllocal Includes defined relatives 4 (time li mited)
aia at
xa
5
119
35
3
Composite benefit
levels: N from the
mean (after
housing costs)
90 18 28
5 I 2
50
2
Country 2
Expenditure Beneficiaries as
as St of social % of total
security (1992) population (1992)
Australia
Austria
Belgium 3 4
Canada 14 10
Denmark 8
Finland
ariaF rance 6 9
Germany 12 8
Greece 0.9 1.3
Iceland 1 21
Ireland 41 12
1._isealrNat Family.
National Family 1 4 (pl'cgraanane e...eiations)
9
Italy
Japan
C) 5
Luxembourg
'Netherlands 1 I
4
Administrative
and regulatory
framework
6
l'reutment of income
4 ( with taper)
7
Treatment
of assets
8
Rights
discretion
2 3
Fcdistate i arnaly' 3 (regional variations)
Nat/local I amily 4 (discretionary) 2 2
at_ -Nafilo-.: a) Family 3 (discretionary) I 3
Nat/ la: Family 3 2 2
1 . d/ Includes defined relatives 3 4 (re auaaal variations) I 2.5
Naatllo ai Household for lump-
sum assistance
1 n/a
3
28 I., ocal/Nat Family
4 1 $ Nat/local Household, includes not clear
defined relatives
Nat/local 11oilseho.ld 2 2 1
.
5
Nat/local 1 ranily 2 2 2
.
5
New Zealand 100 18 National la,naily 3 (with taper) 2 3
Norway 5 4 25 Local/Nat Family I 1
Portugal 4 2
-90 National F'arnily I I 1.5
Spain 8 1 41 Local!Nat Family I 1
Sweden 7 7 24 Local/Nat Family 1 f 2.5
Switzerland 5 2 41 Local Household, including 1 (discretionary) 1
other relatives
Turkey nia nla n/a Local/Nat Household 1 I l
UK 33 16 11 Nat Family 2 (but taper with Family Credit)
_
USA 40 11 44 Fed/state Household (for Food Stamps) 3 4 (varies by programme) 1 2 vatrie 2 .... 3
Notes and Sources
Columns:
I
see Table 2.5. Countries marked with an asterisk would record higher spending if income related pension supplements were included. Note also that estimates of social assistance expenditure as a proportion
of social security spending (based on OIICD figures) vary in some cases from those produced by national governments. Japan is a particular example. According to their estimates of overall social security
spending, 9.5% went on social assistance.
Table 2.6
Table 6.7b (USA figure: average of the four states). Note that for countries with local variations in benefit levels, these apply to specific locations.
4 Chapter 4
Table 3.2
Table 3.2
Table 3.2
Chapter 4. I = full discretion exercised by officials; 3 = virtually no discretion and effective appeals. 2 between these two.
Looking first at the extent and the generosity of social assistance schemes.
summarised in columns 1-3, we can see that these two dimensions are not
correlated across OECD countries (see Figure 8.1). The extensive social assistance
programmes in the English-speaking countries deliver generous benefits in
Australia and very low benefits in the USA' , . There are similar variations in those
countries with low or modest reliance on social assistance. Switzerland, for
example. which relies mainly on insurance-based schemes for social protection and
thus has one of the least extensive social assistance programmes in the OECD area.
records the highest level of benefits (at least in the Canton of Fribourg). The
Scandinavian countries also all provide relatively generous benefits, vet southern
European countries with similarly minimal reliance on assistance deliver very low
benefits. The remaining EU member states deliver roughly average benefit levels.
apart from Luxembourg and the Netherlands, which fall into the more generous
group. As emphasised in Chapter Six, the data on benefit levels for local assistance
in Italy are somewhat uncertain. at least for non-pensioner households.
Ingore S.I: A typology - extent and generosity of social assistance
Extent of social assistance- 0
Extensive Minor-modest
> I70':% Australia Iceland, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Level of 100-120X" UK, Ireland,
Finland.. Denmark.. Norway, Sweden. (Italy)
Japan. France
benef its' =? Canada
75-10(1'4; New Zealand Austria, Belgium. Germany
<80e. USA Spain. Portugal. Greece. Turkey
Notes:
Extensive = >30'!-ii social security expenditure, and/or > 1D` :> population.
Average net disposable incomes on social assistance (after housing costs) for ail family= types (except
single person aged 17) as proportion of mean for all countries.
These differences also correlate with the national differences in the reliance on
general or categorical schemes. summarised earlier in Tables 2.1 and 3.1. Among
the English-speaking countries, Britain relies chiefly on a single giant programme
and Canada has one overarching structure through the Canada Assistance Plan.
though with substantial provincial variation (which is set to increase under the new
Canada Health and Social Transfer funding arrangements). Australia. New
Zealand, Ireland and the USA. on the other hand, feature several group-specific
programmes. In the rest of the OECD. the Scandinavian countries. Netherlands.
Austria. Germany and Japan also rely primarily on general assistance programmes.
while all the remaining countries of Europe, plus Turkey, have some or many
different categorical programmes. Each of the two patterns can be found with
more or less generous provision.
There is another contrast between schemes which are nationally uniform and those
which show regional or local variations. To begin with, it helps to demarcate
federal states, where regional or provincial governments have a constitutional role.
from unitary states. In the USA and Canada. there is considerable inter-state
variation in benefits and eligibility. and in the Swiss confederation responsibility is
located at the Cantonal and communal level. Spain too. while not constitutionally
a federal state, allows its regions considerable autonomy. which includes the
provision of minimum income protection. However, in the two remainin g federal
states - Australia and Germany ---- there is little or no variation. Otherwise, there
is a general contrast between the liberal, English-speaking countries and the rest.
All of the former have national or national-state legal and administrative
frameworks. At the other extreme. in south-western Europe (excluding Greece).
Sweden, Norway, Iceland, and Austria (and notably in Switzerland. mentioned
above) local governments have considerable power in provision of assistance. In
'` We should note, though.. that benefits in New York state are above average and tli:,-.e in
Pennsylvania are below-average but not in the lowest category, indicating the very wide spread o
benefits in the USA. One might say that the South, Middle and West of the USA are uniquely low in
the level of benefits in the English-speaking countries_
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Finland. Denmark. Netherlands. Germany, France, Belgium and Japan. the central
government provides a national framework of regulation within which local
administrations operate.
The next level of variation is whether the resource unit extends beyond the nuclear
family to embrace other household members or wider kin networks. With a few
exceptions, modern systems of social assistance have retreated from the `household
means test' and kin liability. The exceptions are the German-speaking countries
( Germany. Austria and Switzerland), Belgium, Luxembourg, Japan and Turkey, all
of which either include other household members in the calculation of needs and
resources (as does the Food Stamp programme in the USA). or, at least in theory,
hold certain categories of other relatives liable for payment, or both.
The extent to which earnings are disregarded in the means-tests is another critical
measure. Table 8.1 distinguishes three categories. First are those countries with
relatively high earnings disregards - Australia, New Zealand, most programmes in
the USA, together with Belgium and Germany. Denmark could perhaps be
included here. though its relatively high guideline disregards appear rarely to be
applied. At the other extreme are those countries with no earnings disregards at all
Southern Europe and Turkey. Austria and Switzerland. In between are countries
like the UK, with low basic disregards, but the taper introduced by Family Credit,
and the majority of assistance schemes in Ireland. It is not clear where Japan fits
into this pattern, as the level of their disregards is not known.
Another important facet of the means test is the treatment of assets. Table 8.1
reproduces the results of findings from Chapter Three, to make a rough divide
between those nations where most assets are counted and those where there are
relatively high disregards on assets, in particular dwellings. Here the patterns are
surprising. A less strict pattern of treatment is found in the extensive social
assistance regimes of the. English-speaking world, with the exception of US
programmes - particularly AFDC. Greater leeway on savin gs and owner-occupied
homes is also common in many countries of the EU. though less so in the limited
assistance regimes of the Mediterranean world. It appears to be in Scandinavia
(except perhaps Denmark), Austria and Switzerland that the toughest tests are
found.
Lastly. there are two partly related features - the degree of discretion in the award
of benefits and the extent to which there are effective rights of appeal. At one end
of the continuum are the English-speaking countries with established appeals
mechanisms. where the discretion of officials tends also to be minimised. In
Finland, Sweden. Luxembourg. the Netherlands and Germany applicants enjoy a
similar degree of codified rights. At the other end are countries where individual
officials and/or local municipalities enjoy considerable discretion in the award of
benefits. These include most of the Mediterranean countries, Austria, Switzerland
and Norway. Japan appears to be somewhere in the middle, with national
regulations and appeal rights, but retaining a degree of officer discretion in the
assessment of entitlements.
Can any pattern be identified in this welter of difference? To a certain extent it can,
but it is not a simple pattern. This section concludes by grouping like countries
together.
I. Selective we// are systems: Australia and New Zealand.
These countries are unique in that all benefits are means-tested. There are several
categorical programmes. nationally organised, inclusive and rights-based. The
means-testing is carefully constructed and monitored and is implemented in a
consistent way. Assets and earnings disregards are relatively generous. However,
there is a significant gap in the value of benefits between Australia (relatively
generous) and New Zealand (below average since 1991).
1613
2. The public assistance state: USA.
The USA exhibits an extensive set of means-tested benefits, arranged in hierarchy
of acceptability and stigma. Assets tests are generally tough, but there are in-built
earnings disregards and work incentives in every scheme. Benefits are variable but
tend to be low both in comparison with other countries and in relation to domestic
poverty lines. Procedural rights. on the other hand, are well entrenched. This
picture must be qualified in certain states, including New York and most of New
England. Minnesota and Wisconsin. California. Washington. Hawaii and Alaska.
Here benefit levels are around the OECD average, though other features of US
assistance remain the same.
3. l welfare states with integrated safety . nets: Britain. Canada. Ireland and
Germany.
This is a varied group of countries. but one with sufficient common factors to place
them together. Income Support in the UK. is a large, national. general programme
providing an extensive safety net at or below social insurance levels. When Housing
Benefit is included. levels of payment are above the OECD average. Rights to
benefit are relatively well entrenched and the means test contains important
disregards, with some work incentives for people with children through Family
Credit. Ireland is at first sight a mix between this and the antipodean pattern.
There are numerous categorical assistance schemes covering a high proportion of
the population with means tests and entitlements on a par with those in Britain.
However, it is moving towards a more integrated system.
Both Canada and Germany are federal states and thus exhibit regional variations.
These are considerable in Canada. but in other respects the Canadian Assistance
Plan has had much in common with social assistance in Britain. Under the new
funding arrangements coming into effect from 1996 onwards, however, the picture
is likely to change. Germany has also developed in a similar way. thou gh from
different historical antecedents: Soiatlailfi' isi despite its federal-Land structure,
geographically equitable. codified, rights-based. extensive and of average
generosity 1i'.
4. Dual social assistance: France and the Benelux countries.
These countries provide categorical assistance schemes for specific groups, but have
supplemented these with newer programmes providing a general basic safety net.
Local discretion remains, but is now firmly placed within a national regulatory
framework. Assets tests are moderately flexible. as are earnings disregards. But
benefit levels vary considerably between generous Netherlands and Luxembourg.
and below-average Belgium.
5. Rudimentary assistance: Southern Europe and Turkey.
National categorical assistance schemes cover certain specific groups. mainly
elderly and disabled people. Otherwise there is Iocal, discretionary relief provided
by municipalities or religious charitable bodies (nationally regulated in Greece and
Turkey). Means testing is not especially stringent and, apart from in Turkey,
obligations do not extend beyond the nuclear family. Money assistance tends to be
integrated with social work and other services. Benefits are very low or. for some
groups and geographical areas. non-existent.
6. Residual social assistance: the Nordic countries.
A tradition of full employment and universal welfare provision has relegated social
assistance to the margins of social programmes in these countries - or rather, it did
'' The argument of Lodemel and Schulte (1992) for putting Germany in a separate category turns on
the existence of a separate programme for the unemployed, which is in practice a peculiar hybrid of
social insurance and assistance, and the existence of wider family obligations. This last is a
distinguishing feature of the German-speaking countries in Europe, but appears to be of limited
significance. Yet in other respects Germany can also be viewed as a bridge to the fourth group of
countries below.
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so until sharp rises in unemployment hit Denmark in the late 1980s. . and Finland.
Iceland and Sweden in the 1990s. Each country has a single general scheme with
relatively high benefit levels. Though there are national regulatory frameworks (to
varying degrees), the role of local authorities is substantial and Iinks with social
work and social care persist. Strict means-tests combine with a view of family
financial responsibilities which place more emphasis than in most countries on the
individual, particularly in relation to cohabitation. General citizenship-based
appeal systems modify the discretionary aspects of assistance in all countries except
N orwav.
7. Highly decentralised assistance with ieee1 discretion. Austria and Switzerland
These countries contain elements of both the Nordic and Southern European
models. I.n the Alpine countries, assistance consists of localised, discretionary relief,
linked to social work and with wider kin obligations. However, benefit levels are
above average in Switzerland the most generous in the OECD, on the basis of
the particular local authority and canton studied. Yet relatively small numbers of
people claim social assistance. This is partly because of a record, at least until
recently, of full male employment. However, take-up also appears to be low, which
is attributed to stigma and the substantial powers of intervention accorded to local
social welfare workers.
Japan is difficult to place in this typology. In certain respects it resembles category
3, the states with integrated safety nets, in that it has a long-standing, nationally-
regulated system, with above average benefits and only moderate local variation.
Expenditure is on a smaller scale than in these countries, however, but larger than
in Austria and Switzerland, with whom it shares the wider concept of family
obligation and the more comprehensive household means test. There are
arguments, therefore, for placing it in a category of its own.
It is evident that the social assistance regimes tentatively outlined here bear only a
distant resemblance to Esping-Andersen's typology of welfare regimes, in particular
to his measures of welfare state stratification (1990. Chapter Three). His first,
liberal' group of countries comprises the English-speaking countries, plus Japan
and Switzerland. This cannot provide a framework for understanding social
assistance programmes for the following reasons. First, the role of assistance is
qualitatively different in Switzerland in particular, so much so it cannot be grouped
with the English-speaking countries in any taxonomy of social assistance regimes.
Secondly. as Castles and Mitchell (1993) point out, his treatment of Australia and
New Zealand overlooks the very different principles of selectivity which they
embody, and the higher level of benefit equality which they generate. Selectivity in
Australasia is sui geneuis. Thirdly. the security, level and uniformity of the safety
net is considerably weaker in most states of the USA than in Britain. Canada and
Ireland. Though all countries in the English-speaking world exhibit extensive
assistance regimes, they differ substantially in other respects.
Esping-Andersen's `social democratic' world of welfare capitalism comprises
countries with universal benefits and substantial redistribution: the Nordic
countries plus the Netherlands. Apart from the Netherlands, these exhibit similar
patterns of social assistance --- or at least did so until the recent rapid growth in
unemployment in all of them except Norway. This, together with some similarities
between this group and the other economies with relatively full employment in
group seven above, suggest that employment regime may be as important as
welfare regime in explaining their common features.
His third world of `corporatist' welfare rests on occupational, contributory
insurance schemes which reproduce stratified and differentiated benefit levels. The
archetypical countries are Germany, Austria, Belgium. France and Italy. Here too,
there cannot be found a single mode of assistance provision. Germany, we argue, is
the only continental European country which has made the transition to a
comprehensive. unified and rather extensive assistance safety net. Of the rest. we
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distinguish three groups, comprising north-western Europe, Mediterranean Europe
and Austria. Other factors would appear to mediate the links between E.sping-
Andersen's principles of welfare state stratification and the social assistance
regimes we have identified.
The careful study of means-tested benefits therefore muddies. but ultimately
enriches, prior comparative models of welfare systems (cf. Gough. 1994).
8.3 Debates and policy initiatives
Using the record of current national debates and policy initiatives presented in
Volume Two. it is possible to consider whether these are similar across countries,
or whether they reflect the different regimes of social assistance noted above.
The English-speaking countries with extensive social assistance do report a range of
issues in common. These include the cost of assistance, work disincentives. fraud
and the issue of targeting. A variety of policy initiatives have been developed to
tackle each of these, some of which are discussed below. In addition, however, a
concern with the extent of poverty continues to feature in political debate in a way
that is unusual in most other countries. In all countries, except the USA, the high
level of unemployment is also a cause for concern.
These patterns are to be expected given the high cost of programmes and the large
welfare clienteles in this group of countries. However_ the question of behavioural
incentives in welfare -- to discourage marriage or remarriage and to encourage
teenage pregnancy and welfare dependency more generally - appears to be a
defining feature mainly of the stigmatising and divided public assistance system of
the USA. The concept of assistance as creating a new 'underclass' is relatively
absent in Australia and New Zealand, and while present in debates in Britain and
Canada it has not achieved ideolo g ical dominance.
The issues of programme costs, fraud and incentives do figure in some other
countries, notably those with relatively high spending levels and numbers of
recipients -- Germany and the Netherlands .......or where recent unemployment is
forcing more people on to assistance rolls as in Sweden and Finland today. In
France and Belgium, where unemployment is higher and benefits are lower. there is
also an ongoing debate about poverty and the role of targeted benefits plus work
programmes in alleviating it. There is thus some overlap with the agenda of the
English-speaking world.
A variety of other concerns feature in contemporary debates over social assistance.
In the Northern European countries, outside Scandinavia. these include the rights
of immigrants and asylum seekers to social assistance benefits. In Germany and
Austria, the transfer of the costs of institutional and domiciliary care for the frail
elderly from social assistance to social insurance is a live issue. In all the
Scandinavian countries, a major issue of debate concerns the future role of social
workers in the assessment and delivery of cash benefits: growing caseloads have
posed strains on social workers and initiated a debate reminiscent of that in Britain
fifty years ago. There is also a growing consensus in all these countries except
Norway that more national regulation and uniformity should override traditional
local autonomy in social assistance. The same is true. to some extent, in
Switzerland, though there are no immediate indications that policy will move in
this direction. Lastly. in some of the southern European countries there is still
another agenda, which concerns the practicalities of introducing a national safety
net for the first time in part a response to the European Commission's Draft
Recommendation (Commission of the European Communities, 1991). .However_
there is little immediate prospect of development on this question in any of the
countries.
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Overall. therefore, it is possible to see some relationship between contemporary
debates and policy initiatives and the types of social assistance regime identified
above.
8.4 Common pressures and national responses
Though there are disagreements, students of the welfare state agree on certain
economic changes affecting the environment of modern welfare states (see for
example, Pfaller et rrl.. 1991; Pierson. 1991; Taylor-Goohy, 1991_ Esping-Andersen,
1994: OECD. 1988. 1994a). One of these sets of factors concerns changes in the
economic environment, includin g the glohalisation of production, the rise of the
emerging economies of East Asia. de-industrialisation. the exposure of
governments to global financial markets and (for some) the end of the capacity of
states to design their own political economic regime. One commonly perceived
casualty of these shifts is full employment in its traditional sense and the emergence
of atypical work. Moreover, pressures mount to cut labour costs, both direct and
indirect, in advanced economies, with impacts on taxation, public finances and
public spending. These pressures on the labour market and fiscal policy pose
questions about traditional features of the welfare state in general and social
assistance in particular.
One set of political changes concerns the effect of rising affluence and changing life
styles on consumption patterns: it is contended that these undermine political
support for traditional universal programmes in favour of differentiated services.
Another school of theorists emphasises the effect of growing inequality and new
divisions in society on older patterns of solidarity and the impetus for the more
affluent to exit from state programmes. Either way. it is argued. political support
for inclusive patterns of social provision ebbs.
The particular pressures driving policy change in the area of social assistance can
be seen as falling into two groups: first those deriving from forces external to the
structure of benefit systems themselves, and secondly those resulting from internal
features of policy systems.
New demands from external. j areas
demography
Although changing demographic patterns particularly population ageing _ are
widely seen as posing a severe challenge for public pension systems, the so-called
'demographic crisis' actually impinges remarkably little on debates about the future
of social assistance. This is because in most OECD countries social assistance
spending on older people represents a declining share of an already small
proportion of total expenditure on social security. The incomes of older people in
many countries have increased, partly because of the maturation and improvement
of pension schemes. and in a number of countries even poorer older people are
protected from having claim assistance by the presence of minimum, non-
contributory citizens' pensions. It is the future viability of insurance pension
schemes themselves which most excites political debate in many countries of the
world.
Older people are more likely to be receiving assistance in the English-speaking
countries, where social assistance covers larger proportions of the population.
However, the population structures of Australia, New Zealand, the USA, Canada.
and Ireland are relatively youthful, whilst the UK has already effectively
undergone much of the ageing process. In Australia, there has been some increase
in the targeting of pensions. In New Zealand, a more concerted attempt to restrain
expenditure has been made, including the taxation of benefits and their de-linking
from earnings. Yet even here, demographic pressures do not in themselves appear
to be significant causes.
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Where ageing is impacting on social assistance, it is in the area of long-term care of
older people. which has been creating considerable difficulties in Austria, Germany
and the UK, in particular. This has led to policy responses such as the creation of
the new long-term care insurance in Germany, whil.e in the UK older people are
having to rely to a greater extent on their own private resources.
• changing family structures
Fundamental shifts have occurred in the role of women, which impact both on the
labour market and on family structure. The rise of divorce, lone parenthood and
other non-traditional family forms are examples of common trends, despite
significant structural differences across nations. More young people are living apart
from their families, which is likely to be one reason why increasing numbers of
assistance recipients in some countries are young, single people. One policy
response, in the UK. has been to reduce the availability of benefits to people under
18, unless in demonstrable hardship.
Ideas about family obligations and relationships more generally have also been
shifting. The rise of cohabitation. for example, has led some countries, such as the
Netherlands. to review its payment structure for people sharing households and to
shift the burden of proof of non-cohabitation more on to claimants. Cohabitation
in the Nordic countries, on the other hand, seems to be regarded as unproblematic
in relation to social assistance.
• labour market change
The importance of increasing unemployment - and particularly long-term
unemployment as a factor in increasing claims for social assistance has already
been emphasised. The changing nature of the labour market in all the industrialised
countries has also reduced opportunities for unskilled work, necessitating more
pro-active approaches to re-training and job creation. The concentration of long-
term unemployment amongst unskilled workers also leads to potential `social
exclusion', as the social and labour market difficulties of assistance recipients
multiply and deepen. Policy approaches to deal with these problems are considered
in more detail below.
• rising housing and fuel cost problems
Another significant factor driving the increase in costs of social assistance in some
countries is a rise in housing costs. In the UK, for example, expenditure on
Housing Benefit has risen faster than that on Income Support. not primarily
because the number of claimants has grown dramatically, but because it has been
Government policy to allow rents to rise closer to market levels. Similar pressures
have been experienced in a number of other countries.
Pressures f-om within the policy systems
A number of related pressures which impact on social assistance policy stem from
within the structure of social security systems themselves. These include:
• the breakdown of traditional social insurance coverage
Limits to duration of unemployment insurance mean that with longer-term
unemployment fewer people are covered. With higher youth unemployment, there
are more unemployed young people without entitlement to insurance benefits. This
is alleviated in some countries in particular, the Benelux countries _-._ by giving
education leavers special entitlement to short-term, non-contributory insurance
benefits. The growth in lone parenthood has also exposed gaps in insurance
coverage.
• pressures on public expenditure
Pressures on public expenditure on social programmes is common to all the
countries in the study to some degree. In most countries where social assistance
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represents only a minor expenditure. costs have not in themselves been a major
issue. but containment of expenditure on other insurance programmes is sometimes
leading to increased claiming of assistance benefits.
s tensions between central and local governments over costs
The individual country chapters in Volume Two, and Chapter Four in this volume.
show how in several of the countries with centralllocal cost-sharing for social
assistance there has been pressure on local authorities to assume greater
responsibility for expenditure. This has happened either through direct reductions
in central government subsidies, as in Canada from 1996 onwards. or by local
authorities being given cash-limited block funding for exceptional needs
expenditure. as in the Netherlands. Such changes may lead to greater geographical
variation or inequity, as some of the areas with the most difficulty financing
assistance are also those with the hi ghest numbers of claimants.
• public sector staffing
A related issue of costs applies to the staffing of public sector welfare agencies.
There is a general pressure to simplify systems that are complex and staff-.intensive,
as is often the case in social assistance. In the countries with a tradition of linking
social work intervention closely with cash assistance. however, such a pressure
results in tensions between a streamlined income maintenance role and the
traditional casework approach. Such tensions have been particularly evident in the
Nordic countries.
it was stated above that unemployment and labour market change were amongst
the factors driving policy on social assistance. We now consider in more detail the
different policy approaches to job search activity and work incentives.
Unemployment and work incentives
The pressures outlined above impinge on social assistance programmes in two main
ways. First, as we have seen, rising unemployment drives more people to claim
social assistance as their entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits (where
they exist) is exhausted. Secondly. concern has grown that assistance programmes
create disincentives to find work and leave welfare beneficiaries in an
'
unemployment trap'. This in turn exacerbates unemployment and boosts social
expenditure.
These concerns have stimulated the search for ways to make the welfare system
more compatible with the changing labour market, itself driven by shifts from an
industrial to some form of post-industrial employment pattern. Policies can be
loosely grouped into two familiar categories
- 'carrots' and `sticks'. ' Carrots`
include reducing the withdrawal rate of benefits as earnings rise, providing
education, trainin g and work experience programmes for jobless claimants, and
extending child care and other benefits to enable claimants with caring
responsibilities to combine these with paid work. `Sticks' include enhanced
monitoring of able-bodied claimants, stricter tests of job-search activity with
sanctions for non-compliance. time-limited benefits and straightforward reductions
in relative benefit levels.
It would appear from a reading of debates in the English-speaking world that this
set of issues has dominated discussions about the future of social assistance.
However, comparative study suggests a more variegated pattern. Let us consider
the tw o trends in turn. First. the pressure of rising long-term unemployment on
claimant numbers can certainly be observed in several countries. These include:
Canada. New Zealand, the UK. Ireland, France. Germany. Netherlands and
Belgium during the 1980s, and Sweden and Finland in the 1990s. However, not
surprisingly. we do not find such pressures in those countries with better job
records, including Australia, the USA. Luxembourg, Norway, Austria and Japan
(and Finland and Sweden before 1990). Nor is this the case in Denmark and
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The sticks have included more intensive requirements for job-search
activity in all countries in this group. In addition, Britain is to introduce
the new Jobseeker's Allowance, which further reduces the insurance
element of unemployment protection and enhances work seeking
requirements. Benefits and entitlements in the USA were reduced in 1981,
and training requirements have been extended again in the 1990s.
Following the recent mid-term elections, debate and policy proposals have
become more punitive. Republican congressional leaders have called for
time-limited benefits for AFDC claimants. yet without federally-funded
work programmes, and for public orphanages for those children whose
parents cannot support them ( The Economist, 19 November 1994).
Overall. the pattern of response to common economic pressures is complex. In
many respects the differences are to be expected, given national differences in
labour markets, social assistance regimes, political complexion and broader social
traditions. The prominence of work incentives in policy debates is certainly greater
in countries with greater reliance on social assistance. Yet even within this group,
differences are noticeable between the Australian selective welfare state and the
American public assistance state.
8.5 Evaluating national assistance regimes
Having observed patterns of debate and policy response to common political and
economic pressures, it is necessary to reflect on how the variety of social assistance
arrangements currently in operation across the OECD area can be evaluated on a
comparative basis. We do not attempt a full-scale evaluation here. This was not
within our original remit and could not be carried out within the time and
resources available. Nevertheless, some discussion is appropriate of the criteria
according to which national assistance programmes might be evaluated. There
appear to be three main options.
First, we might specify and use the actual objectives which inform the operation of
individual social assistance schemes in each country. There would be merit and
logic in comparing performance to policy objectives in this way, but it would reveal
very little. in so far as policy objectives are framed at all for social assistance, they
are often at a level of generality which would make it difficult to measure their
achievement. The greater the number of countries to be included in the framework.
the greater also will be the diversity of more specific objectives. Within each
country the relationship between social assistance and other elements of the social
protection package is mediated by the structure and form of government. the level
of unemployment, the demo graphic profile and the overall size of the economy.
The OECD countries satisfy certain basic criteria for admission to the
organisation, but beyond that member states vary in many significant respects. One
of the findings of the study is that social assistance programmes are too diverse for
such a relative measuring rod to yield comprehensible results.
Secondly, we might identify certain benchmark criteria, as used in one country, and
apply them to the schemes in the other countries. For example, we might turn to
the elaboration of general 'aims, priorities and objectives', as presented by the UK
Department of Social Security (1995). These include: that benefits should focus on
the most needy: that there should be minimum disincentive effects within the
benefit system: that the benefit system should be as simple as possible; that benefits
should adapt to the differing needs of people rather than the other way around;
that fraud and abuse should be kept to a minimum: that personal responsibility
should be encouraged". Two observations must be made at this stage. First. these
priorities and objectives are not criteria for the evaluation of either efficiency or
effectiveness. There is no indication of what methodological procedures or data
would be required to relate outcome to objectives systematically. Secondly, they are
4 These stategic priorities and objectives are presented in the context of the British social security
system and not just the social assistance component. However, and by definition, several may be
considered to apply to the objectives and operation of social assistance schemes.
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primarily internal objectives for the benefit system, without any broader view of
what the outcomes of social assistance are meant to be. Such a view, of course.
relates to the elaboration of wider policy and societal objectives: these are not
always made explicit, in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. However, in some
countries they are made more explicit. For example, the Australian government
proposes a set of specific objectives for social policy within the context of a wider
statement of objectives for social justice (equity, equality, access and participation).
Quebec, among the Canadian provinces, also specifies objectives for its social
assistance schemes.
Nonetheless, it would not be appropriate to derive evaluative standards from the
objectives of any one territory, whether the United Kingdom, Australia. Quebec or
anywhere else. There is no reason to suppose that even if valid criteria could be
identified they would be relevant elsewhere.
The third approach is to construct evaluative criteria from first principles. We are
not the first to seek benchmarks against which to measure social security schemes
( Meade, 1978; NCC, 1984). Schulte (1994) has also used criteria derived
particularly from a legal and administrative perspective to compare social
assistance schemes. In a recent comprehensive survey, Barr (1992) has identified
three categories of objectives for social institutions: efficiency, equity or supporting
living standards, and administrative feasibility. These dimensions, formal and
abstract, can be elaborated to suggest an evaluative framework for the comparative
assessment of social assistance.
Barr argues that efficiency has the following aspects:
® Macro efficiency: the proportion of GDP committed to total social
protection should avoid distortions which generate inflation.
® Micro efficiency: policy should ensure the efficient division of total welfare
state resources between the different programmes. This applies to the
division between social insurance and social assistance benefits.
B Incentives: the range of benefits should minimise adverse effects on labour
supply, employment, saving and other forms of behaviour. The number
and extent of 'traps' (savings, unemployment, poverty, disability) should
be minimised if not eliminated.
His second strategic aim. 'supporting living standards', is wide-ranging and can be
sub-divided into at least seven goals:
• Poverty relief: within any country or society no individual/family/house-
hold should fall below a prescribed minimum. However, the choice of
standard is normative. The effectiveness with which this objective is
achieved may be measured by the numbers falling below the prescribed
level (a simple head count); or by how much below these people fall (the
poverty gap) and for how long they are below the poverty line (life
cycle/duration).
• Protection of accustomed standards: no one should experience an
unexpected or dramatic fall in living standards. Social assistance should
provide protection and security against contingent events such as
unemployment, disability, death of a bread-winner - either on a continuing
or one-off basis. An indicator would be a replacement rate of income
before and after a given life event.
® Income smoothing: structures and policies should enable individuals to
reallocate their consumption over their lifetime. Assistance should be
available when needs are acute (for example when there are young
children, or costs associated with illness or disability).
• Vertical equity: the system should redistribute toward individuals or
families with lower incomes. By definition, social assistance payments are
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made to the poor and not the rich, and to that extent they automatically
contribute to this goal_ provided that their financing is progressive.
® Horizontal equity: benefits should take account of family size, age and
composition. This requires that appropriate equivalence scales are applied
to benefit rates to reflect differences in families' needs. Also, circumstances
such as the extra costs of disability or illness should be taken into account
when assessing the level of benefit.
® Dignity: policies and services should preserve individual dignity and should
not engender unnecessary stigma. The difficulty here is in defining di gnity
and stigma and finding relevant indicators.
® Social solidarity: social programmes should seek to promote cohesion and
to reduce exclusion. This objective too is fraught with definitional and
measurement difficulties.
Lastly, administrative feasibility entails the following two objectives:
® Simplicity: the system should be simple, easy to understand and as cheap
as possible to administer. Indicators might include administrative costs as
a proportion of benefit expenditure, error rates in adjudication. kiwis of
take-up or evidence of claimant satisfaction.
® Absence of abuse: there should be minimal fraud. Indicators might include
estimates of the extent of fraudulent activity and the numbers of
prosecutions.
It is apparent that these criteria are numerous, that each of them is complex and
that some are difficult to put into operation. This is especially so with respect to
social assistance programmes which serve people who are frequently vulnerable or
marginal within the societies in which they live. The above criteria would have to
be interpreted sensitively to reflect the experience of users. Nevertheless, Barr is list
suggests the sort of measuring rods which would need to be applied if a normative
comparison of social assistance systems is to be undertaken.
Yet this approach also faces practical and conceptual problems. First, even within
a national context there are frequently limits to what is analytically possible
because of data deficiency. The absence of detailed, accurate or recent data on the
funding of social assistance, the characteristics of claimants, the impact on labour
supply. the treatment of urgent or exceptional needs and the role and
responsibilities of non-governmental organisations are all areas where information
is patchy. Secondly. there is no fundamental agreement on basic definitions: social
security, let alone the more specific term social assistance, means different things in
different countries. Within and between countries there are differences over the
meaning and measurement of poverty, inequality and unemployment. Thirdly, even
if indicators for specified outcomes could be found, a further problem remains: the
causal relationship between objectives inputs. outputs and outcomes will remain
unclear. Indeed. such apparent relationships lie at the heart of important debates
about dependency, underclass and incentives. Fourthly. it could be argued that
these criteria give too little attention to the consequences of aspects of the
administrative structure of social assistance, including rights and discretion. or
local variation - aspects which Schulte (1994) emphasises.
8.6 Conclusion
This study has compared the structure and operations of arrangements for
providing minimum income protection in 24 countries of the OECD. The research
has found that as a form of social security, resource-tested social assistance is
becoming more important in nearly all the countries studied, both in terms of
expenditure and claimant numbers. There are wide differences in the form and
structure of provision, while there are also similarities. By comparing key
characteristics, it is possible to create a typology of social assistance regimes, which
in some respects is consonant with previous efforts. but in others cuts across them.
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While policy debates also vary, there are a number of issues which are salient in
most countries to varying degrees. particularly that of work incentives. Perhaps the
clearest distinctions, however. between different countries' arrangements for social
assistance, apart from the level of benefits provided, are whether they are organised
on a national or local basis, and whether needs are met through one general
inclusive scheme or on a cate gorical basis.
Such differences raise questions about how the performance of different schemes
can be evaluated comparatively. We have discussed some criteria for how schemes
might be judged, though it was not within our remit to carry out such an
evaluation in this study. Nonetheless, we hope that it provides the beginnings of an
empirical basis for that task to be attempted.
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Appendix Model Families Income Matrix
UNIVERSITY OF YORK
Social Policy Research Unit
INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
SCHEMES: THE SOCIAL ASSISTANCE INCOME MATRIX
Introduction
As part of our comparison of social assistance across countries. we wish to be able
to prepare quantitative estimates of the value of social assistance benefits for
individuals in specified circumstances. It is very important that these estimates are
prepared in exactly the same way in all countries, so that the final results can be
comparable. We would like you to fill in the attached data matrix, which will
enable us to make these comparisons.
If you have any questions about this data matrix, or if you require any further
explanation of the circumstances of individuals in the matrix, please contact Tony
Eardley by phone or fax.
In this matrix we want you to calculate the monthly disposable cash income of a
number of households that differ in size and composition. These are 'model ' or
hypothetical families. It is possible that the circumstances described in the matrix
are not realistic in your country, or that few people will actually be in the
circumstances described. Nevertheless, it is very important that you follow all the
assumptions that are spelt out or the results will not be comparable across
countries. If you would like to comment on the representativeness of these
assumptions. or if there are particular issues in your country that affect
interpretation of the results, please write them down on a separate page.
We are trying to understand the structure of social assistance in your country and
the relationship between social assistance and other forms of income. We are
therefore interested in how much social assistance would be received by individuals
and families in the specified circumstances. These calculations are to be made in
the first matrix, labelled 'Category 1'. We also wish to compare the situations of
people receiving social assistance with those of people with the same family
characteristics but different levels of income. We are interested therefore in two
further sets of calculations - `Cate gory 2 ' covers people who are not working but
who receive social insurance benefits, on the basis that they have contributed to
social insurance funds. `Category 3 ' covers a number of individuals and families
who are in full-time work as employees in manufacturing industry.
We are asking you about more than just cash social assistance, since our previous
research in this area found that there are other important forms of protection
available that can have a significant impact on the economic well-being of
households receiving social assistance benefits. You will see from the matrix tables
that we wish you to identify assistance with housing costs and with local taxes, the
i mpact of health care costs, and the impact of school costs and pre-school child
care costs, where relevant.
In some countries there may be no set rates of social assistance payments made to
certain family types, even in specified locations, either because there are no
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assistance benefits at all or because payments are discretionary. Where you would
expect no payment to be made at all you should indicate this. Where there is no set
rate, please enter an amount which you would realistically expect a family in the
specified circumstance to receive and explain in a note how you have arrived at
this fi gure.
For those countries which were part of the previous study of child support you will
see that substantial parts of the tables have already been filled in. The figures are
derived from the data obtained in that study. We would be grateful if you could
check the entries for accuracy. They may not always be precise because they have
been derived by reconverting rounded pounds sterling back into the original
currency, using purchasing power parities. Please let us know if they appear to be
more than five per cent out. For other countries some figures have been entered
which are derived from published international data. Again we would be grateful if
you would check the accuracy of this data.
General assumptions
The first point to note is that all incomes and benefits are those applying at May
1992. All components should be expressed in monthly terms in your own national
currency. If benefits are actually paid weekly, then the weekly rate should be
multiplied by 52 and then divided by 12. If the rate is fortnightly, multiply by 26
and then divide by 12, and so on. In the case of factors that are calculated on an
annual basis --- perhaps income tax -- we want you to calculate the tax payable as if
the monthly income were to be received for the whole tax year. This will involve
you `scaling down' the income tax schedule for your country to its monthly
equivalent. We understand that this may have some implications for persons
receiving social insurance benefits, which we will ask you to identify later.
Location
All cases in each category of the matrix should live in the same city or town. In
order to be able to synthesise this information with that acquired for some
countries in the earlier comparative study of child support, we need to keep the
same locations for these countries. Also, because of known regional or local
variation in benefits paid in some countries we have already specified certain areas
for the official questionnaire. For your country we therefore need the location to
be...................The housing costs and local taxes should reflect actual practice in this
city or town. The rates of social assistance should also be those actually applying
in this city or town.
Housing
All cases are assumed to be living in a rented dwelling. Please assume that this is
the most common form of renting in your chosen area, whether it is provided by a
public authority, a housing co-operative or a private landlord. Please assume that
all categories are renting the same type of dwelling, depending on the number of
people in the household. Please assume:
1. Single people are renting a one-bedroom dwelling.
2. Couples with no children or with one chilth and lone parents with one
child are renting two-bedroom dwellings.
3. Couples with two children are renting a three bedroom dwelling.
The gross rent payable should be the average rent for these types of dwellings in
the city or town chosen. Net rent should be after the receipt of any relevant
housing benefits or rent rebates.
Please note, we understand that these assumptions may be highly unrealistic in
your country. We need to have the same assumptions in all countries, however, so
that any housing benefits that exist are calculated on as similar a basis as is
possible. We will be presenting results before and after cases pay their housing
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costs, so that in those countries where these assumptions are unrealistic we will still
be able to compare incomes before housing costs. There is space at the end for you
to indicate your views on these assumptions.
Local taxes
Please calculate the gross local taxes that cases in the location you have chosen
would have to pay. If sewerage, garbage collection, water charges or other charges
are not included in these taxes. do not calculate them. What we want to find out
here is whether there are any programmes that reduce the impact of local taxes, so
also calculate the net local taxes that cases would have to pay after receiving these
benefits.
Health costs
For each case we want you to calculate how much the specified household would
have to pay for a standard package of health care. This package is as follows:
• each person (including children) in the household makes three visits to a
general practitioner in a year,
s each person is prescribed a standard antibiotic three times in each year,
o each person spends one week in hospital per year, and
® each person has one visit to a dentist in the year and has one tooth filled.
Once again we realise that this might not be particularly realistic. but it is
i mportant that you calculate the costs of a standard package. Please note that these
should be net charges. That is, calculate how much each case would pay and
subtract any reimbursement from the Government. If it is common in your country
for households to take out private health insurance, then the costs of these
premiums should be included in the charges. These should be added to the fees
paid by the household, and the reimbursement that the health insurance company
would provide should then be deducted.
After you have calculated the annual costs in this w please turn it into a
monthly charge, if any, in the matrix tables.
School costs (or benefits)
Please assume that the seven year old child is attending a public primary school
and the 14 year old attending a public secondary school. Assume that the families
live close to school and can walk, thus incurring no transport costs to school. Also
ignore any occasional small voluntary contributions to school funds or charges for
outings (such as going to a museum). Only include costs that parents must pay for
books or equipment, or any benefits that families may receive for school meals or
in terms of reduced costs for books. For the working lone parent with the pre-
school aged child only, the cost of the most common form of full-time. pre-school
child-care should also be included.
Thank you very much for supplying this information. Please send your replies to
SPRU by 31 May.
CATEGORY 1; RECIPIENTS OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE BENEFITS
The following cases are to be estimated. All individuals have no income apart from
the social assistance. child benefits, housing assistance, or non-contributory
minimum pension relevant to people in their circumstances. In many cases only one
form of social assistance would be applicable to any one family or individual. but
where they might be entitled to more than one at a time the figure entered in the
box labelled social assistance should represent the total payment available. If you
have to make a decision about which benefit the individual or family might be
receiving please add a note explaining your decision.
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Case 1 Single person, aged 17, living at home with parents
Case 2 Single person, aged 35, living alone
Case 3 Single person. aged 68, living alone
Case 4 Couple, no children. both aged 35
Case 5 Couple, no children, both aged 68
Case 6 Couple, both parents aged 35, with one child aged 2 years and 11 months
Case 7 Couple. both parents aged 35, with one child of 7 years
Case 8 Couple. both parents aged 35, with one child of 7 years and one child of
14 years
Case 9 Lone parent (female, separated or divorced, not widowed) aged 35. with
one child of 2 years and 11 months
Case 10 Lone parent (female, separated or divorced, not widowed) aged 35, with
one child of 7 years
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C,4 TEGOR 1: RECIPIENTS OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE BENEFITS
Case Case Case Case Case Case Case Case Case Case
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Social assistance
Child benefit
Income-tested child
benefit
Income tax
Employee social
security contributions
Employer social
security contributions
Gross rent
Net rent
Gross local taxes
Net local taxes
Health costs
School benefits costs
OTHER
CATEGORY 2: RECIPIENTS OF SOCIAL INSURANCE BENEFITS
The following cases are to be estimated. All individuals only have income from the
social insurance benefits relevant to people in their circumstances - they have no
earnings or unearned income. Cases 1 , 3, 5 and 6 are assumed to be unemployed
and receiving the appropriate unemployment insurance benefits. Cases 2 and 4 are
assumed to be receiving the insurance-based retirement pension appropriate to
their circumstances. In addition, if their social insurance benefits are below the
social assistance minimum, they receive supplementary social assistance benefits. if
relevant.
Case I Single person, aged 35. living alone, unemployed for the past three
months, when working he had received the average wages of male
workers in the manufacturing sector and had paid continuous
contributions
Case 2 Single person, aged 68, living alone, retired since 1989, when in work he
had received the average male manufacturing wa ge and had made full
contributions to the social insurance fund
Case 3 Couple, no children, both aged 35, the man has been unemployed for the
past three months, when working he had received the average wages of
male workers in the manufacturing sector and paid continuous
contributions, the wife has never worked
Case 4 Couple, no children, both aged 68, the man has been retired since 1989,
when in work he had received the average male manufacturing wage and
had made full contributions to the social insurance fund. the wife has
never worked
Case 5 Couple, with two children, both parents aged 35, one child of 7 years, one
child of 14 years, the man has been unemployed for the past three
months, when working he had received the average wages of male
workers in the manufacturing sector and had paid continuous
contributions, the wife has never worked
Case 6 Lone parent. aged 35, one child of 7 years, unemployed for the past three
months, when working she had received the average wages of (male)
workers in the manufacturing sector and paid continuous contributions
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CATEGORY  2: RECIPIENTS OF SOCIAL INSURANCE BENEFITS
Case Case Case Case Case Case
1 2 3 4 S 6
Social insurance
benefit
Social assistance
benefits
Child benefit
Income-tested child
benefit
Income tax
Employee social
security contributions
Employer social
security contributions
Gross rent
Net rent
Gross local taxes
Net local taxes
Health costs
School benefits costs
per child
OTHER
CATEGORY 3: WORKING INDIVIDUALS AND FAMILIES
Case I Single person, aged 35, living alone, receiving the average wages of male
workers in the manufacturing sector
Case 2 Couple, no children, both aged 35, husband receiving the average wages
of male workers in the manufacturing sector, wife not working
Case 3 Couple, with 1 child, both parents aged 35, child 2 years and 11 months,
husband receiving the average wages of male workers in the
manufacturing sector, wife not working
Case 4 Couple, with 1 child, both parents aged 35, one child of 7 years. husband
receiving the average wages of male workers in the manufacturing sector,
wife not working
Case 5 Couple, with 2 children, both parents aged 35, one child of 7 years, one
child of 14 years, husband receiving the average wages of male workers in
the manufacturing sector, wife not working
Case 6 Lone parent, aged 35, one child 2 years and 11 months, receiving the
average wages of (male) workers in the manufacturing sector
Case 7 Lone parent, aged 35, one child of 7 years, receiving the average wages of
( male) workers in the manufacturing sector
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CATEGORY 3: WORKING INDIVIDUALS AND FAMILIES
Case Case Case Case Case Case Case
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Gross earnings
Child benefit
Income-tested child benefit
Income tax
Employee social security
contributions
Employer social security
contributions
Gross rent
Net rent
Gross local taxes
Net local taxes
Health costs
School benefits/costs per child
OTHER
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Other Research Reports available:
No. Title ISBN Price
1. Thirty Families: Their living standards in unemployment 0 11 761683 4 £6.65
2. Disability household income & expenditure 0 11 761755 5 £5.65
3. Housing Benefit Reviews 0 11 761821 7 £16.50
4. Social Security & Community Care: The ease of the Invalid Care Allowance 0 11 761820 9 £9.70
5. The Attendance Allowance Medical Examination: Monitoring consumer views 0 11 761819 5 £5.50
6. Lone Parent Families in the UK 0 11 761868 3 £12.75
7. Incomes In and Out of Work 0 11 761910 8 £.17.20
8. Working the Social Fund 0 1 1 761952 3 £9.00
9. Evaluating the Social Fund 0 11 761953 1 £22.00
10. Benefits Agency National Customer Survey 1991 0 11 761956 6 £36.00
1I. Customer Perceptions of Resettlement Units 0 11 761976 0 £13.75
12. Survey of Admissions to London Resettlement Units 0 11 761977 9 £8.00
13. Researching the Disability Working Allowance Self Assessment Form 0 11 761834 9 £7.25
114. Child Support Unit National Client Survey 1992 0 11 762060 2 £30.00
15. Preparing for Council Tax Benefit 0 11 762061 0 £5.65
16. Contributions Agency Customer Satisfaction Survey 1992 0 11 762064 5 £18.00
17. Employers' Choice of Pension Schemes: report of a qualitative study 0 11 762073 4 £5.00
18. GPs and IVB: A qualitative study of the role of GPs in the award of Invalidity
Benefit 0 11 762077 7 £1.2.00
19. Invalidity Benefit: A Survey of Recipients 0 11 762087 4 £ 10.75
20. Invalidity Benefit: A Longitudinal Survey of New Recipients 0 11 762088 2 £19.95
21. Support for Children: A comparison of arrangements in fifteen countries 0 11 762089 0 £22.95
22. Pension Choices: A survey on personal pensions in comparison with other
pension options 0 11 762091 2 £18.95
23. Crossing National Frontiers 0 11 762131 5 £17.75
24. Statutory Sick Pay 0 11 762147 1 £23.75
25. Lone Parents and Work 0 I1 762148 x £12.95
26. The Effects of Benefit on Housing Decisions 0 11 762157 9 £18.50
27. Making a Claim for Disability Benefits 0 11 762162 5 £12.95
28. Contributions Agency Customer Satisfaction Survey 1993 0 11 762220 6 £20.00
29. Child Support Agency National Client Satisfaction 1993 0 11 762224 9 £33.00
30. Lone Mothers 0 11 762228 1 £16.75
31. Educating Employers 0 11 762249 4 £8.50
32. Employers and Family Credit 0 11 762272 9 £13.50
33. Direct Payments from Income Support 0 11 762290 7 £16.50
34. Incomes and Living Standards of Older People 0 11 762299 0 £24.95
35. Choosing Advice on Benefits 0 I1 762316 4 £13.95
36. First-time Customers 0 11 762317 2 £25.00
37 Contributions Agency Customer Satisfaction Survey 1994 0 11 762339 3 £21.00
38. Managing Money in Later Life 0 11 762 340 7 £22.00
39. Child Support Agency National Client Satisfaction 1994 0 11 762341 5 £35.00
40. Changes in Lone Parenthood 0 11 762349 0 £20.00
41. Evaluation of Disability Living Allowance and Attendance Allowance 0 11 762351 2 £40.00
42. War Pensions Agency Customer Satisfaction Survey 1994 0 11 762358 X £18.00
43. Paying for Rented Housing 0 11 762370 9 £19.00
44. Resettlement Agency Customer Satisfaction Survey 1994 0 11 762371 7 £16.00
Social Security Research Yearbook 1990-91 0 11 761747 4 £8.00
Social Security Research Yearbook 1991--92 0 11 761833 0 £12.00
Social Security Research Yearbook 1992 .... 93 0 11 762150 I £13.75
Social Security Research Yearbook 1993-94 0 11 762302 4 £16.50
Social Security Research Yearbook 1994-95 0 11 762362 8 £20.00
Further information regarding the content of the above may be obtained from:
Department of Social Security
Attn. Keith Watson
Social Research Branch
Analytical Services Division 5
10th Floor. Adelphi
1-11 John Adam Street
London WC2N 6HT
Telephone: 0171 962 8557
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